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Reach-Through Rights and the Patentability,
Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on
Drug Discovery Tools
by ALFRED C. SERVER, M.D., PH.D.,* NADER MOUSAVI,** AND
JANE M. LOVE, PH.D.***'

I.

Introduction

During the reign of Edward III of England (1327-1377 A.D.), the
protection of the sovereign was sought, in the form of the grant of a
royal patent, for the invention of a stone that could transform lead
into gold, the so-called "philosopher's stone." Presumably, the
stone's "inventors" did not possess the mythical object, but they could
describe it in terms of its function. In addition, they could describe
the utility of the invention and a method for identifying such a stone,
namely through the trial and error process of testing each candidate
stone for its ability to generate gold from lead. After a favorable
review by a royal commission, the King granted the requested patent
"apparently upon what we now regard as sound doctrine, that the
invention was new and useful., 2 The "inventors" thus obtained
monopoly rights to the philosopher's stone, despite the fact that they
did not possess it, and with such rights they could exact royalty

* Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP and an advisor to the
Hastings College of the Law LAB (Law and Bioscience) Project, fred.server@
wilmerhale.com.
**Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, nader.mousavi@
wilmerhale.com.
***Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, jane.love@
wilmerhale.com.
1. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Server, Mr. Mousavi and Dr. Love and
not of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. We thank Mr. Peter Singleton for
valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article.
2. McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct.CI. 396, 418 (1878) (citing John Coryton, THE

LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT 4 n.1 (London, H. Sweet, 1855)).
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payments for the stone's future use or sale, should it later be found by
a third party.
The royal patent granted for the philosopher's stone has been
described as the first known instance of patent protection. It may
also be the first example of a "reach-through" intellectual property
right, in that the so-called "inventor" of the philosopher's stone
received monopoly rights to an imagined, but yet-to-be-discovered,
object.4 Fast forward 650 years to the present, and inventors are still
seeking intellectual property protection that "reaches through" that
which is known to capture imagined, but undiscovered, inventions.
The philosopher's stone of our era, however, is no mythical object,
but the elusive blockbuster pharmaceutical product.
Today,
discovering a single molecule that can safely and effectively be used
to diagnose, treat or cure a human disease is worth more than gold. It
can improve and save lives, and in so doing, generate billions of
dollars in sales, sustain or create tens of thousands of jobs, and change
the fortunes of companies. The "critical path"' to these new drugs
requires access to biomedical research tools used in the initial stages
of drug development to identify new drug candidates-tools which we
will refer to in this Article as Discovery Tools. The inventors of these
Discovery Tools have sought, and in some cases successfully
obtained, ' patent rights that reach through their tools and claim drug
products that may, someday, be discovered by others using such tools.
Meanwhile, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that rely
on the use of such tools for their drug discovery efforts, and on the
revenues that result from the sale of the drug products that such
companies identify using such tools, have fiercely defended their
rights to their own drug discoveries. The result is a clash of
competing interests that has led to recurring disagreements between
Discovery Tool inventors and tool users as to the appropriate
compensation for use of these tools.
Any discussion of the appropriate compensation for the use of
Discovery Tools, however, implicates the longstanding debate
regarding the use of biomedical research tools, generally, in the drug
3. McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct.CI. 396, 418 (1878) (citing John Coryton, THE
LAW OF LETTERS-PATENT 4 n.1 (London, H. Sweet, 1855)).

4. Analogy adapted from that provided by Judge Larimer in Univ. of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle, 249 F. Supp. 2d 216,230 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
5. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH

PRODUCTS (March 2004).
6. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850.
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development process. At the heart of the debate is a basic policy
issue of how best to strike the balance between the rights and
interests of tool inventors, tool users and the public. Tool users,
among others, argue that the excessive protection of research
methods and tools, particularly reach-through protections, stifles
downstream drug development efforts to the detriment of the public.
The problem is amplified by the sheer number of research tools that
are typically employed in the drug development process, requiring the
tool user to obtain rights to, and to provide compensation for, the use
of each such tool. Tool inventors, on the other hand, argue that the
lack of reach-through rights and other protections undercuts their
incentive to innovate which, in turn, undermines the discovery and
development of critical methods and tools for finding the drugs of
tomorrow. In this Article, however, we note, but do not attempt to
resolve, the policy debate regarding the use of biomedical research
tools. Rather, we take the position that Discovery Tools constitute a
special class of research tool, both with respect to the value of their
use in the drug development process and their treatment under
current law. With respect to these high value research tools, we ask
the more limited question of how a Discovery Tool inventor can be
compensated for his or her contribution to the drug development
process within the existing legal framework? Specifically, we address
the following issues: (1) what is the scope of patent protection
available with respect to a Discovery Tool and can such protection
reach through to an as-yet undiscovered drug candidate (the
proverbial philosopher's stone) identified using such tool; (2) if patent
rights are available to the Discovery Tool inventor, at least with
respect to the use of the tool itself, are these rights enforceable
against unauthorized users; and (3) if use of the Discovery Tool
requires authorization from the tool inventor with a valid and
enforceable patent right, can compensation for such use be in the
form of a "reach-through" royalty, a sometimes controversial royalty
arrangement whereby the tool inventor obtains a royalty on the sale
of a drug product that is found using the Discovery Tool, but is not
covered by the tool inventor's patent rights? In addressing these
issues, we review recent and significant district court, Federal Circuit
and U.S. Supreme Court cases. The holdings in these cases apply not

7. In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) addressed the question of whether the inventor
of a drug discovery method could obtain patent protection for a claimed medical
treatment that required the use of a compound that was described only in terms of its
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only to Discovery Tool use, but to significant patent law issues, such
as the statutory requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
the scope of the statutory exemption to infringement (35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1)) and that of the common law experimental use exception,
and the current status of the doctrine of patent misuse.
Accordingly, in Part II of this Article we describe the class of
Discovery Tools, discuss the special contribution of these tools to the
drug development process, and provide background regarding the
policy debate on the patenting of research methods and tools
generally. In Part III we discuss the District Court and Federal
Circuit decisions in University of Rochester v. Searle," and define the
permissible scope of patent protection for Discovery Tools and their
use in the post-Rochester era. We conclude that a novel, nonobvious
Discovery Tool and its use can be the subject of valid patent claims,
but claims that reach through to cover as-yet undiscovered drug
products generally fail to meet the statutory requirements under 35
U.S.C. § 112 for written description and enablement. In Part IV we
argue that valid claims to Discovery Tools and their use are
enforceable against unauthorized users, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's broad reading in Merck v. Integra9 of the scope of the
statutory exemption to infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), and the
occasionally misapplied common law experimental use exception.
Finally, in Part V we discuss one form of compensation occasionally
sought by Discovery Tool inventors as consideration for the grant of a
license to the use of their patented tools: the "reach-through"
royalty, which is a royalty paid on the sale of a product that is
identified by a licensee using a patented Discovery Tool but is not
covered by the inventor's tool patent. In particular, we focus on the
legality of such a royalty obligation in a Discovery Tool patent license
agreement. In addition, we review judicial remedies in patent
infringement cases that are analogous to a negotiated contractual
function and where the means of finding such a compound required trial and error
experimentation using the patented discovery method. In 2002, a Delaware U.S. District
Court in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd,
340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003), addressed the related question of the legality of a royalty
obligation based on the sale of a drug product discovered by the licensee of a patented
discovery tool, where the product itself was not covered by the licensed patent. In 2005,
the United States Supreme Court, in Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005), rendered an
opinion which raised the question of whether any compensation is due the inventor of a
Discovery Tool for use of the tool by a third party in the identification of therapeutic
compounds that require approval by the Food and Drug Administration.
8. 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) aff'd, 358 F. 3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

9. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

25

reach-through royalty obligation, in that the remedies reach through
the infringed patent to burden products and activities of the infringer
that are not covered by the infringed patent. We conclude that reachthrough royalty arrangements between willing licensors and licensees
are permissible under applicable law, despite potential patent misuse
challenges, and represent a viable method by which the free market
for patented Discovery Tools may adequately reward the tool
inventor.

II. Discovery Tools
The term "research tool" encompasses a myriad of compositions,
apparatuses, and methods useful in experimental research. In the
context of biomedical research, the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") Working Group on Research Tools has broadly defined
"research tool" to "include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies,
reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry
libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning tools (such as
"PCR"), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases
and compute software.""' In this Article, however, we focus on the
Discovery Tool, whose utility is in the initial identification of a
putative drug candidate and, accordingly, whose contribution occurs
at an early stage of what the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") has described as the "critical path from laboratory concept
to commercial product."" As indicated in the Introduction, our focus
on Discovery Tools reflects our view that these tools are of particular
value in the drug development process and that a discussion of such
tools is an effective way to explore the issues that have arisen in
recent legal controversies regarding reach-through rights (i.e., the
legality of reach-through patent claims and of reach-through
royalties). Further, while this Part II is intended to provide the
necessary background for our legal analysis of reach-through rights in
the context of Discovery Tools, no discussion of research tools is
complete without an acknowledgement of the ongoing policy debate
regarding the appropriateness of patent protection of all types of

10. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH

TOOLS, at 3 (June 1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2008).
11. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
PRODUCTS, at ii (March 2004).
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research tools used in biomedical research. Accordingly, we conclude
this Part 11 with a brief discussion of some of the relevant policy
considerations.
A.

The Discovery Tool and Its Value in Drug Development

The nature and value of a Discovery Tool is best appreciated in
terms of its contribution along the critical path for medical product
development.
Today's mechanism-based approach to drug
development often begins with the identification, in the course of
basic research, of a putative drug target (e.g., a cell surface receptor
or an intracellular enzyme) that has a role in a disease-related
molecular pathway. The target is "validated" by a demonstration that
modulation of its activity generates effects that correlate with disease
in human beings. The validated target is then configured into an
assay that allows for high-throughput screening of a large number of
compounds in the search for "hits" that bind to the target and
appropriately modulate its activity. The pursuit of hits is intended to
select from a library of compounds not known to interact with the
validated target, through a process of trial and error, those
compounds that are worthy of further investigation. Once a hit is
identified, its specificity for the target of interest is assessed by
determining its ability to interact with other known drug and toxicity
targets. A hit that demonstrates acceptable affinity and specificity for
the drug target of interest, and appropriate modulation of such
target's activity, is then "optimized" through reiterative chemical
modification to generate a lead drug candidate. Such lead is then
subjected to preclinical testing necessary for the submission of an
application to a regulatory agency for use of the drug in human
clinical trials. A drug candidate that is accepted for use in human
beings undergoes a series of phased clinical trials in order to evaluate
the safety and effectiveness of the drug in the treatment of the
relevant disease indication. The final stage of the process for those
drugs that have demonstrated the requisite safety and effectiveness in
human beings is the submission of an application to the appropriate
regulatory authority for marketing approval and product launch.
The Discovery Tool that is the focus of this Article is an assay
that embodies a novel putative drug target, is configured for highthroughput screening of compound libraries and is intended for use in
the initial identification of hits. The value of such a tool can be
demonstrated by application of the two-dimensional research tool
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characterization suggested by Walsh et al. 12 According to these
authors, biomedical research tools can be distinguished in terms of
how essential or "foundational" for future innovation they are and
the degree to which they are "rival-in-use." A research tool is
essential or foundational if its use is critical for subsequent innovation
and the anticipated innovation is of considerable breadth, i.e., "[i]s
the research tool a key building block for follow-on research on a
specific approach to a specific disease, is the tool key to advance in a
broad therapeutic area, or might its application even cut across a
range of therapeutic and diagnostic domains?"' 3 A rival-in-use tool is
primarily used to develop innovations that will compete with
one another in the marketplace. For instance, in the case of a
receptor that is specific to a particular therapeutic approach to a
disease, if one firm finds a compound that blocks the receptor,
it undermines the ability of another [firm] to profit from its
compound that blocks the same receptor. 14
The Discovery Tool qualifies as valuable along both of the
dimensions described by Walsh et al. It is more than a so-called "butfor" tool in the causal chain leading from identified hit to marketed
drug product. Arguably, access to a Discovery Tool provides the
most efficient (in terms of effort expended and costs incurred)
method of identifying a drug to treat the medical indication with
which the validated drug target embodied in the tool is associated;
exclusive access to a novel Discovery Tool can provide the user with a
considerable competitive advantage in the marketplace. The special
contribution of a Discovery Tool to the drug development process
was recognized by Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit in his majority
opinion in Integra v. Merck.'5 In the words of Judge Rader, "[a]
research tool enabling the identification of a drug candidate during
high throughput screening... may supply more value to the ultimate
invention than a research tool used to confirm an already recognized
drug candidate's safety or efficacy.""6

12. John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-

BASED ECONOMY 285, 285-340 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
13. Id. at 332.
14. Id.
15. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

16. 331 F.3d at 871.
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The Controversy

Despite the potential value of access to a novel Discovery Tool,
many have expressed concerns with respect to the negative impact of
biomedical tool patents in general.
Heller and Eisenberg
characterized one such concern as "the tragedy of the anticommons"
in biomedical research.' 7 According to this view, the proliferation of
intellectual property rights covering biomedical research tools can
result in underutilization of these valuable resources.
The tragedy of the anticommons ... arise[s] when a user needs

access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful
product. Each upstream patent [that, for example, covers a
research tool useful for the discovery or development of a
product, but does not cover the product itself] allows its owner
to set up another tollbooth on the road to product
development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation."s
In the case of patented upstream research tools, the consequence
of an anticommons effect can be significant transaction costs in
collecting the necessary property rights for subsequent innovation,
the stacking of excessive royalty obligations to tool patent owners on
the products of downstream users, and, in some instances, cessation
of promising lines of biomedical research as a result of an inability to
identify and collect the fragments of intellectual property rights
necessary to proceed.
A second concern, described by Merges and Nelson, 9 results not
from a multiplicity of intellectual property rights, but from the grant
of a broad patent on a foundational innovation. Such a patent may
confer upon the holder the right to exclude downstream innovators
from an entire area of investigation. This restricted access problem,
resulting from the blocking power of broad patents, is particularly
relevant in light of the breadth of patent coverage frequently sought
by inventors of upstream foundational drug Discovery Tools.
These concerns are reflected in the policy of the NIH regarding
the appropriate protection and licensing of federally-funded tool

17. Michael A. Heller, and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
18. Id. at 699.
19. Robert P. Merges, and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990).
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inventions. While acknowledging the need for funding recipients to
capture the value of their tool inventions, certain licensing practices,
such as demand for reach-through royalties that can contribute to a
royalty stacking problem, are considered inconsistent with the NIH's
goal of wide dissemination of federally-funded tool inventions. 2 ' The
FDA has also expressed the view that the biomedical research tools
necessary to expedite the process of developing new medical products
should be publicly available.22 The position of the federal government
regarding patent protection of biomedical research tools is reflected
in the views expressed in its Amicus Brief submitted to the Supreme
Court in Merck v. Integra23 endorsing a broad reading of the scope of
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the so-called FDA exemption from
infringement, which protects the unauthorized use of patented
inventions where such use is reasonably related to the development
and submission of information to the FDA.24 In the view of the
20. Principles and Guidelinesfor Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, Federal
Register Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090 (Dec. 23, 1999).
21. Id. at 72,091 ("in the final policy, the NIH has left considerable discretion to
Recipients in determining how to achieve the principle of ensuring appropriate
distribution of NIH-funded tools. As articulated by the policy, imposing reach-through
royalty terms as a condition of use of a research tool is inconsistent with this principle.
When transferring an NIH-funded research tool to a for-profit entity that intends to use
the tool for its own internal purposes, Recipients are entitled to capture the value of their
invention. Arrangements such as execution or annual fees are an appropriate way for
Recipients to do so. Royalties on the sale of a final product that does not embody the
tool, or other reach-through rights directed to a final product that does not embody the
tool discourage use of tools and are not appropriate in these circumstances. Royalties on
the sale of final products are more appropriate to situations where a for-profit entity seeks
to commercialize the tool, e.g., by developing a marketable product or service, or
incorporating the tool into a marketable product or service.").
22. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH

& HUMAN SERVS.,
TO NEW MEDICAL

PRODUCTS, p 8 (March 2004) ("The goal of critical path research is to develop new,
publicly available scientific and technical tools-including assays, standards, computer
modeling techniques, biomarkers, and clinical trial endpoints-that make the
development process itself more efficient and effective and more likely to result in safe
products that benefit patients. Such tools will make it easier to identify earlier in the
process those products that do not hold promise, thus reducing time and resource
investments, and facilitating the process for development of medical products that hold
the most promise for patients.").
23. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, Merck v.
Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237).
24. In its Amicus Brief supporting the grant of a writ of certiorari, the government
decried the narrow reading of the exemption provided by the Federal Circuit in its review
of the case in Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). According to the
government, "the affected federal agencies, including FDA and NIH, believe that the
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government, a broad statutory exemption would lessen the impact of
tool patents on the drug development process to the benefit of the
public.
Not all who have reviewed the impact of patent protection of
research tools have found a significant reduction in innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry. Walsh et al.,2' using interviews and archival
data, have concluded that despite the increase in patents on research
tools, the discovery of novel drugs has not been significantly impeded.
According to the authors,
[n]otwithstanding concerns about the proliferation of IP on
research inputs and about the ability of rights holders to limit
access to upstream discoveries and promising research targets,
the problem was generally considered to be manageable. Firms
reported a variety of private strategies and institutional
responses that limited the adverse effects of the changing IP
landscape. Although negotiations over IP and licensing fees
surely affect access, and sometimes choice of projects, our
conclusion is that patents on research tools do not yet pose the
threat to research projects that they might given the number of
patents and diversity of owners.
The issue of the advisability of patent protection for biomedical
research tools remains the subject of considerable debate. As noted
in the Introduction, however, we make no attempt in this Article to
resolve this policy debate. Our focus is on the validity, enforceability
and exploitation, under current law, of patent rights covering
Discovery Tools. We conclude that the existing legal framework
allows for the enforcement of a valid patent claim to a Discovery Tool
and for the compensation of the Discovery Tool inventor in the form
of reach-through royalties. At least with respect to this type of highvalue, foundational, rival-in-use research tool, such compensation
from the tool user may adequately reflect the significant contribution

court of appeals' decision is likely to restrict significantly the development of new drugs.
Indeed, FDA is aware of anecdotal evidence that the court of appeals' decision is already

adversely affecting the legal advice given to drug researchers regarding their ability to use
patented inventions in new drug research." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
at

19,

Merck

v.

Integra,

545

U.S.

193

(2005)

(No.

03-1237),

available

at

http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/6invit/2003-1237.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
25. John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-

BASED ECONOMY 285, 285-340 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
26.

Id. at 322.
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that such a tool can make to drug discovery and, thereby, strike the
appropriate balance between the interests of key stakeholders in the
drug development process.
III. Patentability of Discovery Tools
As described in Part II above, a Discovery Tool can have an
essential role in the development of a pharmaceutical drug product
and, accordingly, has the potential for high value in the marketplace.
In this Part III of the Article, we discuss the type and scope of patent
protection available to a Discovery Tool inventor under U.S. patent
law. A patentability analysis of a Discovery Tool is undertaken,
which confirms that tools of this type are indeed patentable. In
addition, we focus on the legal reasoning underlying our conclusion
that patent claims that reach through a screening tool to an as-yetunidentified drug candidate (that could be found through the use of
such tool) are not patentable. Specifically, we conclude that patent
claims to an unidentified compound or claims to a therapeutic
method using that unidentified compound are invalid (1) where the
compound that is necessary to practice the treatment method is
described only in terms of its function, and (2) where the only means
described by the inventor in the patent application for finding such a
compound is the use of the inventor's Discovery Tool in a trial and
error process of searching for "hits," i.e., compounds that have the
desired functional activity.
University of Rochester v. Searle - An Exemplary Case

A.

The holdings of the District Court and the Federal Circuit in
University of Rochester v. Searle27 provide the basis for our analysis of
the type and scope of patent protection available to a Discovery Tool
inventor under U.S. patent law. The case involved an allegation by
the holder of a patent covering a Discovery Tool (the University of
Rochester) that various pharmaceutical company defendants (G.D.
Searle & Co., Inc., Monsanto Co., Pharmacia Corp., and Pfizer Inc.
("Searle")) infringed reach-through claims of the patent by the sale of
the defendant's drug products.
1.

Background

Scientists at the University of Rochester identified the separate
functions of two closely related enzymes, PGHS-1 and PHGS-2, and

27.

249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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developed a method for screening for drugs that selectively inhibit
one of the two enzymes. 2' The enzymes are involved in the
production of prostaglandins in the body. PGHS-1 is expressed in the
gastrointestinal tract, and the hormones produced there protect the
stomach lining. PGHS-2 produces prostaglandins responsible for
pain and inflammation. Traditional medicines such as aspirin and
ibuprofen inhibit both enzymes and result in reduced pain and
inflammation, along with undesirable side effects such as stomach
upset, irritation, ulcers, and bleeding. The Rochester scientists
developed a screening assay for use in the identification of
compounds that would selectively inhibit PGHS-2, and would not
affect the function of PGHS-1, thus avoiding the negative side effects
that result from the use of non-specific PGHS inhibitors. A drug that
comprised such a selective PGHS-2 inhibitor would reduce pain and
inflammation, not affect the stomach lining, and constitute a
considerable medical advance.
The university obtained two patents to cover its claimed
inventions. The first, U.S. Patent No. 5,837,479 (the '479 patent), was
directed to a screening method "for identifying a compound that
inhibits
prostaglandin
synthesis
catalyzed
by mammalian
prostaglandin H synthase-2 (PGHS-2)." Subsequently, Rochester
obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850 (the '850 patent) with claims
directed to therapeutic methods of treatment using compounds that
could be identified using the screen covered in the '479 patent. There
were no specific compounds disclosed in either of the Rochester
patents. The therapeutic method claims of the '850 patent were the
subject of the lawsuit in which the University of Rochester sued
Searle for patent infringement. These claims were directed to
methods of selectively inhibiting PGHS-2 activity by administering a
non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits activity of the
PGHS-2 gene product in a human host. 29 The defendants challenged
28. The PGHS abbreviation refers to prostaglandin H synthase enzyme (also known
as cyclooxygenase or Cox).
29. Representative Claim 6 of the '850 patent is as follows: "A method for selectively
inhibiting PGHS-2 activity in a human host, comprising administering a non-steroidal
compound that selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2 gene product in a human host in
need of such treatment, wherein the ability of the non-steroidal compound to selectively
inhibit the activity of the PGHS-2 gene product is determined by: a) contacting a
genetically engineered cell that expresses human PGHS-2, and not human PGHS-1, with
the compound for 30 minutes, and exposing the cell to a pre-determined amount of
arachidonic acid; b) contacting a genetically engineered cell that expresses human PGHS1, and not human PGHS-2, with the compound for 30 minutes, and exposing the cell to a
pre-determined amount of arachidonic acid; c) measuring the conversion of arachidonic

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

33

the validity of the Rochester patent by arguing that the claims were
not sufficiently described or enabled by the specification.
The district court in the Rochester case granted summary
judgment for Searle, holding that the treatment claims of the '850
patent were invalid as not in compliance with either the written
description or the enablement requirement for patentability, as set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112 1. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling. A request for an en banc rehearing was denied.
2.

"Reach-Through" Claims Distinguished

The claims included in the Rochester '479 patent were directed
to the use of a screening method for identifying a compound that
selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity, i.e., the use of a Discovery Tool.
Access to such a compound was not required to utilize the claimed
method since the method could be performed whether or not a
specific compound with the desired activity (i.e., the ability to
selectively inhibit the function of the PGHS-2 enzyme) was available.
In other words, the practice of the screening method of the Rochester
'479 patent was not dependent upon the successful use of the method
resulting in the identification of a selective PGHS-2 inhibitor; the
method could be practiced in the search for such a compound. In that
sense, the screening claim of the Rochester '479 patent did not
depend upon, nor reach through to, a yet-to-be made discovery.
In contrast, the therapeutic method claims of the Rochester '850
patent, which required administration of a yet-to-be discovered
selective PGHS-2 inhibitor, are classic reach-through claims. These
claims required the use of a compound that was described only by its
function (i.e., selectively inhibiting the activity of the PGHS-2
enzyme) and covered a treatment method that could not be practiced
without such a compound.3 Simply put, the reach-through claims of

acid to its prostaglandin metabolite; and d) comparing the amount of the converted
arachidonic acid converted by each cell exposed to the compound to the amount of the
arachidonic acid converted by control cells that were not exposed to the compound, so
that the compounds that inhibit PGHS-2 and not PGHS-I activity are identified." U.S.

Patent No. 6,048,850, col.71-72 (filed Jun. 7, 1995).
30. While the claims in the Rochester patent were method of treatment claims and
not claims to compounds, the cases on written description relied on by the district court in
Rochester (i.e., Fiers, Eli Lilly and Enzo) each addressed composition of matter claims.
The Rochester district court found this difference in the form of the claims irrelevant to its
holding, stating that "[v]irtually any compound claim could be transformed into a method
claim ...simply by means of wording the claim in terms of a method of using the
compound. With respect to the issue before the Court, then, this is little more than a
semantic distinction without a difference." 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the Rochester '850 patent went beyond what had actually been
discovered by researchers at the University of Rochester to cover a
method of treatment that was dependent upon the successful use, at
some point in the future, of Rochester's Discovery Tool.
3.

Patent Protection of Discovery Tools Under Rochester

For the purpose of our analysis, we have assumed that the
inventions claimed in both Rochester patents and the Discovery
Tools under consideration in this Article have met three of the four
statutory requirements for patentability under U.S. law, i.e. that the
claimed inventions are novel, not obvious, and useful.'
In the
discussion that follows, we review the requirements for written
description and enablement of a claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. §
112 1 1,2 the fourth statutory requirement for patentability. This last
requirement establishes the critical criteria for differentiating a valid
patent claim from an invalid reach-through claim. The question to be
answered is whether an "invention" that is the subject of a reachthrough claim can be adequately described by the content of the
patent, and whether, on the basis of the information contained in the
patent and what is known in the relevant field, one of ordinary skill in
such field would be enabled to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation. With the above qualifications as to our focus
in mind, we turn to the insights provided by Rochester regarding the
validity of patent claims relating to Discovery Tool invention.
The claims included in the Rochester '479 patent covering the
use of the University's Discovery Tool were not in dispute in
Rochester and, accordingly, there was no ruling on the validity of
those claims. However, both the district court and the Federal Circuit
in their Rochester decisions expressed the view that the screening
method claims were sufficiently described in the Rochester patents to
meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112
1. The district court
affirmatively noted that although "detail is lacking" in the description
of the compound to be administered in the method of treatment

31. The U.S. patent law requires that subject matter of a patent claim be novel (35
U.S.C. § 102 (2000)), be nonobvious in view of what would have been known at the time
of filing the patent application by one of ordinary skill in the relevant art (35 U.S.C. § 103
(2000)) and that the claimed subject matter be useful (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 requires that patent applications contain "a written

description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set

forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."
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claims in the '850 patent, "[t]he patent does describe how to conduct
assays 'for screening of drug actions on both [enzymes]."' 3
According to the Federal Circuit "[t]he only claims that appear to be
supported by the specification [of the '850 patent] are claims to assay34
methods, but those claims were already issued in the '479 patent. ,
Moreover, the Federal Circuit stated in a closing footnote that "[h]ere
the patentee has done no more than invent a search method, i.e., a
method of identifying a selective COX-2 inhibitor ... ,5 In our view,
the language of both the district court and the Federal Circuit in
Rochester supports the conclusion that a Discovery Tool inventor
would be entitled to claims directed to a novel, nonobvious, and
useful composition of matter that is a protein target, and to claims
directed to the use of that protein target in a novel, nonobvious, and
useful method for screening for drug candidates that would
specifically interact with that protein target. However, based on the
Rochester courts' interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112
1, a "reachthrough" compound claim or method of treatment claim (such as the
one of the Rochester '850 patent) would be held invalid for a failure
to meet the statutory requirements for written description and
enablement.3 ' A review of the reasoning of the Rochester courts
regarding such reach-through claims is presented in the following
sections.

33. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 232 (W.D.N.Y.
2003), aff'd, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
34. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 928.
35. Id. at 930 n.10.
36. Our conclusion regarding the validity of patent claims relating to Discovery Tool
inventions described in this Part III is consistent with that presented in a comparative
study of reach-through claims by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the European
Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office. (THE TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION.
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN SEARCH AND EXAMINATION: COMPARATIVE STUDY ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PRACTICES (TRILATERAL PROJECT B3B) (THE TRILATERAL
CO-OPERATION, 2001).
http://www.trilateral.net/projects/biotechnology/reach-through-

claims/). Each of these offices, based on the applicable law of their jurisdiction, assessed
the patentability of claims in a patent application that described a novel protein receptor
that was implicated in a disease state. Among the claims assessed were those to the novel
receptor, to screening methods for the isolation of compounds that modulate the activity
of the receptor, and reach-through claims directed to such compounds and to methods of
treatment that required the use of such compounds. All three of the offices concluded, as
we do here, that claims to the newly discovered and isolated receptor and claims to a
screening method using the receptor were patentable. However, in the absence of
working examples of compounds that modulate the activity of the receptor, the reachthrough claims were not valid for failure to meet the statutory requirements for
patentability (in the case of the U.S. analysis, the written description and enablement
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 1129 1).
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Reach-Through Claims and the Written Description Requirement

In assessing the patentability of the therapeutic method claims in
the Rochester '850 patent, the district court framed the question
before it as follows:
[t]he real issue here is simply whether a written description of a
claimed method of treatment is adequate where a compound
that is necessary to practice that method is described only in
terms of its function, and where the only means provided for
finding such a compound is essentially a trial-and-error
process.
The court relied on recent Federal Circuit precedent in
concluding that such a written description does not comply with the
requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 1."
In providing its interpretation of the written description
requirement, the district court in Rochester cited the Federal Circuit's
holding in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar39 for the proposition that a
patent application must describe every element of the claimed
invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at
the time of filing. The district court then reviewed the Federal
Circuit's holding in Regents of the University of Californiav. Eli Lilly

& Co." In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court
ruling that certain patent claims were invalid because the
specification did not provide an adequate written description of a
human DNA encoding insulin. The human sequence was not
disclosed, despite the constructive example explaining how to obtain
a cDNA encoding human insulin. The application only disclosed the
sequence for rat insulin DNA, which was not enough to adequately
describe the human DNA sequence. The court ruled that the
37. Univ. of Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
38. The opinions expressed in the Federal Circuit's decision to deny en banc review of
the Rochester case indicated disagreement among the circuit judges regarding whether the
written description validity requirement is new and whether it is good law. Judge Lourie,
who concurred in the decision, expressed the view of a number of the judges in stating that
"there is and always has been a separate written description requirement in the patent
law." Univ. of Rochester v Searle, 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Lourie, J.,
concurring). However, Judges Rader, Gajarsa and Linn, in their dissent, took the position
that the written description requirement was only created in 1997 in the Eli Lilly case, and,
in the words of Judge Rader, is a "new judge-made doctrine [that] has created enormous
confusion .... " Id. at 1308 (Rader, J., dissenting).
39. 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
40. 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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invention of a gene of one species, e.g., a rat, does not sufficiently
describe the gene of another species, e.g., a human. According to the
court in Eli Lilly, the written description requirement for
patentability is intended to ensure that an inventor describe his or her
invention in the patent application-and not be permitted to obtain
an exclusive right over an invention that has yet to be made.
The Rochester district court also cited the Federal Circuit's
holding in Fiers v. Revel.41 In that case, where the claims were
directed to a DNA sequence, the patent application failed to satisfy
the written description requirement because the specification did not
disclose the complete sequence.
Instead, the application only
disclosed a method for obtaining the DNA sequence. The court
stated that a description of DNA requires "a precise definition, such
as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties... ,,42
Claiming a DNA sequence that was not described, based on a
disclosure of a method for isolating the sequence,
was "... an attempt
43
to preempt the future before it has arrived.,
The district court in Rochester concluded its review of written
description jurisprudence by citing the Federal Circuit's holding in
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. , in which the Federal Circuit
adopted the standard set forth in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications
Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 "Written Description" Requirement
("Written Description Guidelines"). 4' According to the Written
Description Guidelines, the written description requirement can be
met by "show[ing] that an invention is complete by disclosure of
sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics," including,
inter alia, "functional characteristics when coupled with a known or
disclosed correlation between function and structure ..... ,4'The
Written Description Guidelines, though, do not prohibit patentability
without actual, physical production of the invention. An applicant
can show possession of the claimed invention by describing the
invention with all of its limitations using words, structures, figures,
41. 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
45. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112 [1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5,2001) ("Written Description

Guidelines"). The Guidelines are not binding, but may be given judicial notice to the
extent they do not conflict with the statute.
46. 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106.
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diagrams, and formulas. Possession may be shown in a variety of
ways including description of an actual reduction to practice, or by
showing that the invention was "ready for patenting" such as by the
disclosure of drawings or structural chemical formulas that show that
the invention was complete, or by describing distinguishing
identifying characteristics sufficient to show that the applicant was in
possession of the claimed invention. There are no bright lines that set
out what is and is not a sufficient written description. The Written
Description Guidelines make clear, however, that one cannot validly
claim a compound when disclosing only its function in the absence of
a known or disclosed structure-function correlation.4
After its review of the Federal Circuit's written description
requirement, the district court in Rochester then applied its

47. The assessment of the correlation is based on facts at the time of filing a patent
application. As science and technology advances, so will the understanding of how certain
characteristics correlate with structure. For example, antibodies possess a structure that
has been accepted by scientists and the courts to correlate with a function of binding to a
particular antigen. As noted in Enzo,
the PTO would find compliance with § 112, P 1, for a claim to an "isolated
antibody capable of binding to antigen X," notwithstanding the functional
definition of the antibody, in light of "the well defined structural characteristics
for the five classes of antibody, the functional characteristics of antibody binding,
and the fact that the antibody technology is well developed and mature."
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(internal citations omitted).
Thus, the possession of the antigen itself permits one of skill in the art to routinely
obtain an antibody to that antigen and, accordingly, a patent claim to the antibody in that
circumstance is valid. See Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding
that the characterization of an antibody by its binding affinity to an antigen in the
specification of a patent meets the statutory written description requirement if the antigen
is adequately characterized by its structure, formula, chemical name or physical properties

or by deposition of the antigen in a public depository.) But see In re Kenneth Alonso, No.
2008-1079 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2008) (A claim to a method for treating cancer by
administering a monoclonal antibody that binds to a neurofibrosarcoma cell, where only
one monoclonal antibody was disclosed, was found invalid because the scope of the genus
was found to vary substantially (there was shown to be considerable antigenic
heterogeneity of tumors both between patients and metastatic sites within a single patient)
and the single antibody disclosed was found to be insufficiently representative to provide
adequate written description support.).
With advances in computer modeling and the advent of reliable computer-based
screening of virtual small molecule libraries, the definition of routine experimentation in
the context of compound screening methods will evolve. Should rational drug design
replace trial and error screening in the search for small molecules that modulate drug
targets, the scope of valid claims in patent applications that describe and enable the use of
drug targets is likely to expand to include yet-to-be-identified small molecule modulators
of the targets.
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interpretation of that requirement to the facts before it. The court
acknowledged the significance of the discovery by the Rochester
scientists that a selective PGHS-2 inhibitor would constitute an
important advance in the treatment of pain and inflammation.
However, the therapeutic methods claimed in the '850 patent could
not be practiced without such a selective inhibitor and, in the opinion
of the court, the Rochester scientists neither isolated such an inhibitor
nor described "a process through which one skilled in the art would
be directly led to such a compound., 4' s The court's review of the '850
patent indicated that nowhere in the specification, "is there even any
suggestion that the inventors had identified so much as one
compound that would be suitable for use in practicing the claimed
invention. ,49 To the extent that any description of the required
inhibitor was provided, it was functional in nature and, in the absence
of a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure,
such a description failed to meet the requirements of the Written
Description Guidelines adopted by the Federal Circuit in Enzo."
Such failure to identify or adequately describe the required PGHS-2
inhibitor led the court to the following conclusion:
It means little to "invent" a method if one does not have
possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that
method. Without that substance, the claimed invention is more
theoretical than real; it is, as defendants argue, akin to
"inventing" a cure for cancer by utilizing a substance that
attacks and destroys cancer cells while leaving healthy cells
alone. Without possession of such a substance, such a "cure" is
illusory, and there is not meaningful possession of the method.

48.

Univ. of Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 228.

49.

Id. at 225.

50. Id. at 227 ("Union Oil and the other cases relied upon by plaintiff, such as In re
Herschler, 591 F.2d 693 (C.C.P.A. 1979), and In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349 (C.C.P.A.
1978), indicate, as this Court has recognized, that it is not always necessary to set forth
exact chemical formulas to satisfy § 112,
1, but they do not hold that a functional
description of a chemical compound is necessarily sufficient. Rather, these cases simply
reflect the fact that 'compliance with the written description requirement is essentially a
fact-based inquiry that will 'necessarily vary depending on the nature of the invention
claimed." Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563). In all of those
cases, however, the description was found to contain enough information to lead a person
skilled in the art to the claimed compound .... The '850 patent is completely lacking in

that respect."').
51.

Univ. of Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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The Rochester district court opinion also made clear that the
disclosure of a trial and error method for the identification of the
required PGHS-2 inhibitor is not sufficient to satisfy the written
description requirement. Such a method fails to "directly lead" to a
compound required for the practice of the therapeutic methods
claimed in the '850 patent. "Knowing the 'starting point' is not
enough; that is little more than a research plan. The patent describes
how to test compounds to determine whether they work, but it does
not set forth any procedure that will necessarily lead to discovery of
such a compound .... (Emphasis added.)
The district court in Rochester concluded that "without
possession, or at least knowledge, of such a compound, or of a
method to yield such a compound, the inventors could not have
possessed the claimed invention, i.e., a method of treatment using the
compound." ''
The court did not require that an exact chemical
structure be included in the patent application. Indeed, the court
stated that a patent need only "set forth enough detail to allow a
person of ordinary skill in the art to understand what is claimed and
to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed., 54 The
Rochester '850 patent, however, did not do that. In the words of the
court,
the patent does no more than describe the desired function of
the compound called for, and it contains no information by
which a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
that the inventors possessed the claimed invention. At best, it
simply indicates that one should run tests on a wide spectrum of
compounds in the hope that at least one of them will work.5'
On appeal of the Rochester case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that the '850 patent did not comply with the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 1. In the opinion
for the court, Judge Lourie wrote that it was
undisputed that the '850 patent [did] not disclose any
compounds that can be used in its claimed methods. The
claimed methods thus cannot be practiced based on the patent's
specification, even considering the knowledge of one skilled in

52. Id. at 229.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 227.
55.

Univ. of Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
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the art. No compounds that will perform the claimed method
[were] disclosed, nor has any evidence been shown that such a
compound was known.!" -

56. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 927.
57. The Federal Circuit in Rochester was clear that in the null case, i.e., where a
patent specification provides no examples of a compound necessary to practice the
claimed invention, the patentability requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 are not met.
But what of the Discovery Tool inventor who uses her tool to identify one or a small
number of compounds that modulate the novel target that is embodied in her tool and has
been linked to a human disease state? Can she then validly claim any compound that
modulates the target and a method of treatment using any such compound? The
Discovery Tool inventor would be attempting to support a broad genus with some number
of species, and the fact-specific question will be whether they are representative.
The Federal Circuit has recently addressed this species/genus issue in relation to the
written description requirement in Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541
F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Carnegie court held that, based on the facts in that case,
one species was not enough to support a broad genus. The court found Carnegie Mellon's
patent invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement. The claims were
directed to a recombinant plasmid containing a cloned gene isolated from a bacterial
source for expression of a polymerase. The patent disclosed E. coli as the bacterial source.
Carnegie Mellon had filed suit to enforce its patent against Roche in view of the Roche's
successful Taq polymerase product, which is isolated from another bacteria called
Thermus aquaticus. In Carnegie, the Federal Circuit agreed that the specification only
supported claims to E. coli bacterial sources, and not Taq. There was not a representative
number of species described to support a genus of any bacterial source.
The Federal Circuit in Carnegierelied upon Lilly and reiterated that "[a] description
of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number
of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a
recitation of structural features common to the members of the genus, which features
constitute a substantial portion of the genus." Id. at 1122 (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at
1569). Thus, reading the patent specification, a person of ordinary skill in the art must be
able to understand that a genus was invented, not just a species. Id. at 1124. As in
Rochester, the Carnegie court endorsed the Written Description Guidelines (see supra
note 45): "[W]e find [the Written Description Guidelines] to be an accurate description of
the law by the agency responsible for examining patent applications, and thus persuasive
authority .... " Id. Quoting from the Guidelines, the Court noted that "[s]atisfactory
disclosure of a 'representative number' depends on whether one of skill in the art would
recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary common attributes or
features of the elements possessed by the members of the genus in view of the species
disclosed. For inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written description of a genus
which embraces widely variant species cannot be achieved by disclosing only one species
within the genus." Id. Thus, in Carnegie, the Federal Circuit held that the disclosure of
one species did not support the breadth of a claim to a genus because a single species was
not a representative number. The narrow disclosure of the E. coli gene was not
representative of and did not support the genus. The Federal Circuit set out what is
needed to meet the written description requirement in another way: "To satisfy the
written description requirement in the case of a chemical or biotechnological genus, more
than a statement of the genus is normally required. One must show that one has
possession, as described in the application, of sufficient species to show that he or she
invented and disclosed the totality of the genus." Id. at 1126.

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do Noi DELEIE)

42

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:1

Furthermore, according the court, "the '850 patent does not
provide any guidance that would steer the skilled practitioner toward
compounds that can be used to carry out the claimed methods-an
essential element of every claim of that patent-and has not provided
evidence that any such compounds were otherwise within the
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time
....
At the conclusion of the Federal Circuit's written description
analysis of Rochester's '850 patent, Judge Lourie provided the
following observation in a closing footnote:
",

Although we have treated the issue in this case as one of written
description, as it was argued and decided below, underlying that
question is the fundamental issue whether Rochester actually
invented the subject matter it claimed in the '850 patent as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). As the Supreme Court has
cautioned, "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward
for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 16 L.Ed.2d 69, 86 S.Ct.
1033 (1966). Here the patentee has done no more than invent a
search method, i.e., a method of identifying a selective COX-2
inhibitor, much less did it invent, as claimed in the '850 patent, a
method of using any such compound to selectively inhibit COX2 in humans. Under these circumstances, it might appear that
In Carnegie, the court noted that "[w]hether the written description requirement is

satisfied is a fact-based inquiry that will depend on the nature of the claimed invention,
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 963, and the knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time an invention
is made and a patent application is filed." Id. at 1122. The Carnegie court stated "that
'what is needed to support generic claims to biological subject matter depends on a variety
of factors, such as the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of
the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, the predictability of the aspect at
issue, and other considerations appropriate to the subject matter."' Id. at 1126 (citing
Capon v. Eshhar,418 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Carnegie court recognized,

however, that the applicable "knowledge may change as time progresses." Id. at 1122.
There is a constant advance and increase of the knowledge base of any particular
technological or scientific field. Therefore, an assessment of the written description
requirement will need to be made against a backdrop of the changing state of the art, with
consideration of the maturity of the technology, and of the knowledge of a person of
ordinary skill in the art in that field. As is currently the case with antibodies, where
extensive knowledge in the public domain of the structure and function of these
biomolecules allows a party that has characterized a novel biomedical target to validly
claim a yet-to-be obtained antibody that binds to such target (see, supra note 47), advances
in x-ray crystallography, molecular modeling, and bioinformatics may eventually permit a
patent applicant who has characterized a novel target and who discloses in her patent
application only a limited number of (or even no) small molecule species that interact with
the target to validly claim a genus (i.e., all small molecules that interact with the target), in
compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 T 1.
58.

Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 929.
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the patentee also failed to satisfy the requirements of section
102 (f). 9
b. Reach-Through Claims and the Enablement Requirement
The Rochester district court considered the issue of enablement,
in addition to the written description requirement, in assessing the
therapeutic method claims in Rochester's '850 patent."' The court
began with a restatement of the enablement requirement for

patentability as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112

1.

Under the

enablement requirement, one of skill in the art, after reading the
patent specification and in view of what is already known from the
prior art literature, must be able to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without requiring undue experimentation."6 The
court cited Federal Circuit precedent in explaining the meaning of
"undue experimentation." In PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus.
Corp., the Federal Circuit stated that
[t]he test [for undue experimentation] is not merely
quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is
permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specification in
question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect
to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed to
enable the determination of how to practice a desired
embodiment of the invention claimed.
In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit identified the following
factors that may be considered in deciding whether the disclosure of a
patent would require "undue experimentation": (a) breadth of the
claims; (b) nature of the invention; (c) state of the prior art; (d)
relative skill of those in the art; (e) level of predictability in the art; (f)
amount of direction provided by the inventor; (g) existence of any
working examples; and (h) the quantity of experimentation needed to
make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure.64
The determination that "undue experimentation" is needed to make

59. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 930 n.10.
60. The Federal Circuit in Rochester, basing its affirmation of the district court's

decision on its written description analysis, did not review the lower court's holding
regarding enablement.
61. See, e.g.,
In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-04 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
62. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 217 USPQ 804, 807 (1982)).
63. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 737.
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and use the claimed invention is a fact-based analysis and requires the
careful weighing of multiple factors depending on the circumstances
of the particular case.6
Applying the enablement standard as developed in Federal
Circuit precedent, the Rochester district court ruled that the
therapeutic method claims of the '850 patent did not comply with the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 1. The court noted that
the '850 patent required trial and error to attempt to find a compound
that would selectively inhibit the PGHS-2 enzyme, a compound
essential to the practice of the patent's therapeutic method claims.
The '850 patent, however, lacked the necessary "reasonable detail...
to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the
invention., 6 The court concluded that the patent "provides precious
little guidance in the way of selecting a particular compound, or even
of narrowing the range of candidates in order to find a suitable
compound without the need for undue experimentation. ' 6, 1 In the
words of the court, "[a]t most, [the patent's] . . . description will
enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to attempt to discover how
to practice the claimed invention. 6 1 Such a description does not
satisfy the enablement standard of 35 U.S.C. § 112 1.
B.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the type and scope of patent protection available
to a Discovery Tool inventor under U.S. patent law yields the
following conclusion. An inventor who has identified a novel drug
target and described a screening method based on the target, but who
has yet to identify compounds that modulate the activity of the target,
may obtain valid claims to the target itself and to the screening
method (the essential aspects of the Discovery Tool). However, the
inventor will not be able to reach through to claim yet-to-bediscovered compounds that modulate the activity of the target (our
philosopher's stone) or methods of treating patients through the use
of such compounds.
Should the inventor intend to profit from his or her scientific
contribution by granting to a third party a right to use the Discovery
Tool for the purpose of identifying drug candidates, he or she must be
65. Id. at 736-37.
66. Univ. of Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citing Genentech v. Novo Nordisk, 108
F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

67. Id. at 233.
68. Id. at 235.
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able to enforce such rights against an unauthorized user of the
patented tool and to obtain compensation from an authorized user in
a form that does not constitute patent misuse. In Part IV of this
Article, we address the issue of patent enforcement in the context of
Discovery Tool use, reviewing recent case law relating to the
statutory FDA exemption under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and the
common law experimental use exception. In Part V, we discuss the
legality of reach-through royalties as a form of compensation of the
Discovery Tool inventor for an authorized third party's use of the
tool.
IV. Enforceability of Discovery Tool Patents
Given that patents may cover Discovery Tools and their use, we
turn our attention to whether and to what extent such patents are
enforceable against potential infringers. Enforcement of a patent
hinges upon its validity, and that is no different in the case of patents
on Discovery Tools. However, Discovery Tools patents have also
faced challenges in terms of enforcement based on both a statutory
exemption from infringement (35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)) directed to the
drug development process and the common law experimental use
exception to patent infringement liability.
In our view, while
triggering significant uncertainty and debate on the topic, neither of
these potential limitations ultimately undermines the enforceability of
Discovery Tool patents.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Merck v.
Integra,9 in which the breadth of the statutory exemption was
addressed, the impact of the Court's holding as applied to research
tools has been widely debated. In this Section, we analyze the
enforceability of patent claims covering Discovery Tools post-Merck,
while highlighting the key deficiencies and likely impact of the
decision as applied to such tools. We argue that, while Merck v.
Integra may have significant implications for the enforceability of
research tool patents generally, it does not undermine the
enforceability of patents on Discovery Tools. Moreover, we argue
that such patents are otherwise enforceable notwithstanding the socalled experimental use exception, which the Federal Circuit has
interpreted7 as very narrow in scope in its decision in Madey v. Duke
University. 1

69. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).

70. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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A.

Statutory Exemption From Infringement (35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1))
and Merck v. Integra

1.

Background: Roche v. Bolar

A United States patent confers on its holder the right to exclude
others during the term of the patent from making, using, selling,
offering to sell and importing within the United States those
inventions claimed in such patent. Nonetheless, as the Federal
Circuit has observed, "[i]t is well-established . . . that the
[unauthorized] use of a patented
invention, without either
7
manufacture or sale, is actionable.", 1
It was the strict application of this principle in the context of drug
development in Roche Productsv. Bolar Pharmaceuticalsthat laid the
foundation for the enactment of the statutory exemption in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1). In that case, Roche, a pharmaceutical company, owned
certain patents covering a chemical compound that was the active
ingredient in its successful brand name prescription sleeping pill
"Dalmane." Bolar, a generic pharmaceutical company and potential
competitor of Roche, was interested in marketing a generic version of
"Dalmane" upon the expiration of the Roche's relevant patents.
Bolar imported and began pre-market testing to obtain the data
necessary for the submission of a New Drug Application to the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"). Roche then sued Bolar for
patent infringement and won, overcoming Bolar's defense that its
activity was "experimental" since it was strictly limited to testing and
investigation needed to obtain FDA approval. The Federal Circuit
found that such activity, while potentially desirable as a policy matter,
constituted an unauthorized "use" infringing Roche's exclusive rights
under its patent that was not protected by any applicable exception
for experimental activity, and therefore constituted patent
infringement.
At least in part as a reaction to the Federal Circuit's decision in
Roche v. Bolar, 2 Congress enacted a statutory exception to patent
infringement as part of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term

71. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharms., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964);
Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 510 (Ct. Cl. 1967)) (noting that "the patentee does
not need to have any evidence of damage or lost sales to bring an infringement action").
72. The Supreme Court has noted that "[u]ndoubtedly the decision in Roche
promoted the proposal of [the exemption]; but whether that alone accounted for its
enactment is quite a different question." Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 670 n.3 (1990).
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Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
it shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the U.S. or import into the U.S. a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.
While this statute raises numerous interpretive issues, the
question raised by § 271(e)(1) for purposes of this Article is whether
that statutory safe harbor precludes the enforcement of a patent on a
Discovery Tool against an infringing party engaged in drug discovery
using that tool.
2.

The Landmark Case: Merck v. Integra

While there is no U.S. Supreme Court case that specifically
addresses this question, the Court's decision in Merck v. Integra, the
leading case on the interpretation of § 271(e)(1), offers significant
clues as to the likely answer. In that case, Integra owned certain
patents relating to Arg Gly Asp peptides (RGD peptides, in single
letter notation) that promote cell adhesion by interacting with certain
protein receptors on the cell surface, and that are therefore
potentially useful in promoting wound healing and biocompatibility
of prosthetic devices. A scientist at Scripps Research Institute
discovered that blocking those same receptors using the patented
peptide inhibits angiogenesis, the process of generating new blood
vessels, which might be useful in treating a variety of diseases,
including cancer. Merck entered into an agreement with Scripps to
fund experiments using the patented peptide to identify potential
drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis by interacting with
this receptor. Integra learned of this agreement and sued Merck for
patent infringement.
Merck responded that its activities were
protected by § 271(e)(1). The Federal Circuit disagreed on the basis
of its narrow reading of the scope of § 271(e)(1). According to the
court, "the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing
to supply information to the FDA, but only general biomedical
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.",74 As such, the
work fell outside of the safe harbor provided by § 271(e)(1), which
73. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
74. Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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was intended to allow' 7for only a "de minimis encroachment on the
rights of the patentee. , '
The Federal Circuit went on to note the dire consequence of a
broad reading of § 271(e)(1) with respect to the research tool
industry. In the words of Judge Rader, writing for the court:
[E]xpansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps Merck
activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of
patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.
After all,
patented tools often facilitate general research to identify
candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-related
experiments on those new drugs. Because the downstream
clinical testing for FDA approval falls within the safe harbor,
these patented tools would only supply some commercial
benefit to the inventor when applied to general research. Thus,
exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the
whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of
biotechnological inventions.76
The Federal Circuit concluded by stating that the safe harbor
under § 271(e)(1) "does not reach any exploratory research that may
rationally form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests,",77 and,
specifically, that exploratory drug discovery is not protected by §
271(e)(1). 7' By this interpretation, it was clear that the safe harbor
under § 271(e)(1) would not limit the rights of inventors of Discovery
Tools to enforce their tool patents against potential infringers.
Merck appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and in a
landmark ruling that has had a profound effect on the research tools
industry, the Court overruled the Federal Circuit in Merck v.
Integra.7' Finding for Merck, the Court adopted a construction of the
FDA exemption that considerably broadens its scope as compared to
the interpretation of the exemption provided by the Federal Circuit.
The Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit's view that the safe
harbor "does not globally embrace all experimental activity that at
some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
process."' Nonetheless, the Court significantly expanded the Federal
75. Id. at 867.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. It is axiomatic that a drug candidate need only to be discovered once, and once
discovered, the method of its discovery has made its most significant contribution.
79. Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
80. Id. at 205 (citing Integra, 331 F.3d at 867).
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Circuit's construction of § 271(e)(1), based on the following four
principles:
1. The exemption from infringement provided by § 271(e)(1) is
not limited to research conducted in clinical trials; use of
patented inventions in preclinical studies is exempted under
the statute provided that there is a reasonable basis to believe
that the experiment will produce the type of information
relevant to an FDA submission.
2. The preclinical studies that can be exempted under §
271(e)(1) are not limited to those that assess the safety of a
drug candidate, conducted in accordance with good
laboratory practices regulations. Exempted experiments may
be designed to assess a drug candidate's efficacy, mechanism
of action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics and they need
not be conducted in accordance with good laboratory
practices.
3.

The FDA exemption is not limited to experiments on drugs
that ultimately form the basis of an FDA submission. If this
were not the case, only the testing of a generic drug would
provide the certainty ex ante that the experiment would fall
within the ambit of § 271(e)(1), and the Supreme Court did
not read the statute so narrowly as to apply only to the study
of generics.

4. The FDA exemption is not limited to experiments that are
ultimately included in a submission to the FDA. According
to the Court, the scope of § 271(e)(1)'s exemption is
sufficiently broad to include studies that may not be
submitted to the FDA "as long as there is a reasonable basis
for believing that the experiments will produce 'the types of
information that are relevant to an IND or NDA." (citation
omitted).'
While the Court effectively broadened the Federal Circuit's
narrow interpretation of § 271(e)(1), its holding failed to provide
clear guidance as to whether the exemption applies to the
unauthorized use of a Discovery Tool. Specifically, the Court did not

81. Merck, 545 U.S. at 208.
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describe a bright line demarcating the upstream reach of the
exemption. Moreover, the opinion did not clearly articulate a test to
be used in distinguishing between the research activities on the
critical path for drug development that are exempted under the
statute and the discovery activities on the critical path that are outside
of the ambit of the exemption. As discussed below, a careful reading
of the Supreme Court's ruling provides some guidance as to the
upstream boundary of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). However, there remains
ambiguity as to the scope of the exemption.
In addition, the Court's decision in Merck v. Integra failed to
address the impact of the holding on the use of biomedical research
tools. The only reference by the Court to the research tool issue
appears in Footnote 7, as follows:
The Court of Appeals also suggested that a limited construction
of § 271(e)(1) is necessary to avoid depriving so-called
"research tools" of the complete value of their patents.
Respondents have never argued the RGD peptides were used
at Scripps as research tools, and it is apparent from the record
that they were not .... We therefore need not-and do notexpress a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1)
exempts from infringement the use of "research tools" in the
development of information for the regulatory process."'
This language is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, inaccurate. In
the Court's description of the allegedly infringing acts undertaken by
Scripps, they referenced one research project in which Scripps used
RGD peptides as "positive controls" against which to measure the
efficacy of organic mimetics." The use of the peptides in this capacity
is clearly use as a research tool. This was recognized by the majority
in the Federal Circuit decision and so it is surprising that the
Supreme Court failed to address the tool issue and, thereby, left
unanswered the obvious question of whether the principles
articulated in its holding regarding § 271(e)(1) apply to research tools.
82. Id. at 205.
83. Merck, 545 U.S. at 199 ("Scripps also conducted more basic research on organic
mimetics designed to block
integrins in a manner similar to the RGD peptides ... ; it
appears that Scripps used the RGD peptides in these tests as 'positive controls' against
which to measure the efficacy of the mimetics .... ").
84. In footnote 4 of the Federal Circuit's opinion, in Integra v. Merck, Judge Rader

stated the following: "the dissent asserts that Integra's patented RGD peptides are not
research tools, 'but simply new compositions having certain uses.' ... The dissent does not
explain why one of those 'certain uses' cannot embrace use of an RGD peptide as a
laboratory tool to facilitate the identification of a new therapeutic." 331 F.3d at 872 n.4.

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

51

Nonetheless, if we assume that the principles articulated by the
Court apply to research tools in the same way as they do to other
patented inventions, and we consider the language of the Merck
decision in light of the arguments made by Merck in its Petitioner's
Brief, we may shed a degree of light on the Court's intended scope of
the § 271(e)(1) exemption as applied to Discovery Tools. Two
statements in the Supreme Court ruling are particularly instructive
for this analysis. The Court indicated that the safe harbor would
protect activity "where a drug maker has a reasonable basis for
believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular
biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and
uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.
,,"5 The Court
also noted that the safe harbor does not protect "[b]asic scientific
research on a particular compound, performed without the intent to
develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound
will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to
induce .... "' In our opinion, these two statements, interpreted in the
context of the position expressed by Merck in its Petitioner's Brief,
provide support for the conclusion that the unauthorized use of a
Discovery Tool can fall outside of the ambit of § 271(e)(1).
Not even Merck argued that the use of Discovery Tools for highthroughput screening to identify potential "hits" falls within the scope
of exempted activity under § 271(e)(1). Rather, like the Court,
Merck acknowledged that there are upstream research activities that
are clearly beyond the protection of the exemption, such as where a
"university scientist conduct[s] basic research on the cause and
progression of a disease" or a "researcher who, having learned of a
plausible mechanism of a disease, screens compounds whose
structures are not known to be (or reasonably suspected of being)
likely to affect the disease, in the hopes of finding one that might do
so. 80 7
However, unlike the Court, Merck identifies a "critical
threshold" in the path of drug discovery at which point the exemption
applies. Specifically, Merck argued, that threshold is where "a
researcher endures the unpredictable and open-ended process of
screening untested structures and emerges with unmistakable
evidence that a particular structure shows promise, in a living body, in
85.

Merck, 545 U.S. at 207.

86.

Id. at 205-206.

87. Brief of Petitioner at 38-39, Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237),
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 162.
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treating a particular disease through a known mechanism.""8 It is only
after the researcher has crossed this critical threshold that the
exemption provided under § 271(e)(1) can apply to future
experiments undertaken to study the identified drug candidate.
The conclusion that emerges from our analysis of the Court's
decision in Merck v. Integra is that the screening of untested
structures, where there is no expectation that such structures will
likely affect the particular disease process that is under investigation
is not protected by § 271(e)(1) because such activity "is surely not

88.

Brief of Petitioner at 39; see also the following excerpt from the Brief at 37-40:

Extending the exemption beyond the clinical phase-to cover preclinical
research, or even a few steps before-is not tantamount to insulating all drug
research from the patent laws. The FDA graphically illustrated the point in a
recent white paper describing the phases of drug development: . . . As this
spectrum illustrates, the FDA exemption can "reach back down the chain of
experimentation to embrace" preclinical development, and even further back in
the "Critical Path" toward drug development-to efforts to optimize the design
of promising drug candidates-without embracing "all experimental activity that
at some point... may lead to an FDA approval process."
This spectrum manifests itself in the researcher's shifting orientation.
A
university scientist conducting basic research on the cause and progression of a
disease is unlikely to think of his experiments as directed at the FDA. Nor
would a researcher who, having learned of a plausible mechanism of a disease,
screens compounds whose structures are not known to be (or reasonably
suspected of being) likely to affect the disease, in the hopes of finding one that
might do so. These scientists might dream of some day discovering a blockbuster
drug, but they are under no delusion in those early years that the FDA is the
audience.
Everything changes when a researcher endures the unpredictable and openended process of screening untested structures and emerges with unmistakable
evidence that a particular structure shows promise, in a living body, in treating a
particular disease through a known mechanism. After that point, the researcher
may continue to optimize the drug candidate's structure, testing variations to
ascertain which shows the greatest promise with the fewest side effects or
complications. J.A. 358, 416-20. In fact, the FDA fully expects the scientist to
conduct such research on "related drugs," and to include the resulting
information in the IND application, if it sheds light on the lead candidate's
suitability. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5)(v); infra at 46. But from that juncture, every
experiment that bears on the relationship between the drug candidate or its
analogs and the target disease is reasonably viewed as pertinent to the FDA-at
least to the extent that the experiment relates to a topic that is of interest to the
FDA. While a drug innovator that has crossed this crucial threshold could never
be sure ex ante that a particular drug candidate will emerge as the candidate for
commercial development, or that a specific experiment will necessarily find its
way into an IND application, there can be no doubt that the prospect of
regulatory approval is very much in the picture ....
There is, in short, a world of difference between basic exploratory research or
screening of untested structures in test tubes and the drug optimization and
preclinical research, mostly on animals, that drug innovators conduct with a view
toward demonstrating (in an IND application to the FDA) that clinical trials are
justified ....
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'reasonably

related to the development and submission of
information' to the FDA . . ."" By contrast, research activities that
are downstream of this initial discovery effort may fall within the
reach of the FDA exemption. While the safe harbor provided by §
271(e)(1), as interpreted by the Court in Merck v. Integra, has been
applied in protecting the unauthorized use of selected biomedical
research tools from infringement claims, the exemption should not

89. Merck, 545 U.S. at 206.
90. In Classen v. Biogen Idec, Classen brought an action against a group of
biotechnology and pharmaceutical defendants alleging infringement of its patented
method for evaluating the safety of vaccine administration schedules used by the
defendants in evaluating their FDA-approved vaccines. 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md.
2005). The district court held that the defendants' infringing activities fell within the scope
of the § 271(e)(1) exemption, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra, 545
U.S. 193 (2005).
In so holding, the district court applied the exemption to the
unauthorized use of a patented method that was employed as a research tool to study the
defendants' products.
In Classen v King, Classen brought an action against a
pharmaceutical defendant alleging infringement of its patented method for identifying
new uses of existing drugs. 466 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2006). The district court held that
the defendant's "use of the patented process was reasonably related to the submission of
information under the FDCA and so is protected under § 271(e)(1)." Id. at 625. The
district court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra failed to
address the question of whether the use of a research tool was protected under §
271(e)(1), but concluded that "[a]lthough the Classen process could be considered a
"research tool" the Court finds extension of the safe harbor to cover the use of these tools
warranted by the language of Merck and a plain reading of the statute." Id.
Not surprisingly, on remand of the Integra and Merck case, the Federal Circuit, in
applying the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of § 271(e)(1), found that all of
the challenged actions of Scripps and Merck fell within the statutory exemption. Integra v.
Merck 496 F.3d 1334 (Fed Cir. 2007). The court focused on the fact that "[a]ll of the work
... at issue was done after the initial recognition at Scripps of the 'particular biological
process' whereby the RGD peptide blocks the cell surface receptors, and the recognition
of the 'particular physiological effect' of angiogenesis inhibition," i.e., all of the allegedly
infringing activities using the patented invention involved an identified drug candidate. Id.
at 1339. The court avoided the research tool question by noting that counsel for Integra,
in a letter to the panel, adopted the following position:
Integra agrees with Merck that this is not an appropriate case in which to make
new law on the issue of whether patent claims to research tools (however that
term may be defined) are excluded from the ambit of Section 271(e)(1). The
Supreme Court has ruled that this case does not raise that issue. Hence, its
resolution is outside the Supreme Court's mandate. Integra has never argued,
and does not now contend, that any of its claims at issue belong to a class of
patent claims outside the reach of that statutory exemption. Id. at 1348.
In a separate opinion in the case, however, Judge Rader objected to the court's
reliance on the Integra counsel's letter in refusing to address the "research tool
exception."
According to Judge Rader, "the Supreme Court [in Merck v. Integra]
extended the exemption back up the experimentation chain to include selection of
particular species for FDA approval out of a patented genus. The Supreme Court did not,
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however, extend the exemption to encompass any method or process or other research
tool that might be used in a pharmaceutical laboratory." Id. at 1349 (Rader, J., dissentingin-part and concurring-in-part). Judge Rader lamented that "[b]y treating ... research
tools the same as drugs potentially needing FDA clearance, this court's opinion poses a
danger to the entire research tool industry." Id.
Judge Rader's concern regarding the research tool industry appears to have
registered with the Federal Circuit panel that recently decided Proveris v. Innovasystems.
536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In that case, Proveris brought an action against Innova
alleging infringement of its patent claiming an apparatus and system for characterizing
aerosol sprays used in drug delivery devices. Innova's allegedly infringing device was not
subject to FDA approval, but was used as a research tool by Innova's customers in
generating data for FDA regulatory submissions. After determining that Innova's device
was covered by valid claims of the Proveris patent and that Innova's manufacture and sale

of the device infringed the patent, the court rejected Innova's claim that its activities were
exempted under § 271(e)(1). The court based its ruling on its interpretation of the phrase
"patented invention" in the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor statute. The court noted that a major
goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act, of which § 271(e)(1) and its companion patent term
extension provision, § 156, are a part, was "to eliminate two unintended distortions of the
effective patent term resulting from the premarket approval required for certain products
by the FDCA ... The first distortion was the reduction of effective patent life caused by
FDA premarket approval ... The second distortion was the de facto extension of effective
patent life at the end of the patent term, which also resulted from FDA premarket
approval requirements." Id. at 1260-61. According to the Federal Circuit panel, however,
the invention claimed in the Proveris patent (and embodied in the product manufactured
and sold without authorization by Innova) was not of the type that the Hatch-Waxman
Act was enacted to address
[b]ecause Proveris's patented product is not subject to a required FDCA
approval process, it is not eligible for the benefit of the patent term extension
afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 156(f). At the same time, because Innova's OSA device
also is not subject to a required FDCA approval process, it does not need the
safe harbor protection afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1).
Id. at 1265-66.
The court concluded that the research tool claimed in the Proveris patent and
manufactured and sold by Innova is not, for the purposes of § 271(e)(1), a "patented
invention," and, accordingly, Innova infringing activities could not be exempted under §
271 (e)(1). While the scope of the Proveris holding is currently the subject of considerable
debate, it appears that Judge Rader's "research tool exception" to the § 271(e)(1)
statutory exemption has been given new life, at least at the Federal Circuit.
The recent District Court and Federal Circuit decisions reviewed in this footnote that
relate to the applicability of the § 271 (e)(1) statutory exemption to research tool use are of
considerable significance for the tool industry. These cases do not, however, alter the
conclusion reached in Part IV of this Article regarding the enforceability of Discovery
Tool patents. Unlike the research tools at issue in the Classen cases, in Integra (if one
believes that the case involved research tool use) and in Proveris, which were used to
evaluate drug or device candidates that had already been identified, a Discovery Tool is
utilized for the identification of a drug candidate. According to our view of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of § 271(e)(1) in Merck v. Integra, the use of a
Discovery Tool is outside of the upstream reach of the FDA statutory exemption. Thus, it
need not fall within a "research tool exception" to the statute to preserve the Discovery
Tool inventor's right to enforce his or her patent on the tool against an unauthorized user.
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preclude enforcement of a Discovery Tool patent where such tool is
used in the high-throughput screening of a library of random
compounds as discussed in this Article.
B.

Common Law "Experimental Use" Exception

A second possible basis for arguing that a patent that claims the
use of a Discovery Tool is not enforceable against a potential
infringer is the so-called common law "experimental use" exception.
The exception was initially created in a decision handed down almost
200 years ago, but debate and, in some cases, confusion as to the
scope and application of the exception persist until today.91 As
If the recent cases discussed in this footnote have any impact on the issues addressed
in this Article, it is as follows. We have concluded that the unauthorized use of a patented
Discovery Tool is an infringement, outside of the ambit of § 271(e)(1), and that the
payment of reach-through royalties to the tool inventor is a legal and reasonable form of
compensation for the right to use the tool. However, in the absence of a research tool
exception to § 271(e)(1), many drug development research tools fall within the scope of
the § 271(e)(1) exemption and may be used in the development process without
authorization. This undermines the royalty stacking argument frequently raised by
research tool users concerned about the mounting royalty burden that could attach to the
sale of a pharmaceutical product that is discovered and developed through the use of
multiple third party patented research tools. As the number of third party research tools
that could be used legally without authorization increases, so too do the drug profits
available to share, in the form of reach-through royalties, with the licensor of a
foundational, rival-in-use Discovery Tool. If, on the other hand, § 271(e)(1) is read to
include a research tool exception, tool use in the course of drug discovery and
development will require authorization from, and compensation to, the tool inventor. In
that circumstance, the royalty stacking argument of tool users against reach-through
royalties on research tools carries more weight. This, however, is a policy argument
regarding the advisability of such reach-through royalties and does not speak to the
legality of this type of payment arrangement.
91. See Judge Newman's concurring-in -part, dissenting- in-part, opinion in Integra v.
Merck, 331 F.3d 860, 872-878 (Fed. Cir. 2003); also see Tom Saunders, Renting Space on
the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of Experimental Use Doctrines, 113 YALE
L. J. 261 (2003); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of Compromised Solution to the Problem
Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH L. J. 347 (2003-2004); Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the
Myth of Universities' Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 175 (2004);
Steven P. Caltrider and Paula Davis, The Experimental Use Defense: Post-Madey v. Duke
and Integra Life Sciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
1011 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption From United
States Patent Infringement Liability: Implicationsfor University and Non-Profit Research
and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Cristina Weschler, The Informal
Experimental Use Exceptions: University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536 (2004); Kevin Iles, A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of
Experimental Use Exemptions in Patent Law on Incentives to Innovate, 4 NORTHWESTERN
J. OF TECH. AND IP 61 (2005); Jennifer L. Owens, "Not Quite Dead Yet": The Near Fatal
Wounding of the Experimental Use Exception and its Impact on Public Universities, 3 J.
TELECOM AND HIGH TECH. L. 453 (2005); David G. Swell, Rescuing Science from the
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initially articulated by Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter, the
rationale for the experimental use exception is as follows: "[I]t could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who
constructed ...a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
produce its described effects., 92 By 1861, it was "well-settled ...that
an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement is
not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.",93 Since that time,
the experimental use exception has remained narrow, such that no
activity that is in keeping with the "legitimate business" of the
accused infringer qualifies for protection from patent infringement,
regardlessof whether such activity is commercial in nature.94
This narrow interpretation of this experimental use exception
was confirmed by the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke University,9'
in which the potential benefit of the defense to patent infringement
was denied to a private university in connection with the conduct of
basic laboratory research. In that case, Madey was a tenured research
professor at Stanford University where he managed an innovative
laser research program through which he obtained sole ownership of
two laser-related patents. Duke University recruited Madey from
Stanford to take a tenured position at Duke. Madey accepted the
position and then, for nearly a decade, managed a certain free
electron laser research lab at Duke. At that time, a dispute arose

Courts: An Appeal for Amending the Patent Code to Protect Academic Research in the
Wake of Madey v. Duke University, 93 GEO. L. J. 759 (2005); Harold C. Wegner, PostMerck Experimental Use and the "Safe Harbor",15 FED. CIR. BJ. 1 (2005).
92. 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
93. Poppenhausen v.Falke, 29 Fed. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1861) (No. 11,279).
94. In Pitcairn v. United States, the Court of Claims stated: "Tests, demonstrations,
and experiments... [which] are in keeping with the legitimate business of the ...[alleged
infringer]" are infringements for which the experimental use defense is not available. 547

F.2d 1106, 1125-1126 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also, Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (the Federal Circuit held that an alleged
infringer's use of a patented drug for the purpose of obtaining FDA approval did not fall

within the experimental use exception, since the "intended 'experimental' use is solely for
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry." Id. at 863); Embrex Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Federal Circuit held that an alleged infringer's use of a patented
invention in an effort to "design-around" it was not exempt under the experimental use
exception despite the contention that the challenged activities were scientific experiments

that did not result in the sale of products, since the activities were for commercial
purposes.).
95. 307 F.3d at 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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between Madey and Duke, and Duke removed him as director of the
lab. As a result, Madey resigned. When Duke continued to operate
some of the equipment in the lab, Madey sued Duke for infringement
of his two laser-related patents practiced by some of the equipment in
the lab. In response, Duke asserted the experimental use defense,
and the district court agreed on the basis that Duke's practice of the
inventions covered by the asserted patents was solely "for research,
academic, or experimental purposes," and "for experimental, nonprofit purposes only." The Federal Circuit reversed this holding,
finding that the district court applied an overly broad interpretation
of the very narrow experimental use exception. As indicated by the
Federal Circuit:
[O]ur precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in
keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business,
regardless of commercial implications ... In short, regardless
of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.
Moreover, the profit or non-profit status of the user is not
determinative.
Accordingly, in order to enjoy the benefits of the experimental
use exception, the accused infringer must derive virtually no practical
benefit from its unauthorized use, since any such benefit could serve
its "legitimate business" and therefore preclude the application of the
exception.
The narrow scope of the experimental use exception provides
little, if any, room for the unauthorized use of Discovery Tools, or
any biomedical research tools, for that matter. It is difficult to
imagine a realistic factual scenario where a scientist would use a
patented research tool for its intended purpose, e.g., identifying or
characterizing a drug candidate, without doing so in a manner that is
in furtherance of the legitimate business interests of that scientist or
his or her sponsoring entity or institution. Even in circumstances
where the scientist is using the patented tool solely in order to design
around the patented claims covering that tool, that is an infringing use

96. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
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which is actionable.
Further, the use need not be meaningful or
substantial to support a claim of infringement. As Judge Rader of the
Federal Circuit concluded in his concurring opinion in Embrex Inc. v.
Service EngineeringCorp., "[b]ecause the Patent Act confers the right
to preclude 'use', not 'substantial use', no room remains in the law for
a de minimis excuse."9 Quoting from a prior case addressing the
experimental use exception, he noted that "[d]amages for an
extremely small infringing use may be de minimis, but infringement is
not a question of degree."
While the narrow scope of the experimental use exception may
appear to be well-settled law, it has recently been revisited by Judge
Newman in her dissenting opinion in Integra v. Merck.... In that case,
Judge Newman argued that, with respect to the allegedly infringing
activities at issue, the experimental use exception was part of a
continuum with § 271(e)(1), such that § 271(e)(1) applied where the
experimental use exception ceased to do so. 0 ' This position, however,

97. In Embrex Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., Embrex had patented a method of
inoculating chicks against diseases while still in ovo. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In its
attempt to find a non-infringing method of inoculating chicks, consultants hired by Service
Engineering practiced Embrex's patented method. The Federal Circuit confirmed that no
experimental use defense was available, since the tests were performed for "expressly
commercial purposes." Id. at 1349. See also, Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.

1984) ("Bolar may intend to perform 'experiments,' but unlicensed experiments
conducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the experimenter's
business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his
patented invention . . . We cannot construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to
allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry
has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.").
98. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
99. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (quoting from Deuterium Corp. v. U.S., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d.
1636, 1642 (Ct. Cl. 1990)).
100. 331 F.3d 860, 872-878 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring-in-part,
dissenting-in-part).
101. Judge Newman described her position as follows:
[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from laboratory
experimentation to development of data for submission to the FDA, was either
exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by § 271(e)(1). It would be
strange to create an intervening kind of limbo, between exploratory research
subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is
infringed and the activity can be prohibited. That would defeat the purpose of
both exemptions; the law does not favor such an illogical outcome.
Integra, 331 F.3d at 877.
While Judge Newman's dissenting opinion in Integra v. Merck focused primarily on
the appropriate interpretation of the common law experimental use exception, she did
express disagreement with the majority's narrow interpretation of § 271(e)(1). She cited
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is inconsistent with the majority decision in Madey v. Duke and does
not stand up to scrutiny when analyzed in the context of the drug
development process. The purpose and scope of the two safe harbors
are entirely distinct. As discussed above, the experimental use
exception does not protect any activity that is in furtherance of a
potential infringer's legitimate business. On the other hand, §
271(e)(1) will not apply unless the allegedly infringing activities are
solely for uses reasonably related to the practical goal of submitting
information to the FDA.
If these exceptions were part of a
continuous spectrum, one would have to conclude that the activities
engaged in by Scripps/Merck that were outside of the scope of §
271(e)(1), yet protected under the experimental use exception, were
not in furtherance of Scripps' or Merck's legitimate business
interests-a clearly unsupportable premise.1 2
Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 US 661 (1990), as evidence of the Supreme Court's broader
construction of the statute. She concluded her opinion by stating that:
I do not attempt to resolve, for all technologies and circumstances, the
application of the research exception or the point at which research into
patented technology loses the immunity that the common law has always
provided. However, the basic research here performed was within the common
law research exemption, and the development shielded by § 271(e)(1) took up
where the research exemption left off. Thus the accused activities were either
exempt from or immune from infringement. Id. at 878.
102. Interestingly, as noted in Judge Newman's concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part
opinion in Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193, 200 (2004), the district court in the case
held that an early Scripps experiment was exempted from infringement liability on the
basis of the common law experimental use exception. This holding was never reviewed on
appeal either by the majority at the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court and is clearly
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's ruling in Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2002). In response to Judge Newman's focus in Integra on the experimental use exception,
Judge Rader speaking for the majority provided the following comment:
In her dissent, Judge Newman takes this opportunity to restate her
dissatisfaction with this court's decision in Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
64 USPQ2d 1737 (Fed.Cir.2002). However, the common law experimental use
exception is not before the court in the instant case. The issue before the jury
was whether the infringing pre-clinical experiments are immunized from liability
via the "FDA exemption," i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The district court did not
instruct the jury on the common law research exemption with respect to the
Merck's infringing activities. On appeal, Merck does not contend that the
common law research exemption should apply to any of the infringing activities
evaluated by the jury. Neither party has briefed this issue to this court.
Moreover, during oral arguments, counsel for Merck expressly stated that the
common law research exemption is not relevant to its appeal. Judge Newman's
dissent, however, does not mention that the Patent Act does not include the
word "experimental," let alone an experimental use exemption from
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). Nor does Judge Newman's dissent
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Judge Newman's objection to the majority's infringement
holding in Integra v. Merck was critically dependent upon her view
that none of the uses by Scripps and Merck of the patented peptides
was a use as a research tool. In her opinion, "[t]he RGD-containing
peptides of the Integra patents are not a 'tool' used in research, but
simply new compositions having certain biological properties.""" As
indicated above, this position was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Merck v. Integra, although both the Federal Circuit majority in
Integra v. Merck and the authors of this Article find this
interpretation inconsistent with the facts of the case.114 Judge
Newman concluded that each research use of the patented peptides
by Scripps and Merck was intended to study the peptides, and,
therefore, was immunized from an infringement claim under the
common law experimental use exception, as she interpreted it.
Rejecting the "sweeping dictum" in the majority opinion in Madey v.
Duke, Judge Newman expressed the view that a research
investigation into a patented thing has always been permitted under
the experimental use exception and the fact that such investigation is
in furtherance of a legitimate business interest does not deprive the
unauthorized user of the benefit of the exception."" What the
experimental use exception does not protect is a research
investigation using a patented thing as it is intended to be used. This,
according to Judge Newman, is what occurred in Madey v. Duke, and
is the reason for her agreement with the holding in that case.""
Interestingly, had Judge Newman been convinced that the RGD
peptides were used by Scripps and Merck as research tools, she would
not have found the experimental use exception available to shield
certain activities of the defendants from an infringement claim. In
note that the judge-made doctrine is rooted in the notions of de minimis
infringement better addressed by limited damages.

Embrex v. Service Eng'g

Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 55 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed.Cir.2000) (Rader, J., concurring);
see also Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 CI.Ct. 624, 631, 14 USPQ2d 1636,

1642 (CI.Ct.1990) ("This court questions whether any infringing use can be de
minimis. Damages for an extremely small infringing use may be de minimis, but
infringement is not a question of degree.").

Integra, 331 F.3d at 864 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
103. Integra, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., concurring-in -part, dissenting-in-part).
104. Note that on remand of the Integra case after the Supreme Court's decision in

Merck v. Integra, the Federal Circuit majority took the position that research tool use was
not at issue in the case. Integra v. Merck, 496 F.3d 1334, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2007); supra
note 90.
105. Integra, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., concurring-in -part, dissenting-in-part).

106. Id.

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

61

her own words, "[u]se of an existing 1tool
in one's research is quite
7
different from study of the tool itself.

0

Unlike the RGD peptides in the Merck case, which could be
studied as candidate products or used as tools to characterize other
compounds, the Discovery Tool discussed in this Article is used only
as a research tool. Whether one adopts the Federal Circuit's
"legitimate business" test or some version of Judge Newman's "use as
intended" test to exclude the application of the common law
experimental use exception, the use of a Discovery Tool falls outside
of the ambit of this exemption. Accordingly, just as we concluded
with respect to § 271(e)(1), the common law experimental use
exception does not compromise the ability of owners of Discovery
Tool patents to enforce claims of infringement against unauthorized
users.
V.

Reaping Value From Discovery Tool Patents:
The Legality of Reach-Through Royalties

In Part III of this Article, we established that, post-Rochester, a
Discovery Tool inventor is unlikely to obtain valid patent claims that
reach through the tool to claim yet-to-be-discovered drugs that may
be found using that tool. Rather, the patent rights of the tool
inventor will generally be limited to the tool itself. Nonetheless,
Discovery Tool inventors may still reap potentially significant
economic value from their research tool inventions. As previously
discussed, U.S. patent law allows claims that cover the Discovery
Tools and their uses, and the patents covering such tools are not
subject to any categorical exceptions to enforceability. Further, if the
tool is in the critical path to the development of a drug in a market of
any significance, as would certainly be the case for some Discovery
Tools, the demand is likely to be equally significant. On this basis, we
conclude that the inventor of a Discovery Tool is afforded adequate
opportunity to reap a financial return commensurate with the value
generated by that tool, even in the absence of reach-through patent
claims.
In this Part V, we discuss one form of compensation occasionally
sought by a Discovery Tool inventor as consideration for the grant of
a license under the inventor's patent rights covering the tool: a reach-

107. Id.
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through royalty."" We begin with a brief explanation of this type of
royalty arrangement and note some of the possible advantages and
disadvantages associated with its use in a license agreement. We then
assess the legality of reach-through royalties with a particular focus
on the potential for patent misuse in the licensing of the Discovery
Tool patent rights. In addition, we review judicial remedies in patent
infringement cases that are analogous to a negotiated contractual
reach-through royalty obligation, in that these remedies reach
through the infringed patent to burden products and activities of the
infringer that are not covered by the infringed patent. We conclude
that a reach-through royalty arrangement between a willing licensor
and a willing licensee is permissible under applicable law and
represents a viable method by which the free market for patented
Discovery Tools may adequately reward the tool inventor.
A.

Reach-Through Royalties

In a typical patent license, a royalty is consideration paid on the
sales of a product that is covered by the licensed patent, where the
royalty is usually a percentage of such sales. °9 In the case of the
license of a Discovery Tool patent, however, the royalty is
occasionally a percentage of the sales of the drug product found using
the patented tool. This is a so-called "reach-through" royalty, since
the royalty is not based on sales of the patented tool, but rather,
"reaches-through" to the sales of the drug product found by the
licensee using the tool, notwithstanding the fact that the Discovery
Tool patent does not cover such drug sales.
Unlike a reach-through claim, which a Discovery Tool patentee
would be able to assert against any infringing party who uses her tool
without authorization, a reach-through royalty obligation would only
apply where a licensee specifically agreed to its terms. Where so
agreed, the reach-through royalty would provide a tool licensor with a
direct contractual claim to a percentage of potentially significant
revenues generated from drug sales. The ability to share in that
upside may be important to the prospects, research programs, and
financial viability of the tool inventor. In other words, a reach108. Alternative compensation arrangements for the license of rights to a Discovery
Tool include a fixed fee determined at the time the license is granted, usage-based pricing
that is keyed to the frequency of use of the tool by the licensee, and milestone payments
based on the developmental and commercial success of a drug product discovered through
the use of the tool.
109. See Brian G. Brunsvold and Dennis P. O'Reilley, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE
AGREEMENTS (Fifth Edition 2004), p. 113.
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through royalty may be a method of accommodating the limits in the
patent system, while preserving some degree of the incentive for
innovation with respect to those research tools that are essential to
the drug development process.
Moreover, some commentators have argued that reach-through
royalties also provide a fair and accurate method of valuing a license
of a Discover Tool patent."" Consider the variety of possible
compensation arrangements for licensing such a research tool. In the
simplest case, the tool licensor and licensee could, at the time the
license is granted, agree upon a fixed price, payable as a lump sum or
in installments. That price would represent the parties' assessment of
the risk-adjusted net present value of the right to practice under the
research tool patent. Alternatively, pricing may vary based on
mutually agreed upon factors, including the amount or character of
the use (e.g., number of assays) or the size of the research and
development budget of the applicable licensee. In each of these
cases, the price is fixed ex ante based on the anticipated value of the
research tool (i.e., the likelihood of identifying a drug candidate and
potential market value of that drug), rather than the actual value
generated by its use (i.e., whether such a drug candidate is in fact
identified, developed and ultimately sold and the actual amount of
those sales). Given the highly uncertain nature of drug discovery,
pricing based on the anticipated value of a Discovery Tool may result
in an inaccurate measurement of realized value, and may even be

110. See Thomas J. Kowalski and Christian M. Smolizza, Reach- Through Licensing: A
US Perspective, 6 J. COM. BIOTECH. 349 (2000) ("Despite criticism, reach-through
licensing creates a license the value of which can be measured, and thus solves the
problem of valuing basic research per se. Indeed, the value of basic research may not be
known at the time of the license and is usually not known until after production of the end
product. Thus, reach-through licensing may be necessary to compensate for use of a basic
research invention ...." (footnote deleted)); Janice M. Meuller, No "Dilettante Affair":
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical
Research Tools," 76 WASH. L.R. 1, 61-62 (2001) ("Reach-through royalty payments
continuing beyond the expiration date of an underlying research tool patent more
accurately recognize the value of the patented research tool, which cannot be definitively
established during the enforceable life of the patent.... The premise underlying reachthrough royalties is that the true value of the patented research tool will be determined by
the ultimate marketplace success of the new product developed through use of the tool.");
See also Louis Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patent or Copyright Expiration
on License Agreements, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y, 297, 303 (1982), discussing post-expiration
patent royalties ("But the trouble with any flat royalty arrangement is that it measures
that patentee's reward by the level of success which the parties expect the licensed product
to achieve, and that may turn out to be much greater or much less than is actually achieved
in the future. The great virtue of a royalty based on sales, as compared to a flat royalty, is
that it automatically expands or contracts as the future unfolds.").
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wildly inconsistent with such realized value. A reach-through royalty,
by contrast, values the use of the tool based on its actual success in
generating drug sales."' If the tool user does not identify any drug
candidates using the tool, or if a drug candidate is identified that
never reaches the market, then no reach-through royalty would be
payable. On the other hand, if a blockbuster drug is discovered,
reach-through royalties could be significant. In either case, the
royalty is arguably proportionate to the value it generates.
As noted in Part II, however, "reach-through" royalties have
generated significant controversy as to whether they are an
appropriate compensation arrangement. The leading concern is that
such royalties constitute an excessive economic burden on the
downstream development and commercialization of drug candidates
discovered using a patented Discovery Tool and, thereby, undermine
incentives for developing drugs. The NIH has adopted this view and
issued a non-binding, but influential, policy statement that generally
discourages the use of reach-through royalties in the licensing of
federally funded research tool inventions,
in order to minimize
112
potential obstacles to drug development.
Thus, the debate continues with respect to the advisability of
reach-through royalties in the context of licensing a Discovery Tool
patent. Nonetheless, our purpose is not to advocate the use of this
type of royalty arrangement, nor to suggest that such royalties are

111. See Thomas J. Kowalski and Christian M. Smolizza, Reach-Through Licensing: A
US Perspective,6 J. COM. BIOTECH., 349, 352 (2000) ("Consider... that in reach-through
licensing the value of the enabling technology is based on the end product. If there is
never an end produ ct, there is no reach-through royalty. Similarly, if the end product
docs not enjoy an cnormou market, the reach-throuh royalty may not amount to sums..
[that in our hypothetical, where the research tool user discovers a blockbuster drug, are
in the range f tens to hndreds of inillions of dollars] ....
[T]he measure of value of a
basic rcsearch tool is not merely the costs for developing and patenting the hasic res;arch
tool; but rather the extent to which the basic research too1 enables the development of
further products and the value of those products; narmey, miarket-place forces.... [T]he
developer of the basic rescarch tool developed the res;arch tool and it solved problems
the dru g developer either could not afford o did not find profitable to solve, or did not
timely solve first, and the research tool-the enablig techno1ogy-played a pivotal role in
developing the end product. Simply, without the basic rcsearch tool, the cnd product
would not have been produ ced ...
The value of the patented research too1 is thus
reflected in the value of the end product. Therefore, a reach-through royalty may not
neccssarily be inequitable or exc< sivc compensation, des;pitc the fact that at first sight it
may seem shocking to possibly recei e.. [tens to hundreds of millhons of dollars] for an
investment in research and patentg tht inay have been only several hundred thou sand
to a few million dollars. But, such returns are contingent on the cnd product being a
blockbtstei ....

).

112. See Footnotes 19 and 20.
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appropriate in any specific case. Rather, it is to determine whether
reach-through royalties are a lawful option that willing tool licensors
and licensees may, under circumstances that they deem to be
appropriate, elect to employ.
Some have argued that reach-through royalties are not legal
under applicable patent law, or alternatively, that applicable law is
sufficiently ambiguous so as to raise questions as to the lawfulness of
such royalties."' At first blush, this may seem surprising, if one
presumes that willing licensors and licensees may under general
principles of freedom of contact agree to any royalty arrangement
that suits their needs and circumstances. However, because reachthrough royalty arrangements impose a financial burden on drug
products that are not covered by the licensed Discovery Tool patent,
they may expose the tool inventor to a claim that the royalty
constitutes an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly. 1 4 So are
reach-through royalties a lawful pricing method for the licensing of
patents on Discovery Tools? For the balance of this Section, we focus
on the answer to this question, and in particular whether such a
reach-through royalty constitutes patent misuse. 5 Ultimately, if the
royalty obligation is properly negotiated and appropriately qualified,
we conclude that reach-through royalties are not patent misuse and
are lawful. Prior to beginning our analysis, though, we will briefly
review the development and rationale for the patent misuse doctrine.
B.

Patent Misuse Primer

1. Background
Patents derive from the authority of Congress under the U.S.
Constitution "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
113. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 443 (2003) ("The legal status of Reach-Through Royalties is unclear.
There are few judicial or administrative pronouncements available, and the ones that exist
are in conflict ....
In recent Congressional hearings, one industry expert noted the need
for clarification on whether Reach-Through Royalties create antitrust or patent misuse
problems, arguing that clear approval or disapproval would be better than the current
uncertainty.").
114. By contrast, if reach-through claims were valid, then a Discovery Tool inventor
would have the right to exclude unauthorized parties from making and selling a drug
product identified using the tool, as well as from using the tool itself. This would enable
the tool inventor to exact royalties on drug sales pursuant to a patent right. In that
circumstance, there would be no question of patent misuse, since the royalty would be
paid on the sale of a drug product that is within the scope of the patent.
115. We assume that: (1) no license is granted to know-how/trade secrets; and (2) use
of the tool and sale of the product occur in the U.S.
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securing for limited times to ... inventors the exclusive right to their.
. . discoveries." 1 6 Consistent with this constitutional mandate, a
patent is a limited exclusive right. Regardless of its subject matter,
the grant of a U.S. patent confers upon its holder the right during the
patent term to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to
sell and importing in the U.S. the process, apparatus, or combination
claimed therein. 1 7 Accordingly, the right to exclude under a U.S.
patent is limited both in scope (of the inventions claimed) and in time
(the 20-year term of the patent).
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent
infringement."'
Analogous to the equitable doctrine of "unclean
hands," the purpose of the misuse doctrine is to prevent the
impermissible exploitation of the patent monopoly. The misuse
defense was created in a series of early Supreme Court cases directed
to curbing abusive tying practices by patent holders." 9 In these early

116. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
118. Patent misuse itself is not actionable. See, e.g., Transition Electronic Corp. v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 47 F. Supp 885 (D. Mass. 1980), affd, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981)
(holding that "patent misuse of itself is not an actionable tort") (cited in Chisum, Defenses,
§ 19.04[4], n2); Foseco, Inc. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 10 USPQ2d 1632, 1633
(E.D. Mo. 1988) ("An allegation of misuse is generally set up as a defense to an
infringement claim, and is not itself an actionable tort serving as grounds for affirmative
relief.") (cited in Chisum, Defenses, § 19.04[4], n3); Medtronic, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 15
USPQ2d 1465, 1468 (D. Minn. 1990) ("The federal patent laws do not provide for
compensatory damages or injunctive relief for proof of misuse.") (cited in Chisum,
Defenses, § 19.04[4], n3).
119. The doctrine of patent misuse originated as a defense against contributory
infringement in a series of Supreme Court cases in the early 1900s. See, e.g., Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Carbice Corp. of
America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Leitch Mnf. Co. v.
Barber Co. 302 U.S. 458 (1938); see, generally, Chisum, Defenses, § 19.04[1]. The Supreme
Court first applied the doctrine of patent misuse in a case of direct infringement in 1942.
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314
U.S. 495 (1942); Chisum, Defenses, § 19.04[1][b]. Prior to the establishment of the misuse
doctrine, improper use of a patent was not a defense to a claim of infringement. Chisum,
Defenses, § 19.04[1]. Rather, the patent holder retained the action and remedies of patent
infringement even if the holder had utilized its patent as part of anticompetitive practices
to monopolize a market or extended its patent monopoly into unpatented products or
components. Id. These cases deemed infringement of a patent to be tantamount to
trespass upon property. Id. (citing Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F. 819, 820-21 (N.D.N.Y.
1892) ("[I]n a suit brought for the infringement of a patent by the owner, any ... inquiry
[into the proprietary of the actions of the patent holder], at the behest of the infringer,
would be as impertinent as one in respect to the moral character or antecedents of the
plaintiff in an ordinary suit for trespass upon his property. Even a gambler, or the keeper
of a brothel, cannot be deprived of his property because he is an obnoxious person or a

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

67

cases, "the Supreme Court relied on public policy found in the ends
and means of the patent laws themselves [where] [a]dvancement of
the useful arts is the end, and [the] grant of a limited monopoly the
means of the patent laws.' 1.. Tying and other arrangements that
"extend" the economic impact of the patent beyond the area actually
claimed or the statutory period of monopoly "upset the careful
balance between monopoly and free usage. ,121 Since these early
cases, courts have applied the misuse doctrine to a variety of
potentially abusive practices involving patents, but with inconsistent

results in some cases.122
2.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, "[t]he right to a patent includes the right to
market the use of the patent at a reasonable return., 123 The central
inquiry of patent misuse is whether the patentee has wielded her
patent monopoly in order to violate the antitrust laws 1 4 or to extend
the physical or temporal scope of the patent beyond the statutory
grant.1 2' If a court has determined that the patentee's conduct does
not constitute patent misuse, it will have necessarily concluded that
the conduct does not violate the antitrust laws. 126 However, the court
criminal; and it is no defense to the trespass upon it... that it was used in carrying out the
unlawful occupation.").
120. Chisum, Defenses, 19-440, § 19.04[2].
121.

Transitron Electronic Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D.

Mass. 1980) ("Patent misuse was developed as an equitable doctrine to provide an
equitable defense, analogous to the clean hands defense, against an infringement action.").
122. Chisum, Defenses, § 19.04[3]. As Chisum observes: "Because courts have failed to
adopt a general theory as to the proper limitations on the exploitation of the patent
monopoly, it is necessary to assess a given practice in the light of precedent, custom and
history, and the treatment of closely analogous practices." Id.
123. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Co., 339 U.S. 827, 833 (1950)

(citing 46 Stat. 376., 35 USC § 40; Hartford-Empire,Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417
(1945), 324 U.S. 570, 574 (1945).
124. Hartford-Empire, Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) ("so long as the

patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot restrain
infringement of it by others").
125. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343

(1971) ("the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of
the patent monopoly").
126. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("conduct that is insufficient to support a misuse defense cannot support an otherwise
flawed antitrust judgment. Accordingly, because we determine that the conduct
underlying the allegations of misuse does not amount to patent misuse, the same conduct
cannot support a judgment that VP's conduct violated the Sherman Act."); Monsanto
Company v. Homan McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("However, because
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will also have determined that the patentee has not engaged in
conduct that falls short of an antitrust violation but still constitutes
patent misuse. 2
In a series of rulings,' 2" the Federal Circuit has developed an
analytical framework for deciding whether conduct by a patentee
qualifies as patent misuse.1 29 First, it must be determined whether the

we have found McFarling's allegations insufficient to present a genuine issue of material
fact concerning whether Monsanto's licensing restrictions went beyond the boundaries of
its patent grant, McFarling's antitrust counterclaim also fails. Cf., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (concluding that an antitrust claim
"does nothing to limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets
within the scope of the statutory patent grant") ...In this instance, the anticompetitive
effect of which McFarling complains is part and parcel of the patent system's role in
creating incentives for potential inventors).
127. C.R. Bard v. M3 Systems, 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("misuse may arise
when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.") See also Chisum, Defenses, §
19.04[2] ("Use of a patent to violate the antitrust laws will constitute misuse. However,
conduct which in some respect falls short of an antitrust violation may still constitute
misuse.").
128. Windsurfing Int'l v. AMF,Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Mallinckrodt,Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133

F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Monsanto Company v. Homan McFarling,363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
129. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

("Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an accusation of patent infringement, the
successful assertion of which 'requires that the alleged infringer show that the patentee has
impermissibly broadened the 'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect.' Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001, 228 USPQ
562, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,

402 U.S. 313, 343, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 1450, 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 169 USPQ 513, 525 (1971); see also
USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510, 216 USPQ 959, 963 (7th Cir.

1982) (JI]n application, the doctrine [of patent misuse] has largely been confined to a
handful of specific practices by which the patentee seemed to be trying to 'extend' his
patent grant beyond its statutory limits.") ...When a practice alleged to constitute patent
misuse is neitherper se patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by §
271(d), a court must determine if that practice is 'reasonably within the patent grant, i.e.,
that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims.' Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708, 24 USPQ2d 1173, 1179-80 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If so, the
practice does not have the effect of broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus
cannot constitute patent misuse. Id., 976 F.2d at 708, 24 USPQ2d at 1180. If, on the other
hand, the practice has the effect of extending the patentee's statutory rights and does so
with an anticompetitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in accordance with the
'rule of reason.' Id. Under the rule of reason, 'the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account
a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature,
and effect.' State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118, S.Ct., 275, 279, 139 L.Ed.2d 199
(1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 & n. 13, 102 S.Ct.
2466, 2472 & n. 13, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982)).") See also, U.S. Phillips Corp. v. International
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challenged practice is one of those identified by the Supreme Court as
per se misuse. Examples of per se misuse include: (1) tying, whereby
a patent holder conditions a license under a patent upon the purchase
of a separable, staple good or component, I3 (2) conditioning the grant
of a license under a patent on the payment of royalties on unpatented
products or components,"' or (3) requiring the payment of royalties
that accrue based on the use of a patented invention after
the
expiration ofexpraton
the
patent
inv
. 132 Ifa
te licensed
lcened
f
atet covering
cverng that
hatinvention.
practice is found to constitute per se misuse, no further misuse
analysis is necessary. If no per se violation is identified, the analysis
will continue as described below.
Second, it must be determined whether the practice falls within a
statutory exemption to patent misuse set forth under 35 U.S.C. §
271(d).13 Section 271(d) statutorily limits the scope of the patent
misuse defense, and in particular, limits misuse based on tying only to
those situations in which the licensor has market power in the
relevant market for the tying patent or product.
Third, assuming that the practice is not determined to be per se
misuse and is not exempt from misuse under § 271(d), the court must
determine whether the practice has the effect broadening the scope of
the patent. 34 As a general rule, no "broadening" of a patent will be
found where the challenged practice is "reasonably within the patent
grant," and where "it relates to subject matter within the scope of the

Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005) for an example of the application of the
Federal Circuit's analytical framework for determining patent misuse.
130. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942). But see 35 USC §

271 (d)(5), precluding a patent misuse defense based on tying in the absence of patentee
market power ("[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement ...of a
patent shall be .. .deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having: .. conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned."). See also Scheiber v. Dolby, 293 F. 3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
("The 1998 amendment [to the patent statute which resulted in 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(5)]
limited the tying doctrine, in cases in which the tying product is a patent, to situations in
which the patentee has real market power, not merely the technical monopoly (right to
exclude) that every patent confers.").
131. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).

132. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which identifies acts of patent owners that shall not be

deemed patent misuse; See supra note 130.
134.

Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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patent claims."' 3 5 If the challenged practice is found to be within the
subject matter of the patent grant, that conclusion ends the misuse
inquiry. No misuse will be found, 13' because a patent misuse defense
cannot prevail where the patentee is merely exploiting the value of
his patent, and a patentee does not commit misuse by maximizing that
value within its lawful bounds.
If, on the other hand, the practice has the effect of extending the
patent beyond the subject matter claimed therein, then a fourth step
in the misuse analysis is required. The question, then, is whether the
practice "impermissibly broadened the 'physical or temporal scope' of
the patent grant with anticompetitive effect."'137 In this inquiry,
anticompetitive effects alone do not themselves require a finding of
misuse. Rather, such anticompetitive effects must be found to
outweigh any procompetitive benefits of the challenged practice,
based on an analysis conducted under "conventional antitrust
principles, in particular the rule of reason."'13' For a finding of patent
misuse in this circumstance, a factual determination must reveal that
"the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition before
and after the restraint
was imposed, and the restraint's history,
1
nature, and effect.' 3
It is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit's analytical framework
for identifying patent misuse has been the object of criticism by

135. Id. at 869 (quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed.

Cir. 1992)).
136. Mallinckrodt,Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d at 708 (holding that a prohibition on

the buyer's reuse of a patented medical device was enforceable under patent law if the
restriction was within the patent grant). See also, Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec.
Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938); Monsanto Company v. Homan McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir.
1997); B.Braun Med,. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
137. Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF,Incorp., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
138.

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, (6th ed.

2007), at 1143 (summarizing USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1982)). See also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 976 F.2d at 708 ("Anticompetitive
effects that are not per se violations of law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of
reason.")
139. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
(quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 552 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332,343 & n. 13 (1982)).
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commentators.1 41 The view generally expressed is that, in contrast to
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit has conflated the
"antitrust type" of patent misuse and the "extension of monopoly
type" of patent misuse, such that from the Federal Circuit's
prospective "no misuse of any kind can be found unless the patent
infringement defendant proves that the alleged misuse had
'anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason.', 1 41
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the patent misuse doctrine,
which appears to ignore the pure "extension of monopoly type"
misuse, raises the threshold for a showing of patent misuse and,
according to some, reflects that court's antipathy to the doctrine in
keeping with its pro-patent bias."4 In light of the increasing activity of
the Supreme Court in reviewing and reversing Federal Circuit
positions regarding the rights of a patentee,1 4' any perceived

140. Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (And Fall?) Of The Patent Misuse Doctrine In
The Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has
departed from Supreme Court precedent by requiring a showing of "anticompetitive
effect," which analysis is derived from the antitrust rule of reason, in order to sustain a
patent misuse defense); Patricia A. Martone and Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent
Misuse Defense-Does it Still have Viability, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST,
213, 250 (2002) (noting that, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit has
required "antitrust-type findings" to support an "attempt to extend the scope of
monopoly"-type patent misuse defense); Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust
Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 418-31 (2003) (arguing that the Federal
Circuit's inconsistent effort "to change patent misuse doctrine so that it tracks antitrust
doctrine" has resulted in "a confusing tangle that distorts both antitrust and misuse
doctrine." Id. at 430-31).
141. Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (And Fall?) Of The Patent Misuse Doctrine In
The Federal Circuit,69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 683 (2001).
142. Id. at 683.
143. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (reversing the Federal Circuit's
restrictive interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts from infringement
liability the unauthorized use of patented inventions in the drug development process)
(see section IV.A.2, supra); Ebay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (overturning the
Federal Circuit's special rules regarding the granting of injunctions in patent infringement
cases; rather, requiring the court to apply traditional principles of equity to the
determination of whether to grant or deny injunctive relief); MedImmune v. Genentech 549
U.S. 118 (2007) (overturning the Federal Circuit's holding that a patent licensee must
breach the license contract before there would be a constitutionally sufficient case or
controversy to establish standing for a declaratory judgment action seeking a finding that
the licensed patent is invalid); Microsoft v. AT&T, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (reversing the
Federal Circuit's holding that selling a copy of a master software disk outside the U.S. as a
component in a computer, which master disk had originally been produced in and sent
abroad from the U.S., gave rise to infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); Quanta
Computer v. LG Electronics, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008), (overturning the Federal Circuit's rule
that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method patents, and interpreting
the scope of the doctrine more broadly than did the Federal Circuit).
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discrepancy between Supreme Court precedent and Federal Circuit
jurisprudence, as has been suggested with respect to patent misuse,
must be given serious consideration when advising patentees as to
their rights in exploiting their patents. As will be shown in the
sections of this Article that follow, however, the conclusion that we
reach regarding the enforceability of a properly negotiated and
appropriately qualified reach-through royalty obligation for
Discovery Tool use does not depend on the Federal Circuit's
heightened threshold for a finding of patent misuse, which some
scholars believe may not survive Supreme Court review (if the Court
should take such a case). Instead, our conclusion that a reachthrough royalty obligation is legal is based on our applying principles
articulated in the leading Supreme Court cases evaluating royalty
arrangements that are analogous to a reach-through royalty.
3.

Consequences

Upon a finding of patent misuse, regardless of the basis for that
finding, courts will refuse to enforce affected license agreements
against the licensees victimized by the misuse, and will refuse to
enforce the misused patents against any person, including third
parties who are not individually affected by the conduct that gave rise
to the misuse. 44 In other words, a single act of patent misuse results
in the denial to a patent holder of all judicial remedies related to the
misused patent. 141 It is not necessary that that defendant asserting the
misuse defense has been-or would be-directly injured by the
misuse. 4' This is because the misuse of a patent, a monopoly which

144. The rationale for this harsh consequence is that to allow an infringement suit by a
patentee who has misused [his] patent "would be to extend the aid of a court of equity in
expanding the patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly." Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); Hensley Equipment v. Esco Corp., 383
F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1967) ("One who attempts to exploit a patented invention beyond
the scope of the patent monopoly may be the subject of a judicially-imposed disability to
enforce the patent.").
145. For example, in the classic tying arrangement, a patent holder would be precluded
from obtaining a remedy for breach of the tying agreement with respect to amounts due
not only the unpatented components that were improperly "tied," but also on the patented
components themselves.
Moreover, the misused patents would be rendered

unenforceable against any third party infringer.
146. "Itis the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit
in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain
the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the
patent .... The patentee, like those other holders of an exclusive privilege granted in the
furtherance of public policy, may not claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is
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was granted by the government in furtherance of an express public
policy originating in the U.S. Constitution for the advancement of
"science" and other "useful arts," is deemed to be a harm to the
public as a whole. For example, if a patent license provision is
deemed to constitute misuse, the consequences would include the
following: (1) the offending contractual provision is rendered
unenforceable as against the licensee, and (2) the misused patent
itself is rendered unenforceable such that the patent holder is
precluded from remedy in an infringement action under that patent,
(a) even if the remedy is otherwise wholly within the patent's lawful
scope (e.g., a fee on the use of the patented tool itself and/or royalties
for pre-expiration use), and (b) not only against the "victim" of the
misuse, but against any third party infringer. 47
Despite these potentially harsh consequences, misuse of a patent
does not affect the validity of the patent itself and does not subject
the patentee to a claim for damages.' 41 It is only an affirmative
defense to patent infringement. As soon as a patentee has "purged"
the misuse, the patent will become enforceable once again. 149 In other
words, patent misuse suspends, but does not forever preclude, the
patent holder's right to recover for patent infringement or breach of a
patent license.'" However, in order to regain the right of relief, (1)
the patent holder must completely abandon the abusive practice, and
(2) the consequences of that abusive practice must be fully
being used to subvert that policy."
492-495 (1942).

Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,

147. Chisum, Defenses, § 19.04. As Chisum observes, "If... misuse is found, the

courts will withhold any remedy for infringement or breach of a license agreement-even
against an infringer who is not harmed by the abusive practice." Id.
148. On the other hand, if a patentee's conduct is found to constitute misuse (whether
per se or under the rule of reason), that same conduct may also be the basis for an antitrust

claim against the patentee, which if found, may result in antitrust remedies in addition to
the consequences that result from a finding of patent misuse alone.
149. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) ("Equity may

rightly withhold its assistance from such a [mis]use of the patent by declining to entertain a
suit for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper

practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have
been dissipated.").
150. See United States Gypsum v. Nat'l Gypsum, 352 U.S. 457,465 (1957) ("It is now, of

course, familiar law that courts will not aid a patent holder who has misused his patents to
recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until
the effects of such misuse have been dissipated or 'purged"'); Senza-Gel Corp. v.
Seiffhard, 803 F.2d 661, 668 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (a "successful patent misuse defense
results in rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged"); Id. at 668 ("All
that a successful defense of patent misuse means is that a court of equity will not lend its
support to enforcement of a mis-user's patent.").
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dissipated.'
As to the first requirement, a patentee may abandon
misuse arising from a license provision by either canceling the
license ' or by canceling the offending license provision.'5 However,
non-enforcement of an offending provision, alone, is insufficient to
constitute abandonment.' 4 Accordingly, if a patent license provision
were found to constitute misuse, an effective purge would require the
patent holder to fully and effectively waive that provision with respect
to all of its licensees of the subject patent. The second requirement of
a purge, which is that the consequences of the misuse have been fully
dissipated, requires another fact-based inquiry. Where the misuse
had no adverse consequence, some lower courts have held that
abandonment alone is sufficient to affect a purge.' 5' In any case, once
the misuse is purged, the remedies of patent infringement and the
right to enforce the affected patent license are revived with respect to
infringing acts occurring after the abandonment and dissipation." '
Accordingly, patent misuse doctrine sets certain limits on the
way a patentee can exploit his or her patent, and places boundaries
on lawful patent licensing practice. Specifically, lawful licensing
practice is limited by the physical and temporal scope of the patent

151. Chisum, Defenses, 19-323, § 19.04[4] (citing, inter alia, Morton Salt and Gypsum).
152. Id.
153. See, Chisum, Defenses, 19-538, § 19.04[4] n.15 (citing Berlenbach v. Anderson &
Thompson, 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Although we have said that nonenforcement
and voluntary relinquishment of an illegal clause will overcome the defense of patent
misuse.... we know of no case permitting an infringement suit where the clause remains
in effect but unenforced."); In re Yarn ProcessingPatent Validity Litigation,472 F. Supp.
180 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("To establish purge, the law requires the patent holder [to] engage in
clear and unequivocal affirmative action in abandoning the misuse .... Mere nonenforcement of the illegal provision is itself insufficient abandonment under the law of
purge.").
154. See supra note 152. Chisum also points out "that the licensor may simply annul a
provision inserted for his benefit without obtaining the consent of the licensees." Chisum,
Defenses, 19-538, § 19.04[4] n.16 (citing Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research
Co., 339 U.S. 827, 835 (1949) ("Since this provision of the agreement was made for the
benefit of respondent, it could voluntarily waive the provision.").
155. Chisum, Defenses, 19-538-539, § 19.04[4]; Chisum notes that "[a]number of lower
court decisions indicate that abandonment alone is sufficient where it is not shown that the
misuse had any actual adverse consequences." Id. n.17 (citing White Cap Co. v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 1953) ("Under such circumstances it was
unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the consequences of the misuse had been
dissipated because it was not shown that the misuse had illegal consequences.")).
156. Chisum, Defenses, 19-538, § 19.04[4]; As Chisum noted, "[i]n Gypsum [United
States Gypsum v. National Gypsum, 352 U.S. 457 (1957)], the Court seemed to assume that
a patent owner could not, even after complete abandonment and dissipation, recover
monetary relief for infringing acts occurring prior to such dissipation."
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itself, each of which is subject to analysis under a distinct line of cases
addressing patent misuse. We start with a discussion of physical
scope.
C.

Physical Scope

In this section, we will analyze a reach-through royalty
arrangement in terms of whether it constitutes an unlawful extension
of the "physical" scope of a patent. The "physical" scope of each
patent consists of the items or methods that fall within the subject
matter of its claims. While such claims cannot themselves be
extended by a patentee, a licensing practice-such as a reach-through
royalty-may have an analogous and therefore impermissible effect
by imposing an economic burden on an item or method outside of the
subject matter of such claims. Our focus is on whether it is lawful to
license a Discovery Tool patent in consideration for a royalty on the
sales of a drug found using that tool, where the drug itself is not
covered by the licensed patent.
To address this question, we review the leading Supreme Court
cases and their Federal and Regional Circuit progeny that have
addressed closely analogous fact patterns. Based on this analysis, we
conclude that a reach-through royalty, if properly negotiated, is not
an impermissible extension of the physical scope of a patent and may
be a lawful arrangement.
1.

Leading "Total Sales" Royalty Cases: Automatic Radio and Zenith

Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal appeals court has
ruled specifically on whether a reach-through royalty constitutes
patent misuse.
Substantial jurisprudence exists, however, on an
analogous royalty arrangement that also involves an extension of the
"physical scope" of a patent. This type of royalty arrangement is
commonly referred to as a "total sales" royalty. A total sales royalty
involves the grant of a patent license where royalties are calculated
not only on the sales of the product covered by the patent, but also on
the sales of products or components that are not covered by the
licensed patent. In this section, we analyze the leading total sales
royalty cases, and argue that the rules and reasoning of those cases

157. But see Bayer v. Housey, 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd, 340 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2003), the only federal district court case of which we are aware that addressed
the legality of reach-through royalties in the context of a Discovery Tool patent license,
discussed in section V.C.3., infra.
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should also govern the analysis of the legality of a reach-through
royalty arrangement.
a.

Automatic Radio

The seminal case in total sales royalty jurisprudence is the
Supreme Court's decision in Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.1'5 In this case, a radio research
organization (Hazeltine) licensed 570 patents and 200 patent
applications covering inventions relating to the manufacture of radio
broadcasting receivers in return for a small percentage of all of the
licensee's (Automatic Radio's) sales of radio broadcasting receivers.
It was clear that some of the receivers on which a sales royalty was to
be paid would not be covered by any of Hazeltine's patents or patent
applications, although with respect to any individual receiver it was
not clear, without a significant tracking effort, whether its
manufacture and sale fell within the scope of any of the licensed
patents or patent applications. Hazeltine sued Automatic Radio to
recover royalties under their license agreement. Automatic Radio
asserted a defense of patent misuse. Rejecting the misuse defense
and affirming the appellate court's judgment for Hazeltine, the
Supreme Court held that "in licensing the use of patents to one
engaged in a related enterprise, it is not per se a misuse of patents to
measure the consideration by a percentage of the licensee's [total]
sales."" 9
In reaching its holding, the Court in Automatic Radio rejected
three main arguments by the defendant, each of which, as we will
discuss, is relevant in terms of analyzing a reach-through royalty
arrangement. First, the Court dismissed as inapposite Automatic
Radio's argument that the total sales royalty constituted per se misuse
and, possibly, an antitrust violation on the basis that it was an
unlawful tying arrangement or "identical in principle" thereto. 6 As
stated by the Court, the "tie-in" cases "have condemned [practices]
requiring the purchase of unpatented goods for use with the patented
apparatus or process,.., prohibiting production or sale of competing
goods, . . .and conditioning the grant of a license under one patent
upon the acceptance of another different license." 6 ' These actions
158. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
159. 339 U.S. at 834.
160. This represents the first prong of the Federal Circuit's analytical framework for
determining patent misuse.
161. Id. at 830-31; See supra note 130.
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are deemed to be unlawful because they involve the use of patent
leverage to create another monopoly or restrain trade. 62 However,
the Court found that none of those elements are present in the case of
a total sales royalty. Solely at issue in Automatic Radio was a method
of calculating royalties for the licenses granted. As stated by the
Court:
That which is condemned as against public policy by the "Tiein" cases is the extension of the monopoly of the patent to
create another monopoly or in restraint of competition-a
restraint not countenanced by the patent grant. . . . The
principle of those [tie-in] cases cannot be contorted to
circumscribe the instant [total sales royalty]. This [total sales]
royalty provision does not create another monopoly; it creates
no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate grant of the
patent. The right to a patent includes the right to market the
use of the patent at a reasonable return. 6
As such, the Court concluded that the "tie-in" cases do not
"on
4
their facts" control the total sales royalty in Automatic Radio.'1
Second, the Court distinguished United States v. U.S. Gypsum,"65
which Automatic Radio had relied upon to argue that the total sales
royalty constituted an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act.
Gypsum also involved a total sales royalty. In that case, a licensor
entered into numerous license agreements-in aggregate, with
substantially all of the parties in the relevant market-that based
royalties on sales of both patented and unpatented products (i.e., a
total sales royalty) with the understanding that only patented goods
would be sold. The Court held that this practice violated the
Sherman Act, since it constituted a conspiracy between the licensor
and its licensees to restrict production and fix prices of unpatented
goods, and to eliminate competition in the market for such goods. In
Gypsum, "[i]t was held that the license provisions, together with
evidence of an understanding that only patented [products] would be
sold, show a conspiracy to restrict the production of unpatented
products which was an invalid extension of the area of the patent

162. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.t Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-666 (1944);
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United

States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
163. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 832-833; see also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United

States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945).
164. Id. at 830-833.

165. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
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16
monopoly.""
The holding in Gypsum therefore relied on a
combination of incriminating facts that demonstrated a concerted
effort by the defendants "to restrain commerce in an entire industry
under patent licenses in order to organize the industry and stabilize
prices. ,117 However, no such facts or conspiracy were present in
Automatic Radio, nor would the Court imply such a conspiracy
merely on the basis that a total sales royalty provision was utilized.
Accordingly, no antitrust violation was found.
Third, the Court rejected Automatic Radio's argument that a
total sales royalty otherwise constituted an unlawful extension of
Hazeltine's patent monopoly. In its reasoning, the Court established
the principle of mutual convenience-a cornerstone of our analysis in
this Article. The Court explained that "there is in this [total sales]
royalty provision no inherent extension of the monopoly of the
patent."'' Rather,

since it would not be unlawful to agree to pay a fixed sum for
the privilege to use patents, it was not unlawful to provide a
variable consideration measured by a percentage of the
licensee's [total] sales for the same privilege... Sound business
judgment could indicate that such a [total sales royalty]
payment represents the most convenient method of fixing the
business value of the privileges granted by the licensing
agreement."9 (emphasis added).
As such, the Court in Automatic Radio established the principle
that a "total sales" royalty entered into for the mutual convenience of
the parties is permissible even if it obligates the licensee to pay
royalties on the sales of products that are not covered by the licensed
patents.1 In essence, the Court found that a "total sales" royalty that
is mutually agreed upon is lawful, and does not constitute per se, or
any other form of, patent misuse. 171
166. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 832 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at
397).
167. United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 444 U.S. at 401.
168. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 834.
169. Id. at 833-834.
170. What is unclear from the facts of Automatic Radio is whether, despite mutual
convenience, a "total sales" royalty will be found to constitute misuse unless there exists a

significant administrative burden in determining whether a product sold by a licensee is
covered by a licensed patent.
171. In this case, although a total sales royalty imposes an economic burden on the sale
of unpatented products (thereby extending the economic impact of the patent), the Court
did not engage in any formal rule of reason analysis.
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b. Zenith
The Supreme Court's decision in Automatic Radio was not,
however, an unqualified endorsement of total sales royalty
arrangements. In Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research
Inc. ,2 the Supreme Court again addressed the legality of total sales
royalties, and in doing so, defined the limitations of the mutual
convenience doctrine of Automatic Radio. Zenith, a radio and
television manufacturer, obtained rights under a license agreement to
use all of Hazeltine's domestic radio and television patents in return
for a payment of royalties on Zenith's total radio and television sales.
Upon the expiration of the license, Zenith declined to accept
Hazeltine's offer to renew it, but continued to practice under the
previously licensed patents. Hazeltine sued Zenith for patent
infringement. Zenith argued in response that Hazeltine's claims were
unenforceable under the patent misuse doctrine. The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that "conditioning the grant of a patent license upon
payment of royalties on products which do not use the teaching of the
patent does amount to patent misuse."'173 (Emphasis added).
Conditioning, in this case, was found where Hazeltine had a "policy
of insisting upon the acceptance of its standard five-year package
license agreement, covering 500-odd patents . . . and reserving

royalties on the licensee's total radio and television sales, irrespective
of whether the licensed patents were actually used in the products
manufactured."'174 The Court explained that conditioning is "where
the patentee refuses to license on any other basis and leaves the
licensee with the choice between a license .. providing [royalties on
at least some unpatented products] and no license at all.",175 The
Court distinguished Automatic Radio on the grounds that no
conditioning was evident in the facts of that case, and limited the
holding in Automatic Radio approving total sales royalties to
circumstances in which no conditioning exists. The fact that the
parties enter into an agreement with a total sales royalty is not, alone,
sufficient to demonstrate that such royalty was not coerced by the
172. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
173. 395 U.S. at 135.
174. Id. at 134.
175. Id. See also id. at 139 ("We also think that misuse inheres in a patentee's
insistence on a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of use, and his rejection of licensee
proposals to pay only for actual use. U nquestionably, a licensee must pay if he uses the
patent. Equally, however, he may insist upon paying only for use, and not on the basis of
total sales, including products in which he may use a competing patent or in which no

patented ideas are used at all.").
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licensor. 176 On the other hand, conditioning should not be implied by
virtue of the mere presence of a total sales provision in a license
agreement. A total sales royalty may be permissible
even if, as things work out, only some or none of the
merchandise employs the patented idea or process, or even if it
was foreseeable that some undetermined portion would not
contain the invention. It could easily be ... that the licensee as
well as the patentee would find it more convenient and efficient
... to base royalties on total sales than to face the burden of
figuring royalties based on actual use .... If the convenience of
the parties [as in Automatic Radio] rather than patent power [as
in Zenith] dictates the total-sales royalty provision, there are no
misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached to
the license... But we do not read Automatic Radio to authorize
the patentee to use the power of his patent to insist on a totalsales royalty and to override protestations of the licensee that
some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for some
lines of his merchandise he177has no need or desire to purchase
the privileges of the patent.
Accordingly, a total-sales royalty-if not obtained through
coercion-will be deemed lawful even if "as things work out only
some or none" of the products sold are covered by the licensed
patents.
However, if a total-sales royalty is obtained through
coercion, it will be deemed to be per se patent misuse.
2. Application of Automatic Radio and Zenith to a Reach-Through
Royalty Arrangement
Our view is that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Automatic Radio and Zenith should apply to an analysis of the
legality of a reach-through royalty arrangement in the context of the
license of a Discovery Tool patent. Like a total sales royalty, a reachthrough royalty is a method of calculating the consideration for a
licensed patent based on the sales of products that are outside of the
subject matter (i.e., outside of the physical scope) of the licensed
patents. If a reach-through royalty is deemed by a willing licensor
and a willing licensee to be a mutually convenient method of
calculating that consideration, and it is not coerced by the licensor

176.

See Glen Manufacturing,Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries,Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d

Cir. 1970) ("The mere fact of agreement is not determinative.").
177. Zenith Radio Corporationv. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138-39 (1969).
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then it too should be found to be

lawful)

Automatic Radio and Zenith set forth the basic principles of
patent misuse law with respect not only to total sales royalties, but
also, as we discuss below, more generally with respect to methods of
calculating patent royalties based on products or components entirely
outside of the subject matter of the licensed patent claims, including
reach-through royalties. In the course of our analysis, we address
three potential jurisprudential objections to the application of
Automatic Radio and Zenith to a reach-through royalty arrangement
in the context of the license of a Discovery Tool patent.
a.

Do Automatic Radio and Zenith Apply Beyond "Total Sales"
Royalty Cases?

A first potential objection is that Automatic Radio and Zenith are
limited to facts involving royalties that are based on "total sales," and
a reach-through royalty is not a total sales royalty.
As demonstrated in Automatic Radio and Zenith, a "total sales"
royalty is a royalty that is based on sales of products of the same
general type, some of which are or may be covered by the licensed
patents, and some of which are not. Like a total sales royalty (at least
in part), a reach-through royalty is calculated based on the sales of
products that are not covered by the licensed patents, and in that way,
also represents an extension of the physical scope of the licensed
patent. However, there are several important distinctions between
total sales royalties and reach-through royalties. A reach-through
royalty, paid in consideration for the license of a Discovery Tool
patent, does not involve the license of rights to a product that is sold
by the licensee to generate revenue, but rather, the license of an
upstream research tool used in the hopes of discovering a drug

178. To avoid a finding of coercion, a Discovery Tool licensor could offer the licensee
economically viable options of paying only for actual use of the patented tool, in addition
to the option of a reach-through royalty. For example, tool-based options might include a
reasonable upfront, fixed payment for the right to use the tool or reasonable variable
payments based on the amount or character of tool usage. If the licensee then elected to
pay based on the reach-through royalty arrangement, the arrangement should qualify as
one entered into for the mutual convenience of the parties, and therefore be deemed
lawful under Automatic Radio and Zenith.
179. See section V.C.2.a., infra (discussion of Engel). In the case of Automatic Radio
and Zenith, the total sales royalty was calculated based on the licensee's sale of televisions
and radios, whether patented or unpatented. More generically, the total sales royalty may
be described as a royalty that accrues on the sale of products, both patented and
unpatented, that are generally of a similar type.
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product that may, in turn, be sold. Accordingly, reach-through
royalties are not calculated based on the "total sales" of licensed and
unlicensed products of the same general type, but rather, on sales of a
product (the drug) that (1) without question is not covered by the
licensed patent (which claims only the Discovery Tool) and (2) is
likely different in character (a composition of matter) from the
licensed tool (a screening method) used to discover it.""
This highlights yet another, albeit more subtle, distinction. While
Automatic Radio and Zenith expressly acknowledge that allowing a
total sales royalty may mean that royalties are calculated based on
product sales where an individual product may not, in fact, be
covered by the licensed patent, those cases also presume that, at the
time the license is granted, at least some of the products sold may be
covered. With respect to a license of a Discovery Tool patent, it is
known from the outset that the licensed patent covers only the
research tool, and that the royalty will be calculated based only on the
sale of a drug that is not, never was, and never will be, covered by the
licensed patent. One may fairly argue, then, that a reach-through
royalty "physically" extends the royalty base for a licensed patent in a
manner that is fundamentally different from that of a total sales
royalty.
Despite these factual differences, case law interpreting
Automatic Radio supports the conclusion that its holding should
apply beyond total sales royalty cases to include reach-through
royalty arrangements.
In Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lock former
Company,l" the Federal Circuit relied on Automatic Radio to uphold
a royalty that was not based on total sales, but rather, was based on
distinct, unpatented components (corner connectors) that were sold
with and used in connection with the patented products (sheet metal
duct sections). Engel involved the grant of a license under a patent
with apparatus and method claims covering a system for connecting
the ends of sheet metal duct sections. In order to use these sheet
metal duct sections as intended (forming an integral frame), there was
a need to utilize certain unpatented "corner connectors." For each
unpatented corner connector produced by the licensee or purchased
by the licensee from another party (other than the licensor), the

180. Cf., Zenith, 395 U.S. at 138 (the Court acknowledged that a total sales royalty was
lawful "even if, as things work out, only some or none of the merchandise employs the
patented idea or process, or even if it was foreseeable that some undetermined portion
would not contain the invention.") (emphasis added).
181. 96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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licensee was required to pay a royalty. If the licensee elected to
purchase the unpatented corner connector from the licensor, no
royalty would be payable. While this royalty applied to unpatented
products (the corner connectors), and therefore represented an
extension of "the physical scope" of the licensed patent, the
arrangement was not a royalty based on the "total sales" of patented
and unpatented products, as in Automatic Radio and Zenith.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit in Engel cited Automatic Radio and
Zenith for the proposition that "royalties may be based on
unpatented components if that provides a convenient means for
measuring the value of the license,"'" and found that the arrangement
was "voluntarily agreed to" by the parties, and, therefore, lawful.
The decision in Engel represents an important application of the
holdings of Automatic Radio and Zenith. In the "total sales" royalty
jurisprudence starting with Automatic Radio and Zenith,81 3 the royalty
base included a category of products, at least some of which might be
covered by the licensed patents, "even if, as things work out, only
some or none of the merchandise employs the patented idea or
process. '1 4 By contrast, in Engel, it was clear at the time the license
was granted that the basis for calculating the royalty (the making or
buying of corner connectors) was a convenient measure of the value
of the licensed rights, but that those corner connectors were not,
never had been, and never would be, covered by the licensed patents.
The reach-through royalty arrangement under consideration in this
Article can be similarly described. As a convenient measure of the
value of the grant of a license to a Discovery Tool patent, royalties
are calculated and paid based on the licensee's sales of drugs found
using that tool, despite the fact that such drugs are not, never were,
and never will be, covered by the tool patent.
The royalty
arrangement in Engel and the reach-through royalty arrangement
under analysis here, each represents an extension of the physical
scope of a licensed patent since it burdens an activity of the licensee
(whether the making or buying of corner connectors in Engel or the
sale of a drug discovered using a research tool) that falls outside of
the scope of the licensed patent. If Automatic Radio and Zenith allow

182. Engel Industries, 96 F.3d at 1408.
183. See also Glen Manufacturing,Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 278
(S.D. New York 1969), remanded in 420 F.2d 319 (2"d Cir. 1970) (toilet tank covers);
Plastic Contact Lens Company v. Young Contact Lens Laboratories,Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 573
(D. Mass. 1972) (contact lenses).
184. Zenith, 395 U.S. at 138.
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a royalty to accrue upon the licensee's making or purchase of a
product (a corner connector) that is not covered by the licensed
patent, so too should they allow a royalty calculated upon the sale of
a product (a drug) identified using a patented research tool, as long as
the royalty arrangement is not coerced and is otherwise determined
by the parties to be a convenient measure of the value of the licensed
rights.
Accordingly, Federal Circuit precedent suggests that Automatic
Radio and Zenith are not limited to facts involving total sales
royalties, but rather apply more generally to cases involving other
types of royalty arrangements, including reach-through royalties, that
contractually extend the physical scope of a licensed patent.
b. Must the extent of the royalty base be difficult to determine?
A second potential objection to the application of Automatic
Radio and Zenith to a reach-through royalty arrangement is that
those cases justify a non-coerced royalty obligation on the sale of
unpatented products only where it is difficult to determine whether
an individual product is covered by the licensed patent(s). Such
difficulty may arise when a large patent portfolio is licensed to a party
that sells a number of closely related products, not all of which are
8
necessarily covered by the licensor's patents"'
In that circumstance,
determining the royalty base for the calculation of a royalty payment
can present a significant administrative burden if it requires tracking
the sales of only those products that are covered by the licensed
patents. Confronted with the possibility of such a burden, the parties
may well agree that extending the royalty obligation to include the
sales of products that may not be covered by a licensed patent is
necessary as a practical matter.

185. Both Automatic Radio and Zenith involved the licensing of large patent portfolios
to licensees that manufactured and sold closely related electronic products. See also
Plastic Contact Lens Company v. Young Contact Lens Laboratories,Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 573

(D. Mass. 1972) for a case that involved difficulty in determining whether a product is
covered by a licensed patent, outside of the context of a package license. (The total sales
royalty arrangement was used as a necessary convenience in light of the fact that it was

"difficult for manufacturers to determine, because the applicability of a particular patent
depends largely on the physical relationship of the lens to the surface of the cornea of the
eye, which ordinarily is not known by the manufacturer but only by the physician or other
person qualified to fit or prescribe the lens which will fit a particular eye." Id. at 573. The
parties agreed that "for the convenience of all concerned, royalties would be based upon
total sales at a substantially reduced royalty rate per lens." Id. at 574. An alternative

arrangement remained available to manufacturing licensees in which royalties were
charged only for lenses manufactured under the patent.)

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do Nor DELEIE)

WINTER 2009]

REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

85

The avoidance of just such an administrative burden was
certainly a factor in justifying the total sales royalty arrangement in
Automatic Radio, where the license agreement at issue was a
"package" license that included hundreds of patents and patent
applications. In that case it would have been a significant and costly
administrative burden to track which products made or sold in fact
8 6 Likewise, Zenith involved the license
used the claimed inventions."
of a large patent portfolio and a reliance on a total sales royalty
arrangement to avoid a significant administrative royalty tracking
burden (although, as discussed above, in that case the royalty
arrangement was held to be illegal because it was a condition of the
license and not agreed to for the convenience of the parties).
By contrast, a reach-through royalty obligation included in a
Discovery Tool patent license agreement presents no administrative
royalty tracking burden. The licensed product (a research tool) is not
sold by the licensee to generate revenues, but is used by the licensee
to identify a drug product. The royalties to be paid by the licensee
are calculated on the sale of the identified drug and it is known, ab
initio, the drug is not covered by the licensed Discovery Tool patent
(since no patent claims reach through the tool to cover the discovered
drug). In the absence of any tracking problems, a reach-through
royalty may be a mutual convenience, but it is not necessary as a
186. Package royalty jurisprudence subsequent to Automatic Radio has followed the
principle that a package royalty provision is lawful provided that the arrangement was
uncoerced and the royalty obligation terminates upon expiration of the last-to-expire
licensed U.S. patent. See McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 410
(10th Cir. 1965) (relying on Automatic Radio to uphold a package license that was "purely
voluntary"); Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1968)
(adhering to the decision in McCullough and holding that "[t]he relative importance of
patents has no significance if a licensee is given the choice to take a patent alone or in
combination on reasonable terms. Freedom of choice is the controlling question."); Hull
v. Brunswick Corporation,704 F.2d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding a royalty that
"does not on its face call for royalty payments to continue after the time that no unexpired
patents are being used."); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433
F.2d 55, 61 (7th Cir. 1970) (relying on the reasoning in McCullough Tool to conclude that
"a package license agreement, voluntarily entered into, which requires the payment of
royalties beyond the expiration of some, but not all, of the licensed patents is valid.");
Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 265(5th Cir. 1967) (upholding a
package royalty where the arrangement was not coerced and the royalty terminated upon
the expiration of the last patent in the package). But see, Rocform Corp. v. AcitelliStandard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 1966) ("[W]e deal with a licensing
arrangement where one important patent (about to expire) is grouped with others of
longer duration for 'leverage"' and "we believe such a contract, when it contains no
diminution of license fee at the expiration of the most important patent and contains no
termination clause at the will of the licensee, constitutes, in effect, an effort to continue to
collect royalties on an expired patent.").
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practical matter. Simply put, if Automatic Radio and Zenith were
limited to their respective facts, and the need to avoid a potential
administrative royalty tracking burden was a required element of
those holdings, those decisions would not support the legality of a
reach-through royalty arrangement.
This proposition, however, is not supported by applicable case
law as it has evolved since the decisions in Automatic Radio and
Zenith were first handed down.
Jurisprudence subsequent to
Automatic Radio and Zenith suggests that the need to avoid a
potential administrative burden is not required in order to justify a
royalty on unpatented products; rather, mutual convenience alone
will suffice. This point was clearly illustrated by the reversal and
remand by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of a decision of the
U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York in Glen
Manufacturing,Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries,Inc.' This case involved
a licensee's challenge, on patent misuse grounds, of a total sales
royalty that was based on the licensee's sales of toilet tank covers,
where only some of those sales were covered by the licensed patent.
In contrast to Automatic Radio and Zenith (each of which involved
the license of a large number of patents as a package), Glen involved
the license of a single U.S. patent that covered a single,
uncomplicated product."' As noted by the district court, upon any
sales of the toilet tank cover, it could be readily determined, without
any administrative burden, whether such product utilized the
teachings of the licensed patent. The district court held that the
royalty arrangement constituted patent misuse, and it based that
decision on a narrow reading of Automatic Radio, as follows:
[Automatic Radio] did little more than establish a reasonable
method of calculating royalties in a situation where it was
virtually impossible to determine whether each product
manufactured by the licensee embodied any of the 570 patents
or 200 patent applications for electronic apparatus. Because of
the complexities involved in the patents and the difficulty in
determining whether the patented devices were used in the
licensee's products, the court permitted the royalty structure in
question. The [Automatic Radio] rationale is, therefore, an
exception to the general rule requiring a strict, limited royalty
structure; it is by no means the standard in a case such as the
187. 299 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. New York 1969), remanded in Glen Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Perfect Fit Industries,Inc., 420 F.2d 319 (2d. Cir. 1970).
188. While there was also a license of a Canadian patent in the Glen case, the existence
of that license did not enter into the court's analysis, and is irrelevant for our purposes.
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present where the patented item involved is a single, simple,
uncomplicated object.
Accordingly, the district court held that, in the absence of a
potential administrative burden, a total sales royalty constitutes
patent misuse (presumably as a contractual arrangement that
impermissibly extends the physical scope of the licensed patent),
irrespective of whether the license was conditioned. Where there is
no difficulty in determining whether a product is covered by the
licensed patent, the Glen district court required that royalties be
calculated solely on the basis of the sales of the covered product.
The Second Circuit reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Zenith, which was handed down just one week after the
district court's decision in Glen, the Second Circuit held that
conditioning-rather than the presence or absence of a potential
administrative burden-was the critical factor in determining whether
a total sales royalty constituted misuse. In the view of the Second
Circuit, the district court had applied the wrong legal standard.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case for further
findings on the key issue of conditioning, as articulated in Zenith.
The fact that the Glen case was remanded is significant to our
analysis, since it dispelled any notion that Automatic Radio is limited
to circumstances where it is difficult to determine whether the
licensee's product sales are covered by a licensed patent. If
Automatic Radio had required difficulty in determining whether a
product sold by a licensee is covered by the licensed patent in order
to avoid a finding of misuse, the Second Circuit in Glen would have
had no need to remand the proceedings. Rather, the lack of such
difficulty in Glen would have alone been sufficient to justify a finding
of misuse on the basis of the total sales royalty arrangement without
any need to remand to determine whether the license was
conditioned. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit in Glen did remand the
case to the district court. Therefore, the procedural history in Glen
suggests that, under the Second Circuit's interpretation of Automatic
Radio, an non-coerced total sales royalty arrangement is not patent
misuse when entered into for the "mutual convenience" of the
parties, despite the fact that there is no difficulty in determining
whether or not a royalty-bearing product is covered by the licensed
patent. The Federal Circuit decision in Engel also supports this

189. 299 F. Supp. 278, 285 (1969).
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conclusion, where it was clear that the royalty-bearing corner
connectors were not covered by the licensed patent.1 9°
Accordingly, the presence or absence of difficulty in calculating
or applying a royalty is not an essential element in determining the
legality of a reach-through royalty arrangement. It follows, then, that
any attempt to reject such a payment arrangement as unlawful based
on a reading of Automatic Radio and Zenith as requiring such a
difficulty would likely fail.
c.

Do Automatic Radio and Zenith Require a Nexus Between the
Licensed Patent and the Royalty Base?

If the holdings in Automatic Radio and Zenith apply generally to
"physical" extensions of a royalty base of a patent license to
unpatented products, may willing licensors and licensees agree to
patent royalties that are calculated based on products or activities
that are wholly unrelated to the licensed patents? In other words,
does the law of patent misuse require any nexus between the licensed
patent and the royalty base? The answer is likely yes. As a practical
matter, rational licensors and licensees negotiating an arms-length,
non-coerced agreement would presumably only enter into a patent
license with a royalty base that reflected a measure of the value
received or generated by the licensee from its exploitation of the
licensed patent. Nonetheless, as a doctrinal matter, commentators
have acknowledged that "[t]he criteria used to establish the royalty
rate may raise antitrust or misuse issues where the royalty calculation
is unrelated to the licensee's utilization of the patent."1' 9 Thus, it
would seem that the principle of "mutual convenience" established in
Automatic Radio is likely premised on an assumption that some nexus
must exist between the subject matter of the licensed patent and the
royalty base. The question, then, is whether the nexus between a
licensed Discovery Tool and the drugs found using that tool (whose
sales constitute the base used to calculate the royalties) is sufficient to
allow the application of Automatic Radio and Zenith? We think so.
As long as a reach-through royalty arrangement is not coerced and is
otherwise determined by the parties to a license to be a convenient
method of measuring the value of licensed rights (i.e., the royalties
accrue based on sales of drugs found using the licensed tool and not

190. See infra section V.C.2.a.
191. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1108

(6th ed. 2007).
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on the sales of unrelated drugs or products), our view is that the
misuse doctrine likely does not preclude such reach-through royalties.
In Automatic Radio, Zenith and Glen, the royalty base was
comprised of sales of products of the same type as those covered by
the licensed patents (i.e., radios and televisions or toilet tank covers).
However, as Engel made clear, a component or peripheral (corner
connectors) that is not covered by the licensor's patent but is
consistently used with the licensed product (sheet metal ducts) may
constitute a convenient measure of value, and therefore, a lawful
royalty base. By contrast, in the reach-through royalty arrangement
under consideration in this Article, the royalty base is comprised of
sales of drugs found using (rather than used or sold with) the licensed
tool patent. As the Federal Circuit recently acknowledged, its "case
law has not addressed in general terms the status of ...restrictions
placed on goods made by, yet not incorporating, the licensed good
under the patent misuse doctrine."' ' 2 This statement applies equally
to goods discovered by a licensed method.
Nonetheless, we would argue that the nexus between a Discovery
Tool and a drug discovered using that tool is at least as close as, and
as rationally connected as, the nexus found in other cases where
mutual convenience has justified royalties on unpatented products.
In Automatic Radio, Zenith and Glen, the patented and unpatented
products included in the royalty base were connected only in the
sense that they were all sold by the same licensee and were generally
the same type of product (i.e., radios and televisions or toilet tank
covers). By contrast, in the Discovery Tool context, the tool and the
drug are categorically distinct products. In Engel, the royalty base
was comprised of a corner connecter that was used every time the
licensee used the licensed product, and therefore the use of the
unlicensed corner served as a measure of the value derived by the
licensee from the licensed product. Drug discovery, however, does
not involve any such contemporaneous use of tools and drugs.
Rather, drug discovery is serial in nature. The Discovery Tool gives
rise to data, and that data is used to identify and then develop drug
candidates. Despite these factual distinctions, the essential point is
that, arguably, drug sales are the best measure of the value created by
the use of a Discovery Tool. The purpose of using the Discovery
Tool is to identify drug candidates, and if successful, such drug sales
are directly enabled by the use of the Discovery Tool. Accordingly,
192. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see supra note
126.
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drug sales certainly can represent a convenient measure of the value
of the licensed rights, and for that reason, are sufficiently related to
such rights to allow the application of Automatic Radio and Zenith.
For all of the reasons discussed above, Automatic Radio and
Zenith should apply to an analysis of the legality of a reach-through
royalty, and any Discovery Tool licensor wishing to avoid a finding of
misuse when entering into a patent license containing such a royalty
arrangement would need to comply with the principles of those
decisions.
On the basis of these Supreme Court holdings, we
conclude that where a reach-through royalty is offered together with
an economically viable alternative to pay only for actual use, and the
licensee elects to pay a percentage of the sales of drugs found using
the licensed Discovery Tool, the arrangement does not constitute
patent misuse and is lawful.
3.

Bayer v. Housey

Our conclusion regarding the legality of a reach-through royalty
arrangement in the context of the license of a Discovery Tool patent
is consistent with the only federal district court decision that
addresses this issue. 9
Applying the principles established in
Automatic Radio, Zenith and Engel Industries, the district court in
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 194 held that a non-coerced
reach-through royalty is not an impermissible extension of the
physical scope of a licensed patent and, therefore, is a lawful
arrangement.19 In that case, Bayer AG, a pharmaceutical company,
193. While we have searched the extant case law, it is of course possible that we have
missed a federal case, and we certainly have not exhaustively searched state case law.
Nonetheless, it is clear that as the time of the drafting of this Article, that there is only one
significant federal case addressing the legality of reach-through royalties of the sort
contemplated by this Article, and the district court in that case reached the same
conclusion as this Article has regarding the required analysis, and ultimate legality, of such
a royalty arrangement.
194. 228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd, 340 F.3d 1367.
195. The royalty obligation in Bayer differs from the reach-through royalty
arrangement under consideration in this Article only in the fact that in the Bayer case, the
patented research tool was used outside of the United States, thereby implicating an
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) that ultimately decided the case on appeal. The
Federal Circuit's holding in Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) is important,
not only for its interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) but also because it
effectively capped the potential value of a U.S. Discovery Tool patent. According to the
Federal Circuit's decision in that case, the act of importing the "fruits" of the
extraterritorial use of the inventor's Discovery Tool (i.e., data and information) into the
U.S. does not constitute infringement under United States patent law. At issue in the case
specifically was a statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), that provides in pertinent part:
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filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain patents
held by Housey Pharmaceuticals were invalid, unenforceable and not
infringed by Bayer. In response, Housey filed a counterclaim of
infringement against Bayer. The patents at issue covered a Discovery
Tool. Specifically, the patents claimed certain methods of screening
for active compounds useful in order to generate data used to identify
and develop new drugs, but did not claim such compounds or drugs
themselves. 96 Housey licensed these patents to over 30 companies
under a licensing program that included two payment options for
potential licensees. The first type of license required the licensee to
make a significant, upfront, lump sum payment based upon the size of
the licensee's research and development budget. The second type of
license required the licensee to pay small license fees as well as reachthrough royalties on the sales of drug products discovered using the
licensed methods. Housey had offered both types of licenses to
Bayer, but the parties did not reach an agreement. Instead, Bayer
filed its declaratory actions seeking to invalidate the Housey patents.
Among its several arguments, Bayer asserted that Housey had

Whoever without authority imports into the Untied States or offers to sell, sells
or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in
the Untied States shall be liable as an infringer. (Emphasis added).
The plaintiff inventor argued that this prohibition captures the importation of data
and information which is generated in the use of a "process patented in the United
States." The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that "in order for a product to have been
'made by a process patented in the United States' it must have been a physical article that
was 'manufactured,' and that the production of information is not covered." Bayer, 341
F.3d at 1377 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, tool users may freely use Discovery Tools that are patented in the U.S.
in non-U.S. jurisdictions where the patentee has no patent coverage, without the threat of
U.S. patent infringement, and then import the resulting data and information into the U.S.
for use in drug discovery. Since § 271(g) is designed to protect tangible products (rather
than data), and is limited to the infringement of manufacturing process patents (rather
than discovery methods), the "fruits" of Discovery Tools are not protected by the statute.
This undoubtedly represents a set-back for tool inventors, and a potential loophole in the
patent laws for the protection of Discovery Tools.
While the practical impact of this decision remains to be seen, it effectively caps the
value of U.S. Discovery Tool patents at approximately the cost of performing the same
research in a non-U.S. jurisdiction without similar patent protection.
Presumably,
potential licensees would not be willing to pay significantly more than the cost of
conducting the discovery work outside of the U.S. in a jurisdiction where no patent
protection for the tool exists, since under Bayer, they can freely import and use the results.
196. 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 468 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd, 340 F. 3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The
patents, which were initially assigned to Housey under its former name of ICT
Pharmaceuticals, claimed a "Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators"
and included United States patent numbers 4,980,281, 5,266,464, 5,688,655 and 5,877,007.
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committed patent misuse by offering a patent license that would
impose royalties on products and activities (i.e., drugs and drug sales)
that were not covered by Housey's Discovery Tool patents. Rejecting
Bayer's misuse argument, the district court held that Housey had not
committed patent misuse since it had not conditioned the grant of a
patent license upon the payment of royalties on drug products, but
rather had offered such a royalty arrangement as an option that the
licensee could elect to take at its discretion.
While not a binding precedent, the Bayer decision is of
significance not only for its holding (that a non-coerced reachthrough royalty arrangement in the context of a Discovery Tool
patent license is legal) but, for the purpose of our analysis, for the
following three reasons: First, like the Engel court, the district court
in Bayer applied the principles of Automatic Radio and Zenith to a
royalty arrangement that falls outside of the limited definition of a
total sales royalty. Second, consistent with Automatic Radio, Zenith
and Glen, the Bayer court did not require that there be the potential
for an administrative royalty tracking burden in order to justify a
royalty on a product that is not covered by the licensed patent, as long
as the royalty arrangement was entered into for the mutual
convenience of the contracting parties for determining the value of
the licensed rights. And, finally, the court in Bayer concluded that
the nexus between a licensed Discovery Tool patent and the product
found using the tool (and whose sales constitute the royalty base) was
sufficient to support the legality of a reach-through royalty on the sale
of the product.
D.

Temporal Scope

In our analysis thus far, we have assumed that all royalties on
drug sales accrue during the term of the licensed Discovery Tool
patent. If most or all of such drug sales were likely to occur during
that period, no further analysis would be necessary. However, due to
the realities of the drug development process, that is not the case.
Discovery Tools are often invented and patented long before the
discovery of any drug using that enabling technology. And, even
after the discovery of a candidate drug, it typically takes many years
to complete the pre-clinical drug development and the clinical trials
necessary to market the drug.17 As a result, if a reach-through royalty
197. Note that a typical user of a Discovery Tool-a drug development company-is
likely to obtain its own patent protection for drugs found using a licensed tool that extends
past, perhaps significantly, the expiration of the patent covering the tool itself. Once the
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accrues only during the term of the relevant Discovery Tool patent, a
tool licensor will be precluded from sharing in at least some, and
perhaps all, of the royalty base comprised of sales of drugs discovered
using his or her enabling tool. Simply put, the practical utility of a
reach-through royalty obligation whose term does not overlap with
the period in which the royalty base is generated through drug sales is
nil from the perspective of the tool inventor.
The question arises, then, whether a Discovery Tool licensor may
lawfully obtain a reach-through royalty on drug sales for a period that
extends-at least for some time-past the expiration of the tool
patent. With respect to this potential extension of "temporal scope,"
we begin our analysis with the specific question of whether a reachthrough royalty that extends beyond the expiration of the licensed
tool patent, even if mutually agreed-upon and absent coercion,
constitutes per se misuse.'98 In Brulotte et al v. Thys Company,9" the
Supreme Court held that a post-expiration royalty for post-expiration
use of a previously patented invention is per se unlawful. In the
remainder of this section, we analyze the ruling in Brulotte and its
applicability to a reach-through royalty arrangement in the context of
the license of a Discovery Tool patent. We conclude that Brulotte is
not only inconsistent with analogous decisions, but more importantly,
does not preclude the inclusion of a reach-through royalty obligation
in a Discovery Tool patent license agreement.
1.

Leading "Post-ExpirationRoyalty" Case: Brulotte v. Thys

Brulotte v. Thys stands for the proposition that royalties that
accrue based on the post-expiration use of a previously patented
invention are per se unlawful. In Brulotte, Thys Company, an owner
of various patents relating to a method of hop picking, sold a machine
incorporating those patents for a flat sum and issued a license for its
use to various licensees, including to Walter C. Brulotte. The license
required licensees to pay a minimum royalty equal to the greater of
$500 for each hop-picking season or $3.33 per 200 pounds of dried

drug development company identifies its drug candidate, that company would commonly

obtain patent protection for that drug candidate and potentially for its relevant
therapeutic uses. These patent claims may be worth potentially hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars since they read directly on the revenue-generating drug and its use in the
treatment of a disease.
198. That is, even if willing parties agree for their mutual convenience that patent
royalties are payable for post-expiration use, that agreement will be deemed to be a
misuse of the licensed patent.
199. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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hops harvested by the machine both during and after the term of the
licensed patents. The licenses also prohibited removal of the
machines from the licensee's initial place of business (Yakima
County) both before and after expiration of the licensed patents.
Upon the expiration of all of the licensed patents, the licensee refused
to pay royalties due under the license agreement. Thys Company, the
seller and licensor, brought suit to collect those royalties. Thys
prevailed in the trial court, defeating the licensees' argument that the
royalty arrangement constituted patent misuse. The Supreme Court
of Washington upheld the post-expiration royalty arrangement on the
basis that "the period during which royalties were required was only
'a reasonable amount of time over which to spread the payments for
the use of the patents. 9,200
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of
Washington's holding that the post-expiration royalty payments were
a lawful means of spreading payments for "use of the patents," since
there was "intrinsic evidence that the agreements were not designed
with that limited view.", 20 The U.S. Supreme Court held that "the
judgment below must be reversed in so far as it allows royalties to be
collected which accrued after the last of the patents incorporated into
the machines had expired. ' 202, 201 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, affirmed the basic principles that (1) after the expiration of
a patent, the exclusive rights conferred thereunder become public
property; 204 and (2) "any attempted reservation or continuation in the
patentee ...of the patent monopoly, after the patent 2expires
.. runs
5
counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws., 0Applying these principles, the Court relied on several key facts
as the "intrinsic evidence" that the royalty arrangement in Brulotte
unlawfully projected the patent monopoly after the expiration of the
licensed patents, rather than "spreading" royalty payments for preexpiration use of the patented invention into the post-expiration
period. First, the royalty payments for use of the machine accrued
200. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30 (quoting Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 382 P.2d 271, 275 (Wash.
1963)).
201.

Id. at 31.

202. Id. at 30.

203. The issue of patent exhaustion upon the sale of the hop-picking machine was not
addressed in Brulotte, but is worthy of consideration, especially in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent holding regarding the doctrine in Quanta v. LGE.
204. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169
(1896); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
205.

Id.(quoting Scott PaperCo. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)).
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annually, both before and after expiration of the patents, for the thencurrent year of use. Therefore, the royalty expressly accrued based
on the post-expiration use of the previously patented machine rather
than a deferred payment for use during the term of the patents.""
The same royalty rates and terms and conditions applied after
expiration of the licensed patents as before that expiration, in what
the Supreme Court refers to as a "bald attempt to exact the same
terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired as
they do for the monopoly period. ' , 21 7 Second, the Court indicated that
the continuity in terms and conditions was "peculiarly significant in
this case in view of other provisions of the license agreements. , 211
Specifically, the agreement prohibited assignment or removal from
Yakima County of the machines covered by the licensed patents both
before and after the expiration of the licensed patents. The Court
indicated that "[t]hose restrictions are apt and pertinent to protection
of the patent monopoly; and their applicability to the post-expiration
period is a telltale sign that the licensor was using the licenses to
project his monopoly beyond the patent period." 2°9 Moreover, such
restrictions "forcefully negate the suggestion that we have here a bare
arrangement for a sale or a lease at an undetermined price, based on
use." 2 " Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that the
challenged royalty arrangement constituted a royalty for use of the
patented machines after the expiration of the applicable patents that
was obtained through the leverage of the patent monopoly in a
manner analogous to tying,2 1 and therefore held the post-expiration
212
royalty was unlawful per se.

206. Id.(quoting Scott PaperCo. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)).
207. Id. at 32.

208. Id. at 31-32.
209. Id. at 32.
210. Id.
211. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33 ("But to use that leverage to project those royalty
payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly
of the patent by tieing [sic] the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of
unpatented ones.").
212. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Brulotte, used the terminology

unlawful per se," rather than "per se patent misuse" in the Court's opinion. It is clear,
however, that the holding is based on the principles of patent misuse. A possible source of
confusion in post-expiration royalty cases is the fact that, after the patent expires, there is
no patent in effect to misuse. However, the misuse arises from the act of exerting leverage
at the time of the grant of the patent license in order to extract a commitment from the
licensee to pay post-expiration royalties. Moreover, the remedy for misuse in postexpiration royalty cases is necessarily limited. Upon a finding of patent misuse, the royalty
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In reaching that holding, the Court also declined to extend the
ruling in Automatic Radio. The Court properly acknowledged that
Automatic Radio found that royalties accruing based on the licensee's
total sales were lawful, even where "no patents were used."
However, the royalties claimed in Automatic Radio were not, as the
Court pointed out, "for a period when all of them had expired." By
contrast, in Brulotte, even after all patents had expired, royalties
continued to accrue based on post-expiration use. In the view of the
Court, to find that the royalty arrangement in Brulotte was lawful
would effectively "project the patent monopoly" past its statutory
term. The Court refused to do so.
Although Brulotte remains good law today, 21 commentators and
even a recent decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals have criticized its
holding as flawed. The leading decision that applies Brulotte while
questioning its legal reasoning and economic effects is the decision of
the Seventh• 214Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheiber v. Dolby
Laboratories. In Dolby, Judge Posner affirmed as patent misuse an
agreement that required the payment of royalties based on U.S. sales
past the expiration of the last-to-expire U.S. patent in a package
patent license. Scheiber, a holder of U.S. and Canadian patents on
the audio system known as "surround sound," granted Dolby rights
under those patents in exchange for its promise to pay royalties on
U.S. and Canadian sales covered thereby. During negotiations,
Dolby requested a lower royalty rate on its U.S. and Canadian sales
in exchange for its agreement to pay that lower rate on both U.S. and
Canadian sales until the last-to-expire Canadian patent expired,
which did so approximately two years after the last-to-expire U.S.
patent. Dolby indicated that it wished to have this reduction in the
royalty rate so that it could pass on this savings to its customers; and
Scheiber agreed. However, when the last U.S. patent in the package
of U.S. and Canadian patents expired, Dolby refused to pay further
provision that requires a payment for use of the patented invention, following expiration
of the licensed patent, is held invalid and unenforceable. However, since the licensed
patent has already expired, the additional consequence of a finding of patent misuse-that
is, that the misused patent is no longer enforceable-is irrelevant.
213. See Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-37
(1969); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 n.40
(1971); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1979) (the Court
distinguished but did not overrule Brulotte). See also Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories,Inc.,
293 F.3d 1014, 1019 (2002) ("the reaffirmation of Brulotte in Aronson tells us that the
Court did not deem the cases inconsistent, and so, whether we agree or not, we have no
warrant for declaring Brulotte overruled").
214. 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
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royalties on U.S. sales, even though it had expressly agreed (pursuant
to its own suggestion) to pay for an additional two years until the
expiration of the last Canadian patent in the package. Scheiber sued
to enforce the express terms of the patent license agreement. Dolby's
principal defense was that the license agreement was per se
unenforceable under Brulotte.
While directly questioning the rationale and logic of Brulotte, the
Seventh Circuit accepted Dolby's argument, depriving the patentee
(Scheiber) of its claim for damages. Characterizing the decision in
Brulotte as a "free-floating product of a misplaced fear of monopoly,"
Judge Posner rejected the notion that post-expiration royalties have
the effect of extending the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent
statute. 215 On the contrary, "charging royalties beyond the term of a
patent does not lengthen the patentee's monopoly; it merely alters
the timing of royalty payments." ' As Judge Posner explained:
After the patent expires, anyone can make the patented process
or product without being guilty of patent infringement. .... For
a licensee in accordance with a provision in the license
agreement to go on paying royalties after the patent expires
does not extend the duration of the patent either technically or
practically, because, as this case demonstrates, if the licensee
agrees to continue paying royalties after the patent expires the
royalty rate will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the
limit of the patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail
whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period
of time or a lower rate over a longer period of time.
Most commentators who have addressed this topic, including the
authors of this Article, fully agree with this critique. 28" Nonetheless,
215.

Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018.

216. Id.
217. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1017.
218. See Harold See and Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble With Brulotte: The Patent
Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814 (1990) ("The
Brulotte rule incorrectly assumes that a patent license has significance after the patent

terminates. When the patent term ends, the exclusive right to make, use or sell the
licensed invention also ends. Because the invention is available to the world, the license in
fact ceases to have value. Presumably, licensees know this when they enter into a licensing
agreement. If the licensing agreement calls for royalty payments beyond the patent term,
the parties base those payments on the licensees' assessment of the value of the license
during the patentperiod. These payments, therefore, do not represent an extension in time
of the patent monopoly."); Louis Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patent or
Copyright Expiration on License Agreements, 64 J. PAT OF. Soc'Y 297, 302 (1982)

("licensees will not normally be willing to pay a royalty, after patent expiration, for what
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as Judge Posner acknowledges in his opinion, the Seventh Circuit has
"no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how
dubious its reasoning."
Since the agreement at issue in Dolby
clearly required payment on U.S. sales of products that occurred after
the expiration of the last-to-expire U.S. patent, and that payment
obligation accrued based on post-expiration use of the previously
patented invention, it fit squarely within the per se prohibition of
Brulotte. The express agreement of the parties that such payments
should continue during that period in exchange for a lower royalty
overall was effectively disregarded.
As the decision in Scheiber illustrates, Brulotte has been
interpreted and applied in such a manner so as to nullify the
contractual intent of the parties, on the basis of a rule intended to
limit the abuse of patents. As a result, willing parties are prohibited
from agreeing to royalties that accrue based on post-expiration use,
even if that royalty structure is mutually agreed (a) without any
coercion by the licensor, (b) as the most convenient method of
measuring the value of the licensed rights, and (c) in exchange for a
lower royalty rate overall. The Brulotte decision, in effect, "requires
the licensor and licensee to amortize the present value for the license
fee over the remaining years of the patent term, rather than over a
longer period of' 2 2years, even if a longer amortization period is optimal
for the parties. 1
2.

Reconciling Total Sales Royalty Jurisprudenceand Brulotte

Can the decision with respect to an extension of the temporal
scope of a patent in Brulotte be harmonized with the decisions with
respect to an extension of the physical scope of a patent in Automatic
Radio and Zenith? The answer, ultimately, is no. Each of these cases
addresses a circumstance in which a patent royalty is calculated based
on the sale of a product that is not, at the moment of sale, covered by
the licensed patent. However, a sale of an unpatented product which

their competitors can then obtain without charge ... They only pay what they must in

order to use the invention during the time when the patent would otherwise bar their
way."); Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1630 (1990). ("agreements that extend royalty terms simply are not
anticompetitive. A licensee will pay a fixed amount for a license, and the courts should
not care whether the licensee pays that amount up front, in ten years, or in a hundred

years").
219. 293 F.3d at 1018.
220. Harold See and Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble With Brulotte: The Patent Royalty
Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814 (1990).
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occurs during the term of a patent (i.e., an "in-term" expansion of
physical scope as in Automatic Radio and Zenith), and a sale of a
product that was once, but is not longer, covered by a patent (i.e., an
extension of temporal scope as in Brulotte), are analyzed and
21
ultimately decided based on fundamentally different policy models. '
Automatic Radio and Zenith rest on the doctrine of contractual
intent. In the nomenclature of these cases, the analysis of "mutual
convenience" is a judicial inquiry into whether the final written
agreement represents the true intent of the parties. Where the final
agreement is the product of coercion, as in Zenith, its terms can no
longer be relied upon as an accurate representation of the contractual
intent of the parties, and therefore, the royalty on unpatented
products is held to be per se misuse.
Brulotte, by contrast,
categorically disregards the intent of the parties by holding that any
post-expiration royalty for post-expiration use is per se misuse, even
in the absence of any coercion.
In other words, while contractual
intent governs where royalties are paid on products that are not
covered by the licensor's patent during the term of a licensed patent
(a physical extension), that intent is overridden immediately upon
patent expiration if a royalty is for post-expiration use (a temporal
extension).
These different models and results in seemingly analogous
circumstances invite the conclusion that these cases are simply
irreconcilable, and ultimately, we believe that that conclusion is
correct. However, a closer analysis of the reasoning behind the
original holdings and subsequent evolution of these cases provides
some insight into the how the case law arrived at these contrasting
outcomes. Consider the rationale for the decisions in Automatic
Radio and Zenith. As discussed above, 2" each of these cases involved
a package license, whereby the licensor granted a license under
numerous patents, some of which may cover the products sold, and

221.

Compare the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Automatic Radio and

Zenith, as discussed supra in section V.C.I., with that of the Court in Brulotte, as discussed
supra in section V.D.1. See also Louis Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patent
or Copyright Expiration on License Agreements, 64 J. PAT OFF. SoC'Y 297, 297-314 (1982)
for a discussion of the interplay between "the contractual intent approach" and "the
statutory policy approach" in analyzing the Brulotte holding.
222. One commentator has aptly referred to the result in Brulotte as the "ultimate
victory of the statutory policy approach over the doctrine of contractual intent." Louis
Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patent or Copyright Expiration on License
Agreements, 64 J. PAT OFF. SoC'Y 297, 308 (1982).
223.

See supra sections V.C.1. and V.C.2.b.
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some of which may not.224 While it was clear that these patent
packages covered an electronic apparatus used in radios, televisions
and phonographs, it would have been difficult or practically
impossible to determine-on a unit-by-unit basis-precisely which
radios, televisions and phonographs sold by the licensee were in fact
covered by one or more of the patents in the package.
In this context, the justification for upholding a total sales royalty
as a "practical necessity" was born. Because actual patent usage was
difficult or practically impossible to determine, the parties mutually
agreed upon, and the Supreme Court upheld, a total sales royalty
calculated as a percentage of the licensee's sales of all radios,
televisions and phonographs, notwithstanding the fact that there may
have been products within that product grouping that (1) had once
been, but were no longer covered by a patent in the package at the
time of sale, or (2) were never covered by a patent in the package.
This is the interpretation of Automatic Radio-as a narrow, necessitybased exception to a general rule requiring that patent royalties
accrue strictly upon items covered by the licensed patents-that was
initially articulated by the district court in Glen.226 For as long as
there is a single active U.S. patent, the difficulty in determining
whether a particular product sold is covered by a patent could-at
least in theory-persist. However, upon the expiration of the last
patent in the package, the rationale of "practical necessity" that
justified the extension of the royalty base to products not covered by
the licensed patent no longer applies, since the problem of
determining patent usage only continues as long as there are active
patents within the package. On the basis of this narrow "necessity"
rationale, Automatic Radio and Zenith may be reconciled with
Brulotte. That is, while "necessity" can justify an in-term extension of
a royalty to products not covered by the licensed patent (as in
Automatic Radio or Zenith), it can never justify a post-expiration
227
royalty on previously patented products (as in Brulotte).

224. For other package licensing cases, see McCullogh Tool Company, Well Surveys,

Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965); Hull v. Brunswick, 704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1983);
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970);
Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco, 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967). But see, Rocform Corp. v.
Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966). See also 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(5).
225. See supra sections V.C.1. and V.C.2.b.
226. See supra section V.C.2.b. and note 188.
227. Perhaps this is the underlying reason why Brulotte declined to extend Automatic
Radio to reach post-expiration royalties. In Brulotte, the Court "decline[s] the invitation to
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Notwithstanding this potential basis for harmonization, as
discussed in section V.C.2.b. supra, Automatic Radio has been
interpreted and applied in cases where there was no difficulty in
determining whether a product was covered by the licensed patent
(e.g., the toilet tank covers in Glen and the corner connectors in
Engel), including in cases were there was a single licensed patent (no
package license) 22' and a single and uncomplicated product. 229 This
more liberal application of Automatic Radio has replaced the notion
that a total sales royalty must be "necessary" due to difficulty in
determining patent usage with a flexible standard requiring only that
a royalty on unpatented products is "mutually convenient" for the
contracting parties in determining the value of the licensed patent
rights.23 With the more forgiving inquiry of "mutual convenience" as
the critical requirement, the restriction of Brulotte no longer makes
sense. While a post-expiration royalty could never be "necessary" in
order to avoid difficulty in calculating royalties, it certainly could be a
"mutually convenient" method of measuring the value of the licensed
rights.231
As a result, Brulotte cannot be reconciled with Automatic Radio
as that holding was interpreted by the Federal Circuit in Engel and
the Second Circuit in Glen. Absent additional facts showing an
attempt to extend the monopoly,"' there would appear to be no
extend [the holding of Automatic Radio] so as to project the patent monopoly beyond the
17 year period" and distinguished Automatic Radio on the basis that although "some of the
patents under that license [in Automatic Radio] apparently had expired, the royalties
claimed were not for a period when all of them had expired." Brulotte, 379 U.S. 33.
228. Glen Manufacturing,Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. New
York 1969), remanded in 420 F.2d 319 (2d. Cir. 1970); Engel Industries,Inc. v. Lockformer
Company, 96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also supra note 185.
229. See Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Company, 96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(corner connectors); Glen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
278 (S.D. New York 1969), remanded in 420 F.2d 319 (2d. Cir. 1970) (toilet tank covers);
Plastic Contact Lens Company v. Young Contact Lens Laboratories,Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 573
(D. Mass. 1972) (contact lenses).
230. See supra section V.C.2.b.
231. As many commentators have noted and Judge Posner forcefully expressed in
Scheiber, post-expiration royalties are merely a method of financing the value received by
the licensee during the patent term, since upon expiration of the patent, the patentee has
nothing of value left to offer in exchange. Following the expiration of the patent, no one
can be excluded from exploiting the previously patented invention, and licensees
presumably know this fact when they negotiate the royalty terms of their license.
232. See, e.g., Brulotte, 379 U.S. 29 (clear evidence that royalties accrued on postexpiration use of the previously patented invention, and post-expiration restrictions on
assignment and prohibition on removal of the previously patented invention from Yakima
County). See also supra section V.D.I.
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reasoned difference between agreeing to a royalty arrangement that
required payment of a royalty on the sale of (1) a product that was
never covered by the licensed patent for as long as the licensed patent
survives (the royalty obligation in the patent license agreement in
Engel); (2) a product that was once covered by at least one of the
patents included in a package license but is no longer covered, for as
long as at least one of the licensed patents survives (as might occur
under the total sales royalty obligation in the package license
agreement in Automatic Radio); and (3) a product that is no longer
covered following the expiration of the last-to-expire patent (the
post-expiration royalty for post-expiration use in Brulotte). In each
case, the parties to the contract would have agreed to pay a royalty on
the sale of a product that was not covered by the licensed patent.
However, while the first two royalty arrangements are permitted and
enforceable as long as they are not coerced (i.e., contractual intent
governs), 2 the last is illegal per se without regard to contractual
intent (i.e., statutory policy overrides contractual intent). 3
The foregoing analysis confirms that Brulotte is anomalous when
considering analogous cases where a royalty base has been extended
to unpatented products, particularly when the parties freely agree
upon that approach as the most convenient and appropriate method
of measuring the value of the licensed patent. Nonetheless, as
Scheiber confirms, Brulotte remains the law today. With that
admonition in mind, we turn to an assessment of the applicability of
Brulotte to a reach-through royalty arrangement in the context of a
Discovery Tool patent license.
3.

Is A Post-ExpirationReach-Through Royalty Unlawful Per Se Under
Brulotte?

While neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any federal appeals
court has ruled on whether a post-expiration reach-through royalty
obligation in a Discovery Tool patent license agreement is lawful, we
believe that a careful analysis suggests that it is. Indeed, the holding
in Brulotte need not even be disturbed in order for us to reach this
conclusion. The reason is that, while Brulotte clearly prohibits postexpiration royalties that accrue based on post-expiration use of a
previously patented invention, Brulotte implicitly allows for deferred
payments for pre-expiration use. The license agreement in Brulotte
included a royalty that expressly accrued based on post-expiration
233.

See supra sections V.C.1. and V.C.2.a. and note 220.

234. See supra section V.D.1. and note 220.
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use, i.e., on an annual basis each year both before and after patent
expiration. Under those facts, deferred payment for pre-expiration
use was not at issue. However, the Court suggested in dicta that a
deferred payment arrangement "would present wholly different
considerations" than those presented by the unlawful royalty
arrangement addressed in Brulotte.235 The implication is clear: The
holding in Brulotte should not be read to prohibit a circumstance
where a payment accrues for the pre-expiration use of a patent, but is
paid after its expiration on a deferred basis.
This interpretation is supported by later descriptions by the
Supreme Court itself of its holding in Brulotte. In Zenith, the Court
described its holding in Brulotte as follows:
Recognizing that the patentee could lawfully charge a royalty
for practicing a patented invention prior to its expiration date
and that the payment of this royalty could be postponed beyond
that time [i.e., following expiration], we noted that the postexpiration royalties were not for prior use but for current use,
and were nothing less than an effort by the patentee to extend
the term of his monopoly beyond that granted by law. Brulotte
thus articulated in a particularized context the principle that a
patentee may not use the power of his patent to levy a charge
for making, using, or selling products
~236 not within the reach of the
monopoly granted by the Government.
Brulotte does not, therefore, stand for the proposition that the
payment of any royalty after the expiration of the licensed patent is,
without more, unlawful.
Rather, as other commentators have
observed, 237 Brulotte stands for the proposition that royalties are

235. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. Note that while the Court used the "wholly different
considerations" phrase in its discussion of deferred payments for unpatented machines, its
opinion in Brulotte suggests that the phrase is equally applicable in the context of a
deferred payment for a patented invention. The Court spent considerable effort in
distinguishing the unlawful post-expiration -payment-for-post- expiration- use royalty
arrangements in Brulotte from a presumably lawful one in which the royalty obligation
extended beyond the expiration of the licensed patent only because it represented "a
reasonable amount of time over which to spread the payments for the use of the patents"
Id. at 31 (quoting the Supreme Court of Washington's holding in the Brulotte case (62
Wash. 2d 284, 291 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1963)). See section V.D.1. supra. Zenith's subsequent
interpretation of the Court's decision in Brulotte, provided in this section, supports this
view.
236. Zenith, 395 U.S. at 136-37.
237. Louis Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of PatentorCopyright Expiration
on License Agreements, 64 J. PAT OFF. SOC'Y 297, 309 (1982) ("The real point of Brulotte
may be that payments are properly considered to be illegal royalties if they are dependent
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unlawful to the extent that that are based on the licensee's use of a
previously patented invention after expiration of the last licensed
patent. This view is consistent with the holdings in Brulotte and
Scheiber, since the royalties held to be unlawful in both of those cases
arose from the licensee's use of the licensed inventions (hop-picking
machines and surround sound, respectively) after the expiration of
the applicable last-to-expire U.S. patent. The most reasonable
interpretation of Brulotte, therefore, is that "[i]t is not the time of
payment, but the time of the use to which the payment is properly
allocated, which should be determinative."
upon the extent of the licensee's use of the invention in the period following expiration of
the last relevant patent.").
238. Id. at 309-10.

239. A pair of rulings of a New York district court provides further support for the
conclusion that a post-expiration payment obligation for pre-expiration patent use is
lawful. These so-called "stock on hand" cases involved the royalty obligation of a patent
licensee that manufactured a product under the licensed patent during its term, but did not
sell the product until after the patent expired. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novamont
Corp., 532 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (SGK); Forbo-Giubiascov. Congoleum Corp.,
1985 WL 1827 (S.D.N.Y., 1985) (Forbo). The District Court of the Southern District of
New York that decided these cases held that a licensee must honor its obligation to pay
royalties on the sale of products following the expiration of the licensed patent on the
theory that such payments were for pre-expiration use of the licensed patent in the
manufacture of the products sold. In SGK, the court noted that relieving the licensee of

its obligation to pay post-patent expiration royalties would permit "a licensee anticipating
a patent's expiration ...[to] freely produce vast quantities of... [the product] prior to the
expiration of that patent, but wait until after the expiration date for sale, and thereby
avoid payment for material produced during the period of the patent's validity, pursuant
to the license agreement." Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novarnont Corp., 532 F. Supp. 234,
236-237 (District Court S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Forbo, the court evaluated essentially the same
fact pattern as in SGK and rejected the licensee's claim that the SGK holding should not

be followed since it violated the Supreme Court's decision in Brulotte. The court held that
there was no violation of Brulotte in obligating a licensee to pay post-expiration royalties
on products manufactured prior to patent expiration. According to the court:
In the case at hand . . . [licensee] is not asked to pay royalties for use
of... [licensor's] patented process after the patent expiration date but only for
goods manufactured while the patents remained in effect. The stock of goods
manufactured by ...[licensee] was produced pursuant to a patented process
granted to ...[licensor] for a limited period of time. There exists no inequity in
permitting ... [licensor] to recover the benefits of its invention over the life of

the patent.
Only if ...[licensee] was obliged to pay royalties on product manufactured after
September of 1984, the time of expiration of... [licensor's] ...patent, might the

royalty provision in the . . .licensing agreement be per se unlawful. This
conclusion is not inconsistent with the concern voiced in Brulotte, that the free
market envisioned for a formerly patented product which has entered the public
domain upon the expiration of the patent not be subjected to monopoly
influences by the former patent holder .... because ...[licensee] is and has been

free to sell product without payment of royalties for all product manufactured
since September, 1984. Accordingly, we hold that .. .[licensee] is obligated to
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This conclusion is consistent with the decision in Bayer v.
Housey, in which the district court held that a post-expiration reachthrough royalty obligation on a product identified through the use of
a patented Discovery Tool was not an impermissible temporal
extension of the scope of the tool patent.24 In its decision, the court
based its ruling in part on the following interpretation of Brulotte:
In Brulotte, the Supreme Court held that patent misuse occurs
when a licensing agreement "allows royalties to be collected
which accrued after the last of the patents [has] expired."
[citing Brulotte] In the case at bar, the royalties to be paid after
the expiration of the patent are for the use of the subject
invention prior to the expiration of the patent. Royalties are
collected based on later pharmaceutical sales, but the royalties
are being accrued as the invention is practiced during the
research phase. Collecting royalties after the expiration of the
patent has expired is not per se patent misuse as plaintiffs assert.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that a patentee may
collect royalties post-expiration without violating Brulotte....
The problem arises when "the post-expiration royalties were
not for prior use but for current use, and were nothing less than
an effort by the patentee to extend the term
2 41 of his monopoly
beyond that granted by law." [citing Zenith]
Accordingly, although not binding precedent, at least one district
court decision has applied the principle of deferred payments to
conclude that a post-expiration reach-through royalty on a drug
identified through the use of a patented Discovery Tool was lawful
and did not constitute misuse under Brulotte. While the Federal
Circuit did not rule on this issue on appeal, 242 we believe that-as long
as the royalty is agreed without coercion and for the mutual
pay royalties to . . . [licensor] on all product manufactured before the date of
expiration of... [licensor's] ... patent.
Forbo-Giubiasco v. Congoleum Corp., 1985 WL 1827, *7 (S.D.N.Y., 1985) (It should be
noted that the patent involved in Forbo was a Swiss, and not a U.S. patent. The
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent misuse jurisprudence by the district court in the
case is open to question, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Microsoft v. AT&T, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007), in which the Court confirmed the limited
extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, albeit in another context. See footnote 142).
240. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,228 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2002), aff'd,
340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). For further discussion of the district court's decision in
this case and the holding of the Federal Circuit on appeal, see supra section V.C.3. and
note 195.
241. Bayer, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73.
242. Bayer, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003); See supra note 195.
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convenience of the licensor and licensee in determining the value of
the licensed patent rights-the district court came to the correct
conclusion.
Under our analysis, then, the inclusion of a non-coerced, postexpiration, reach-through royalty obligation in a Discovery Tool
patent license agreement is permissible under Brulotte and, in fact,
under patent misuse doctrine generally.
However, the royalty
obligation must be appropriately qualified. Consider the following
examples: In using a licensed Discovery Tool, a licensee generates
data and information that may provide a critical clue to the
identification of a new drug. Certainly, if the Discovery Tool is used
after the expiration of the licensed patent covering it, then it is
without doubt that any data or information generated or drug
candidates discovered cannot give rise to any royalty payments
without running afoul of Brulotte. Such a royalty would arise from
the post-expiration use of a previously patented invention (the
Discovery Tool). By contrast, consider a circumstance in which,
during the life of the tool patent, the licensee discovers a new drug
using the tool and that, once the drug product is identified, the
licensee does not re-use the enabling tool. In this case, the use is
solely within the patent term, and that "in-term" use serves its
purpose and delivers its critical value to the licensee entirely during
the patent term. That same "in-term" use also fixes the licensee's
royalty obligation, which attaches to the sale of drugs discovered
using the patented tool during the term of the licensed tool patent.
Regardless of when those royalties are ultimately paid, they are (and
indeed, under these facts, can only be) made in consideration of the
"in term" use of the tool.
Nonetheless, even if a royalty arises only from the pre-expiration
use of the licensed Discovery Tool, some may fairly argue that
Brulotte never envisioned a deferred payment of the type
contemplated in our example of "in-term" tool use. A classic
deferred payment would be an amount that accrues, and is fixed and
determined, during the life of a licensed patent, but is paid later. For
example, suppose a licensor and licensee agree upon a $100,000
license fee accruing in full upon the grant of the license, but in order
to accommodate the licensee's limited cash flow, that $100,000 fee is
payable in regular installments for a 30-year period starting from the
date that the patent issues. In this arrangement, since there is no
doubt that the $100,000 is payable solely for the use of the patent
during its statutory term, the post-expiration payments are clearly
deferred payments for prior use.
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In our example of "in-term" Discovery Tool use, however,
neither the amount nor the timing of payment is fixed and
determined at the time of the license grant or even prior to the
expiration of the licensed patent. Since future drug sales are
unknown and variable (i.e., they may be zero or significant), the
amount and timing of the royalty-which is calculated as a percentage
of those sales-is also unknown and variable. A reach-through
royalty therefore defers a payment obligation for pre-expiration use,
but that obligation is variable and contingent at the expiration of the
licensed patent. As a result, while the obligation to pay the royalty
is determined based only on the pre-expiration use of the tool, the
payment amount will vary depending on sales occurring pre- and
post-expiration. This fact raises the specter of per se misuse under
Brulotte, since, on its face, royalties are "accruing" based on postexpiration sales. However, while the royalty may vary based on postexpiration sales, that royalty is still a deferred payment for preexpiration use of the licensed Discovery Tool as long as the royalty
attaches only to drug candidates identified from the use of the
licensed tool during the life of the licensed tool patent.
Moreover, upon the expiration of the Discovery Tool patent, the
licensee may freely use the previously patented tool to identify new
drugs, and its sale of such drugs would not give rise to any payment
obligation to the tool patentee. In other words, upon expiration of
the patent, the former licensee is appropriately placed in the same
position as every other member of the public-each is entitled to
freely practice, without obligation or charge, the previously patented
tool inventions that have been contributed to the public domain.
As discussed above, a running royalty has the virtue of
representing a measure of the actual value created (in the form of
drug sales) by using the licensed Discovery Tool. And, as the Court
in Automatic Radio concluded in an analogous circumstance, since "it
would not be unlawful to agree to pay a fixed sum for the privilege to
use patents, it was not unlawful to provide a variable consideration
measured by a percentage of the licensee's sales for the same
privilege. ' , 244 One commentator has aptly posed the issue as follows:
"[d]oes it make sense to allow post-expiration patent royalty
payments if the parties merely guess at the probable success of the
243. While linking payments to post-expiration sales raises the risk that a court may
view these payments as improperly accruing after the patent expires, the fact remains that
there is no post-expiration use with respect to which those royalties accrued.
244. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 833.
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licensed product (that is to say, if they commit themselves in advance
to a predetermined total royalty pay-out), but to take the option of
post-expiration payments away from them just because they relate the
total royalty pay-out in some reasonable fashion to post-expiration
sales?", 4 Irrespective of how one answers this question, we believe
that Brulotte, if viewed as a decision where the timing of use to which
the payment is allocated is determinative, does not require such an,
arguably, economically irrational result.
Accordingly, we conclude that a non-coerced, post-expiration,
reach-through royalty obligation in the context of the license of a
Discovery Tool patent is not per se patent misuse under Brulotte, nor
even an extension of the temporal scope of the licensed tool patent,
provided that all royalty payments are based solely on the preexpiration use of the patented tool. 246 For the reasons presented
245. Louis Altman, Is There an Afterlife? The Effect of Patentor Copyright Expiration
on License Agreements, 64 J. PAT OFF. SOC'Y 297, 312 (1982).
246. Even if such a royalty is lawful in principle, is it otherwise subject to any
restrictions in terms of its implementation? Since that question is fact-based and no
jurisprudence exists on the issue, any particular implementation of a post-expiration,
reach-through royalty remains subject to risk of a finding of patent misuse. Nonetheless,
commentators have identified and in some cases evaluated several potential forms of such
a royalty, although none of these alternatives have (other than in Bayer) been endorsed by
a court. While we do not endorse a particular implementation of a reach-through royalty
obligation (nor, for that matter, any use of a reach-through royalty obligation, since it is a
decision to be made by the contracting parties), options cited by commentators have
included arrangements where, with respect to sales of drugs that are identified in the preexpiration use of the licensed tool, the royalty obligation extends past the expiration of the
licensed tool patent(s):
1.

A royalty obligation without a fixed term of years, but up to a maximum
amount of royalties that is fixed at the time of the grant of the Discovery
Tool license or otherwise during the term of the tool patent (e.g., $1 million
license fee, payable only upon drug sales, at a rate of 1% thereof); See
Altman, Is There an Afterlife?
The Effect of Patent or Copyright
Expiration on License Agreements, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
(1982). ("One might then suggest that a flat total royalty figure be agreed
on, but, in deference to the licensee's cash flow problems, it could be paid
out in installments extending over a period of, say 25 years from the date of
a patent issuance.
Presumably no court can find fault with that
arrangement solely because the pay-out period extends beyond the life of
the patent. If it is clear that the royalty is being paid only for the use of the
invention during the patent term, then the length of the pay-out period, or
the fact that it survives the patent, should be of no concern from the
standpoint of any policy underlying the patent statute. It is merely a
matter of financial strategy or convenience for the parties. See also Deehr
and Fiengold, Drafting Around Post Patent Expiration Royalties, THE
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL (2002) ("the parties might . . .
consider a more risky - but perhaps defendable - provision which sets forth
the full amount of the royalty payments due during the life of the U.S.
patent, along with an agreement by the patent holder to defer receiving a
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above in this Part V, we are of the opinion that such a royalty
arrangement is lawful.

portion of those payments until after the patent has expired. The withheld
portion of the royalties would be payable by the licensee after the patent
expires through a continuing series of payments, that include a premium
(e.g., interest) to take into account the value of the deferred payments
(which might be analogized to a loan)).
2.

A royalty obligation for a fixed term of years (e.g., 10 years from the first
commercial sale of the first drug discovered using the tool or for period
equal to the term of the patents covering the drug discovered using the
tool), without any dollar cap. See Meuller, No "Dilettante Affair":
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001) ("this Article
argues for a broadened rule of 'development use' that would permit
scientists to use certain patented research tools without prior authorization,
but require that the research tool patent owner be paid an ex post royalty
based on the ultimate commercial success of the new drugs or other
products developed through the use of the tool. This 'reach-through'
royalty approach maintains incentives for the development and patenting
of new research tools, but alleviates the access restrictions and up-front
costs currently associated with their acquisition and use.... Reach-through
royalty payments are prima facie reasonable so long as the total time
period over which they are paid is no longer than the term of the
underlying tool patent, i.e., a period of twenty years less the patent
application's pendency. . . . This Article proposes that reach-through
royalties be paid beginning with the date of the first sale of the product
developed through use of the patented tool, whenever that sale occurs, and
ending eighteen years thereafter. The recovery period of eighteen years
has been time-shifted to correspond with the period of sales of the new
product.").

3.

A royalty obligation for as long as the discovered drug is sold, without any
limit in terms of years or maximum amount of royalties payable. See
Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1990) ("[A]greements that extend royalty terms
simply are not anticompetitive. A licensee will pay a fixed amount for a
license, and the courts should not care whether the licensee pays that
amount up front, in ten years, or in a hundred years.").

These options present different methods of sharing risk and allocating return between
a tool licensor and tool licensee, and they may also present varying degrees of risk in terms
of whether a court would likely view them as a legitimate deferred payment consistent
with the ruling in Brulotte. In each of these examples, the volume of drug sales will
determine the amount of royalties, if any, to be paid. In that way, each royalty is a
mechanism for sharing the risk and rewards for the actual value generated by using the
tool patent. As long as those royalties are mutually agreed without coercion and are tied
only to sales of drugs identified using the licensed tool during the term of the patent
covering that tool, we do not believe that Brulotte nor patent misuse doctrine generally
should preclude a reach-through royalty that continues past the expiration of the licensed
patents, even if the royalty rate continues undiminished for a reasonable time under the
circumstances.

7 -MASTER REACH THROUGH RIGHTS PAPER v4 (Do NoT DELEIE)

110

E.

2/8/2009 7:42:18 AM

HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:1

Application of the Legal Standard

Having reviewed the case law on physical and temporal
extensions of patent scope, it would be instructive to apply the
Federal Circuit's analytical framework for identifying patent misuse,
described in section V.B.2. supra, to a non-coerced reach-through
royalty arrangement in the context of a Discovery Tool patent
license.
The first question to answer is whether the royalty
arrangement is one that the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically
condemned as per se illegal (e.g., a tying arrangement (as in Morton
Salt Co. 247), a coerced total sales royalty (as in Zenith241) or a postexpiration royalty for post-expiration use (as in Brulotte249 ). Applying
the reasoning of the Court in Automatic Radio in assessing a total
sales royalty, an analogous royalty obligation that also extends the
physical scope of a patent (see supra section V.C.I.a.), we conclude
that a reach-through royalty is not a tie-in. Judge Posner in Scheiber
came to the same conclusion with respect to a royalty obligation that
extends the temporal scope of a patent, 2 ' although (as we argued
above in section V.D.3. supra, relying on Brulotte as interpreted in
Zenith) the post-expiration phase of a properly qualified reachthrough royalty obligation in a Discovery Tool patent license
agreement is a deferred payment for pre-expiration use and not a
temporal extension of the patent.
Having assumed that the reach-through royalty arrangement
under consideration in this Article is non-coerced, any concern under
Zenith with respect to per se misuse as a result of conditioning is
eliminated. Moreover, because we view the post-expiration phase of
the reach-through royalty obligation as a deferred payment, such an
arrangement does not run afoul of Brulotte's prohibition of postexpiration royalties for post-expiration patent use. Accordingly, we
conclude that a reach-through royalty arrangement in the context of a
Discovery Tool patent license has not been previously condemned as
per se illegal by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The second question to answer is whether the royalty
arrangement is "specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by 35
U.S.C. § 271(d).''1 The only potentially relevant provision of 35
U.S.C. § 271(d) is subsection (d)(5), but, as noted by Judge Posner in
247. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488.
248. Zenith, 395 U.S. 100.
249. Brulotte, 379 U.S. 29.

250. Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1020-1021.
251.

Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Scheiber,2 2 the statutory limitation of a defense to infringement
provided in § 271(d)(5) is limited explicitly to tying and, as we
discussed above, a reach-through royalty obligation is not a tying
arrangement.
The next question is whether the royalty arrangement is
"reasonably within the patent grant, '' 2'1 i.e., does the licensee's
payment obligation accrue with respect to a product that falls within
the scope of the patent claims? If this question is answered in the
affirmative, the arrangement "does not have the effect of broadening
the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent
misuse. , 254 As to this inquiry, the weight of the evidence presented in
this Article suggests that a reach-through royalty arrangement does
extend the patentee's statutory rights (i.e., it is an extension of
physical scope, but not, according to our deferred payment
interpretation, an extension of temporal scope) requiring the
continuation of the patent misuse analysis.
The final question, therefore, is whether a reach-through royalty
arrangement impermissibly broadens the scope of the patent grant
with anticompetitive effect. 25 As discussed in section V.B.1. supra,
"impermissibly," in this context, means that the practice broadens the
scope of the patent claims (i.e., is an extension), has an
anticompetitive effect, and such anticompetitive effect outweighs any
procompetitive benefit of the practice, based on a rule of reason
analysis conducted through application of conventional antitrust
principles. While the exact nature of this type of analysis remains
open to some debate, the evidence presented in this Article provides
ample support for the conclusion that a reach-through royalty
arrangement in the context of a Discovery Tool patent license is
lawful (and, therefore, not patent misuse, including patent misuse in
the form of an antitrust violation) under the principles articulated in
Automatic Radio (as qualified by Zenith, distinguished by Brulotte,
and interpreted in Glen and Engel).

252. 293 F.3d at 1021 ("There just is no evidence that Congress in the 1988 amendment
[to the patent statute which resulted in 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(5)] wanted to go or did go
beyond tying. Had it wanted to, it would have chosen different words. We are not
literalists, but there must be some semantic handle on which to hang a proposed statutory
interpretation, and there is none here .... ").

253. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
254. 133 F.3d at 869.
255.
1986).

Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF, Incorp., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
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As noted above, some commentators have challenged the
Federal Circuit's analytical framework for identifying patent misuse
because it ignores the pure "extension of monopoly type" of misuse
recognized by the Supreme Court. This challenge, however, does
little to undermine the validity of our conclusion in this Part V that a
properly qualified, non-coerced, reach-through royalty arrangement
in the context of a Discovery Tool patent license is legal, since our
analysis is based upon the direct application of the principles
articulated in relevant Supreme Court precedent (i.e., Automatic
Radio, Zenith and Brulotte).
F.

Damages Jurisprudence

Damages jurisprudence provides another vantage point in
assessing the legality of reach-through royalties in the context of a
Discovery Tool patent license. As discussed in this section, courts
have imposed damages awards that include reach-through royalties in
a variety of decisions. 2-6 The statutory framework to patent damages
forms the basis for these decisions. Upon a finding of patent
infringement, courts are required under the Patent Act to award
"damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer.",117 As commentators have noted, "[i]f there is an
established royalty rate for patented inventions in the applicable field,
that rate is generally deemed to be the best measure of reasonable
compensation."2 '5 However, more commonly-especially in the field
of biotechnology-there is no established royalty rate for the
patented invention. In that case, the reasonable royalty is calculated
on the basis of a "hypothetical, arm's length license negotiation
between a willing licensor
and a willing licensee at the time the
' 259
infringement began. ,
256. As aptly stated by Mueller (Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 60 (2001)) and documented by Ware (Donald R. Ware, Research Tool
Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA QJ. 267 (2002)), "[r]ecent liberalization of the
Federal Circuit's damages jurisprudence provides additional support for the legitimacy of
a reach-through royalty approach."
257. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
258. Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267
(2002).
259. Id. at 281 ("In applying the hypothetical negotiation method for determining a
reasonable royalty, courts continue to cite the range of factors identified in the district
court case that first articulated the method, Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp. The overriding goal, as the court there explained, is to determine: The amount that
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Consistent with our analysis of patent misuse doctrine generally,
in this section we analyze damages jurisprudence relating both to the
imposition of damages on an object not covered by the infringed
patent (an extension of physical scope), and the imposition of a
remedy that burdens an activity after the relevant patent has expired
(a potential extension of temporal scope).
These judicial
infringement remedies are analogous to a negotiated contractual
reach-through royalty obligation in that they both reach through the
infringed patent to burden objects and actions of the infringer not
covered by the infringed patent.
We conclude that damages
jurisprudence provides further support for our conclusion that a noncoerced reach-through royalty in the context of a Discovery Tool
patent license is a legal payment arrangement.2 0

a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed
upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-who desired,
as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article
embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.").
260. No analysis of damages jurisprudence in the context of reach-through royalties is
complete without a discussion of the relationship between court-sanctioned reasonable
royalties for infringement and actual licensing practices in an industry. The relationship
with respect to the licensing of research tools is succinctly summarized by Ware (Donald
R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: JudicialRemedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 282-83 (2002)) in

the following excerpt:
How then, will courts . . .determine the amount of a reasonable royalty for
infringement of a research tool patent? And, in particular, to what extent are the
courts likely to impose reach-through royalties that extend to revenues
generated by a successful drug whose discovery, development, or production is
facilitated, at least in part, by a research tool patent?
To a great extent, the answer will turn on empirical evidence and will be driven
by the marketplace. Over time, the research institutions, molecular biology
laboratories, developmental biotech companies, and large pharmaceutical
companies will determine, through their licensing negotiations, what are
reasonable licensing terms for research tools.
If reach-through royalties become the licensing norm, then courts can be
expected to factor that into their determinations of reasonable royalty damage
awards. If reach-through royalties become the exception in the marketplace,
courts ought not to assume otherwise in the name of 'adequate' compensation.
The point is that court-sanctioned reach-through royalties are more than an
affirmation of the legality of such a royalty arrangement; they are a reflection of what is,
or could reasonably be, industry licensing practice. It is likely that the Federal Circuit's
holding in Bayer v.Housey will affect the damages awards for reasonable royalties by
courts for the infringement of Discovery Tool patents in the U.S. Those awards are
intended to fix a reasonable royalty based on a hypothetical negotiation between the
parties. Post-Bayer, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a licensee would not
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1. "Reach-Through" Damagesthat Extend the Physical Scope of the
Infringed Patent
Courts have fashioned reach-through remedies that extend the
"physical" scope of a patent in a variety of patent infringement cases.
In each of these cases, the infringer is burdened (in the form of a
required payment of damages to the holder of the patent right) with
respect to, or on the basis of, sales that (1) are either lost by the
patent holder (in computing lost profits) or made by the infringer (in
computing reasonable royalties) as a result of the alleged
infringement, and (2) include items or components, at least some of
which are not covered by the infringed patent. 261 As stated by the
Federal Circuit in King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, "[a]s long as the
patentee receives a proper economic return on its investment in the
acquisition of a patent, the [Patent] Act does not require that return
to come from the sale [or loss thereof] of patented products." '
For example, in both Minco v. Combustion Engineering623' and
Ajinomoto v. Archer-Daniels-Midland,4 the Federal Circuit affirmed
rulings of district courts that awarded reasonable royalties in the form
of reach-through royalties to patentees whose patented technologies
were infringed. In Minco, the patent holder brought an infringement
action against a competitor, alleging infringement of its patent for a
rotary furnace used to fuse minerals. Although the patent did not
cover the fused minerals themselves, the district court awarded both
lost profits and a reasonable royalty calculated on the basis of the
sales of fused silica that were not covered by the asserted patent. As
noted by the court:
The assessment of adequate damages under section 284 does
not limit the patent holder to the amount of diverted sales of a
commercial embodiment of the patented product. Rather, the
patent holder may recover for an injury caused by the
infringement if it "was or should have been reasonably
foreseeable by an infringing competitor in the relevant market,
broadly defined." Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; accord Perego, 65
F.3d at 950. In this case, the invention produced marketable
consider in that negotiation the cost of a non-U.S. development effort in a jurisdiction

where the Discovery Tool could be freely used.
261. See Central Soya Company v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ajinomoto Co.
v. Archer-Daniels-Midlands,228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
262. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

263. 95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
264. 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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fused minerals. Both CE and Minco used the invention to
compete in that market. Therefore, CE should have reasonably
foreseen that infringement of the '462 patent would harm
Minco's sales in the fused silica market. This court accordingly
upholds the
5 trial court's determination to use that measure of
damages."

In A]inomoto, the Federal Circuit affirmed a ruling of a district
court that had awarded reach-through royalties to a patentee based
on the infringement of its patented method of modifying bacterial
genetic structure in order to produce an amino acid in increased
quantities. In that case, the district court had entered a judgment for
damages assessing a royalty ($1.23 per kilogram) on the alleged
infringer's sales of an amino acid that itself was not covered by the
patentee's patent, but was made (without authorization) using the
patented method. While the appellant in Ajinomoto did not dispute
the patentee's theory of damages, 2" ' the Federal Circuit refused to
"disturb" the district court's assessment of that damages award.
Similarly, in Central Soya Company v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co.,267
the Federal Circuit awarded "reach-through" lost profits damages,
based on the sale of a product that was made, but not covered, by an
infringed process patent. In that case, the infringed patent claimed a
"method of making a food product in the form of a patty," which, in
its commercial application using pork loin, was used to make pork
loin fritters. However, the patent covered only the process for
making pork loin fritters, and not the fritters themselves.
In
upholding the damages award, the Federal Circuit rejected the
infringer's argument that an award of damages based on sales of
products (pork loin fritters) that were not covered by the plaintiff's
patents (covering only the process for making such fritters) was an
"improper extension of the rights granted under the [the process]
patent. ,16' The Federal Circuit found that such an argument confused
"the measure of damages with the issue of infringement [since the]
proper measure of damages is that amount which will compensate the
patent holder for his pecuniary loss attributable to the infringing

265. Minco, 95 F.3d at 1118.
266. See Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J.
267, 283-84 (2002) for a discussion of Ajinomoto.
267. 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
268. Id. at 1579.
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acts., 269 Finding those damages not to be clearly erroneous, the court
affirmed.
In each of these Federal Circuit cases, the court approved a
damages award based on the sale of an unpatented object (fused silica
in Minco, an amino acid in Ajinomoto, and pork loin fritters in
Central Soya) as compensation for the infringement of a patented
machine or method. These cases demonstrate that the Federal
Circuit has found that a reach-through royalty arrangement is, at least
in certain instances, both a legal and an appropriate reasonable
royalty remedy for patent infringement.
269. Id.
270. The Federal Circuit has sanctioned three additional damages theories, each of
which can be viewed as an extension of the physical scope of the patent monopoly. The
first, known as the "entire market value rule," was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Garretson v. Clark., 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884). According to the Federal
Circuit in King Instruments Corp. v. Luciano Perego and Tapematic:
[t]he 'entire market value rule' recognizes that the economic value of a patent
may be greater than the value of the sales of the patented part alone. Under this
rule, courts have allowed recovery of lost profits or a reasonable royalty based
not only on the profit from the patented part, but also on non-patented parts.
(See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12
USPQ.2d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 725,
107 L.Ed. 2d 744 (1990)).
65 F.3d 941, 950 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Such an extension is permitted, however, only upon a showing by the infringed party
"that the profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine [including the
non-patented parts], for the reason that the entire value of the whole machine, as a
marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature."
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615, 32 S.Ct. 691,
694, 56 L.Ed. 1222 (1912) (quoting Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 121, 28 L.Ed. 371, 4
Sup.Ct. Rep. 291 (1884)).
The second damages theory was articulated by the Federal Circuit in Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867, 116 S.Ct.
184, 133 L.Ed.2d 122 (1995), and again applied in King Instruments Corp. v. Luciano
Perego and Tapematic., 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995). According to the so-called Rite-Hite
damages theory, damages for an injury that results from an infringement can include
payments by the infringer (in the form of lost profits damages) as compensation for sales
lost by the patent holder of a product that competes with the infringing product but is not
covered by the infringed patent.
The third damages theory, the anticipated collateral sales rule, was sanctioned by the
Federal Circuit in Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
and subsequently in Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984). According to this rule, in determining a reasonable royalty award
for the infringement of a patent based upon a hypothetical negotiation between a willing
licensor and willing licensee, the Court can "take into account the impact of anticipated
collateral sales of an admittedly non-infringing product line on the respective bargaining
positions of the parties engaged in the theorized licensing negotiations." (Deere at 1559).
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In SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus PharmaceuticalCorp.,27' a
district court case in which the alleged infringement of a Discovery
Tool was at issue, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the patentee
and awarded damages of $18 million. This award was likely based
on a calculation of reasonable royalties on the anticipated sale of a
drug product that might be discovered through the use of the
Discovery Tool.273
As stated by Ware, the Sibia decision
demonstrates that "at least some district courts are prepared to
consider awards of reach-through royalties for infringement of
patented drug discovery tools, ' 27 4 providing further support for the
legality of this type of royalty arrangement in the context of a
Discovery Tool patent license.
2.

"Reach-Through"Damages That Burden Infringer Activity
Following the Expiration of the Infringed Patent

In each of the Federal Circuit cases described above, the damage
award was calculated for the duration of the infringement only, 2 and,
accordingly, the issue of a potential extension of the temporal scope
of the infringed patent right was not addressed. For evidence of the
courts' affirmation, in the form of sanctioned damages awards, of the
legality of at least certain types of post-patent expiration royalties,

271.

No. 96-1231-IEG(POR), 1999 WL 335544683 (S.D. Cal. 1999).

272. Note that at the appellate court level the patent on the tool was found to be
obvious and therefore invalid, resulting in reversal of the district court decision without an
evaluation of the $18 million damages award.
273. See Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents:Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J.
267 (2002). Note that in the Sibia case, the basis for the jury's $18-million "reasonable
royalty" damages award was not disclosed. However, the expert testimony and jury

instructions provided in the case (as summarized in various post-trial motions), upon
which the jury likely relied in making its damages determination, suggest that the $18-

million award was a reach-through royalty based upon the anticipated sale of a drug
product that might be discovered through the infringing use of the patented research tool
(a permissible extension of the physical scope of the patent). This is the interpretation of
the award expressed by Ware and we agree with this interpretation.
274. 30 AIPLA Q.J. at 287.
275. See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

("this court affirms the trial court's decision to permit recovery of damages for the full
period of infringement"); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland,228 F.3d 1338, 1351

(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[a]lthough we do not disturb the district court's assessment of damages
for the period before entry of judgment [of infringement], for the period after entry of
judgment ADM is entitled to raise the defense of non-infringement"); Central Soya
Company v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983) -although the
meaning of the following is somewhat less clear- ("[the trial court] awarded Central Soya
lost profits ... based on 90% of Hormel's sales of its infringing breaded pork loin fritters
[or -more accurately stated -fritters made using the infringed process.]").
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one must look to other cases. Specifically, one must consider those
cases in which courts have held that infringement of a patent before
its expiration justifies some form of post-expiration relief, whereby a
burden (either an injunction or a payment obligation) is placed on the
infringer's post-expiration activity.
Early cases demonstrating the willingness of courts to fashion
judicial remedies that place a burden on the infringer's postexpiration activities involved the infringement of patents on the
manufacture of products. In these cases, the product itself was not
covered by the infringed patent, and therefore its sale, whether before
or after the expiration of the patent, would not infringe the
manufacturing claims of the patent at issue. Rather, while the
infringement was limited to the unauthorized use of a manufacturing
apparatus 276 or of a method for making the product, 277 the judicial
remedy (which in these early cases was an injunction against the sale
of the manufactured product) burdened the infringer's activity
following the expiration of the apparatus or method patent. The
product was burdened because it was made, without authorization,
using a patented apparatus or method, and (according to the court) to
allow its free exploitation-even post-expiration-would be to allow
the infringer to reap the "fruits of a poisonous tree." As the Sixth
Circuit in Fulton v. Bishop & Babcock explained:
[I]t is fairly well settled that the patent upon an article will be
enforced by forbidding sales, after the patent expires, of
infringing articles made before the expiration .... We see no
reason why the same rule does not apply where the article has
come into existence through infringing the monopoly of
manufacture given by the process patent as well as when the
infringement has been of the monopoly of manufacture given
by the article patent. In the latter case, no violation of the
patent law comes merely from selling the article after the patent
expires; the violation is indirect; the basic reason of the result is
that the article itself came into existence in violation of law. Its
conception and birth were tainted. To permit it to be sold
[either at all or absent a damages remedy] would be to impair
the patent grant by shortening its term. (emphasis added).2

276. Motion PicturePatents v. Centaur Film, 217 F. 247 (D.N.J. 1914).
277. Fulton v. Bishop & Babcock Co., 17 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1927).
278. Id. at 1006-07.
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In another, more recent, line of cases (referred to as "accelerated
reentry" cases), 79 the courts have fashioned damages remedies to
compensate for the ability of a past infringer to reenter the market of
the patent holder at an enhanced or accelerated level (as a result of
the prior infringement) upon expiration of the relevant patent. As
the theory goes, such accelerated reentry would provide the infringer
with a competitive advantage that would be absent, but for the prior
infringement. The courts in these cases have awarded the patentee a
post-patent expiration remedy in the form of royalties or lost profits
based on the post-expiration sale by the infringer of the thenunpatented product. In Amsted Industries Incorporated v. National
Castings, Inc., 2 ° the defendant, National, infringed upon Amsted's
patent for two and one-half years prior to the expiration date, thereby
gaining "a foothold in the market for center plates [for railway freight
cars] which it would not otherwise have enjoyed had it waited until
the patent expired to begin its sales.'2' Amsted sought damages for
the infringement, including recovery based on National's sales
following the expiration of the Amsted patent to compensate for the
economic impact of National's "accelerated reentry" into the market.
National argued, in its defense, that post-expiration, accelerated
reentry damages were unlawful because they violated the rule set
forth in Brulotte. The district court rejected this argument, and
instead adopted the reasoning of BIC Leisure Products v.
2 2 that had upheld such damages, since:
Windsurfing International
Accelerated reentry damages of the type approved in BIC
Leisure are not the equivalent of a royalty which extends
beyond the expiration of the patent. In other words, reentry
damages are not based upon an assumption that the plaintiff's
statutory monopoly on the market should be extended or that
all of the defendant's post-expiration sales should be deemed
wrongful per se. What BIC Leisure allows are damages based
only upon those post-expiration sales which the defendant
would not have made but for its wrongful conduct before the
patent expired. [See 687 F. Supp. at 138.] Implicit in BIC,
therefore, is the recognition that the plaintiff has no entitlement
to damages based upon the post-expiration sales which the
defendant would have made even had it not engaged in pre279. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), and Amsted Indus. v. Nat'l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737 (N.D. Il. 1990).
280. 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737 (N.D. Il. 1990).
281. 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1752.
282. 687 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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expiration infringement. So clarified, the holding BIC Leisure
in no way conflicts with Brulotte. 3
The remedy fashioned in these accelerated reentry cases is the
judicially sanctioned equivalent of a contractually agreed-to postexpiration reach-through royalty in the context of a Discovery Tool
patent license, where the royalty is paid on the post-patent expiration
sale of a drug identified by a licensee using the tool prior to the
expiration of the tool patent. Both the judicial remedy and the
contractual royalty obligation are examples of a post-expiration
payment for pre-expiration use of a patent that do not violate the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Brulotte.
3.

Infringement Remedies Support the Legality of Reach- Through
Royalties

The judicial infringement remedies discussed in this section are
analogous to a negotiated contractual reach-through royalty in that
they both reach through a patent to burden an object not covered by
the patent and that burden can persist following the patent's
expiration. Conceptually, a damages award in the form a reachthrough royalty places the patent holder and an infringer in the same
position as that of a willing licensor and a willing licensee who elect to
enter into such a royalty arrangement by contract, ab initio. The fact
that courts have continued to fashion reach-through royalty patent
infringement remedies undermines the argument that such a payment
arrangement is an impermissible extension of the scope of a patent.
It would be unreasonable to preclude willing parties from entering
into a contractual payment arrangement ex ante in the form of a
license agreement that is the economic equivalent of a payment
obligation that a court may fashion ex post in the form of a patent
infringement remedy. While a reliance on damages jurisprudence
does not settle the question of whether a reach-through royalty
arrangement in the context of a Discovery Tool patent license is
advisable, it certainly provides additional persuasive evidence that
such an arrangement is lawful.

VI. Conclusion
In this Article, we described the class of Discovery Tools,
discussed the special contribution of these tools to the drug
development process, and provided background regarding the policy
283.

Amsted Indus. v. Nat'l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737, 1754 (N.D. I11.1990).
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debate on the patenting of research methods and tools generally. We
next discussed the district court and Federal Circuit decisions in
University of Rochester v. Searle, and defined the permissible scope of
patent protection for Discovery Tools and their use in the postRochester era. We concluded that a novel, nonobvious Discovery
Tool and its use can be the subject of valid patent claims, but claims
that reach through to cover as-of-yet-undiscovered drug products
generally fail to meet the statutory requirements under 35 U.S.C. §
112 for written description and enablement. We then argued that
valid claims to Discovery Tools and their use are enforceable against
unauthorized users, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's broad
reading in Merck v. Integra of the scope of the statutory exemption to
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), and the occasionally misapplied
common law experimental use exception. Finally, we analyzed the
legality of one form of compensation occasionally sought by
Discovery Tool inventors as consideration for the grant of a license to
the use of their patented tools: the "reach-through" royalty that is
paid on the sale of a product that is identified by a licensee using a
patented Discovery Tool, but is not itself covered by the inventor's
tool patent. In addition, we reviewed judicial remedies in patent
infringement cases that are analogous to a negotiated contractual
reach-through royalty obligation, in that the remedies reach through
the infringed patent to burden products and activities of the infringer
that are not covered by the infringed patent. We concluded that
reach-through royalty arrangements between willing licensors and
licensees are permissible under applicable U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, despite potential patent misuse challenges, and represent a
viable method by which the free market for patented Discovery Tools
may adequately reward the tool inventor.
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